quote author=7B59534E5B5963715D4F5F5457593C0 link=1219760564/45#49 date=1220113729]
SanchoPanza wrote on Aug 30
th, 2008 at 2:18pm:
Dr. Maschke You purport to be a scholar. Do you really endorse the claims made in a "for profit" book over the findings of the inspector generals report?
Sullivan's statement that Ames beat the polygraph is
not contradicted but rather
confirmed by the CIA Inspector General's report, the
unclassified summary of which states regarding his 1986 polygraph:
Quote:1986 Polygraph Examination:
At the conclusion of language training and prior to departing for Rome, Ames was required to take a routine polygraph examination on May 2, 1986. This was his first polygraph since 1976. Ames would subsequently state that he might not have made the decision to commit espionage in April of 1985 if he had known that he was going to be polygraphed the next year. Ames recalls being "very anxious and tremendously worried" when he was in formed that he was scheduled for a polygraph exam in May of 1986, one year after he had begun his espionage activity for the KGB.
Ames was tested on a series of issues having to do with unauthorized contacts with a foreign intelligence service, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and financial irresponsibility.
Ames gave consistently deceptive responses to issues related to whether he had been "pitched" (i.e. asked to work for) by a foreign intelligence service. The CIA examiner noted Ames's reaction to the "pitch" issue but apparently detected no reaction to the other counterintelligence issues covered by the test. When Ames was asked about his reaction during the session, he explained that he was indeed sensitive to the "pitch" issue because, he stated, "we know that the Soviets are out there somewhere, and we are worried about that."
Next the CIA examiner asked a follow on series of questions relating to the "pitch" issue, in order to ascertain why Ames had appeared to give a deceptive response. Ames responded that since he had worked in CIA's Soviet and Eastern Europe (SE) Division, he had been involved in pitches to potential assets. Also, he hypothesized that he might be known to the Soviets because of a recent defector. He further stated that he thought he might be reacting because he was preparing to go to Rome in July 1986, and had some concerns that he might be pitched there. From this, the polygrapher surmised that Ames had gotten his concerns off his chest, and there was nothing more to tell. Once again, the polygrapher went through the CI questions on the polygraph machine, focusing on the pitch issue. This time, the CIA examiner deemed Ames truthful and concluded the examination, characterizing Ames as "bright [and] direct." The examiner's supervisors concurred with the assessment that Ames was non-deceptive.
According to the FBI, which examined Ames's polygraph charts in June 1993, the deception indicated in Ames's response to the pitch issue in 1986 was never resolved, even though the CIA examiner passed Ames on this exam. Also in the opinion of the FBI, significant deceptive responses by Ames were detectable to questions dealing with unauthorized disclosure of classified material. No additional testing or explanations for these deceptive responses, however, were noted in Ames's polygraph file.
The IG report also indicates that Ames also passed his 1991 polygraph:
Quote:1991 Polygraph:
The derogatory information developed during Ames's background investigation also was not provided to the polygraph examiner before Ames's polygraph. The background investigation results were forwarded to the Office of Security on April 12, 1991, the same day that Ames was given his polygraph examination. According to polygraph officials, there was no requirement that background investigation information be made available to polygraphers prior to an examination.
The polygraph supervisor and the examiner were aware that there was some question about Ames's unexplained wealth, but neither recalls actually seeing the December 5, 1990 memorandum from the CIC or having the information in the memo specifically discussed with them. The polygraphers stated that they conducted a routine polygraph examination of Ames, and did not focus on financial questions other than those routinely asked of all employees during an update polygraph.
As is normal procedure, the polygrapher interviewed Ames prior to beginning the polygraph, and at that time Ames volunteered some information on his finances. He said he had money that came principally from his mother-in-law, that he owned property in Colombia, and that he had made several small, but lucrative, investments. Once the polygraph test began he was asked whether he was concealing any financial difficulties from the Agency. To this question Ames answered no, showing no signs of deception. According to CIA officials, the examiner did not ask questions during the polygraph test about the specific examples of Ames's unexplained affluence because they considered this a routine polygraph and were not advised to do any specialized questioning. CIC officials stated that they wanted Ames's polygraph to appear in every way to be routine so as not to tip Ames off to any specific concern in this area. {AMES WAS NOT HAVING ANY FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES, HE HAD PLENTY OF MONEY THE INVESTIGATORS KNEW THAT AND DIDN'T TELL THE EXAMINER}
According to the CIA IG interviews of Ames, "Ames states that if the Agency had interviewed him about his spending in the context of a reinvestigation, he would not have been terribly alarmed. In fact, he prepared himself for the possibility that he would be asked about his finances. Ames attempted to account for the cash purchase of his Arlington home by having a gift letter prepared and notarized making it appear to have been a gift from his mother in law. He states that at some point someone would learn that he had purchased the house for cash and it was reasonable to expect that someone would ask him about the source of his wealth. But no one ever did."
Ames also showed no reaction when he was asked whether he was working for a foreign intelligence service. Deception was indicated, however, when he was asked whether he was concealing contacts with foreign nationals. After several hours of testing, Ames continued to show deception in response to the question. The examiner, as was standard CIA practice, ended the test, called it incomplete, and asked Ames to return again in a few days to try to successfully complete the test.
Four days later Ames returned to finish the polygraph examination. On that day, with a different polygrapher, Ames answered all questions without any deceptive response, including the question regarding unreported contacts with a foreign national. The reaction that had occurred on the previous test was not present, according to the examiner. In fact, the examiner noted that Ames's overall level of responsiveness was down considerably from the prior test. No additional polygraph questions were asked about Ames's finances. The polygrapher concluded the test, dismissed Ames and wrote the polygraph report indicating Ames had passed the test. However, in file notes, the first examiner commented, "I don't think he is a spy, but I am not 100% convinced because of the money situation." CIA officials have recently stated that, in retrospect, the security background check on Ames should have preceded the polygraph and the polygraph examination should have been conducted after taking the results of the investigation into account.
Ames told the CIA IG investigators that he accepted his reinvestigation in 1991 as routine since he was aware that the five-year reinvestigation program "had taken hold." However, he had expected that the 1991 reinvestigation would be more direct and pointed than his 1986 test. Ames maintained that his passing the 1986 polygraph was very important to him because it gave him confidence and reduced his anxiety. Ames was still apprehensive, however, because he viewed the polygraph as "rolling the dice and so I felt that it was perfectly possible that even if I were telling the truth instead of lying I might have problems." Ames said he never received training from the KGB on how to beat the polygraph. He acknowledges, however, that the KGB advised him to "just relax, don't worry, you have nothing to fear."
In its review of the Ames polygraphs, the CIA IG report quotes several current and former polygraph examiners who stated that the Ames case should not be considered to be a polygraph "chart interpretation" problem. Rather, they say, the fundamental problem is that the 1986 and 1991 polygraph charts were invalid because the examiner in each case failed to establish a proper psychological atmosphere in the examination sessions. A former polygrapher noted that without proper preparation, a subject has no fear of detection and, without fear of detection, the subject will not necessarily demonstrate the proper physiological response. Consequently, they surmise, the Ames polygraph tests were invalid because the process was flawed by examiners who had not establish the proper psychological mind set in Ames because they were overly friendly. As a result, Ames's physiological reactions were unreliable.
The fact that Ames passed his 1991 polygraph caused the CIC investigative team to be less suspicious of him....
Clearly, Ames passed both his 1986 and 1991 CIA polygraph tests. You were mistaken when you stated he did not.
You also write:
Quote:I see nothing in your CV (Isn't your PHD in Near Eastern Studies) that would indicate that you are qualified to assess the rigor of a scientific study.
The NAS didn't even LOOK at them.
If you aren't qualified and they didn't look, neither of you are in a position to comment authoritatively on their value or lack of value
A good preliminary yardstick for assessing the rigor of a study is whether it passed the muster of peer review in a refereed scientific journal. The great majority of the American Polygraph Association's "more than 1,000 research studies available" don't meet this basic threshold. [/quote]
These finding may indicate that there was a problem with Polygraph Management, Polygraph Supervisors and even a Polygraph examiner who chose to believe AMES rather than what his charts were telling him, but I stand by my comments that he did not pass his polygraph, because the results of the test showed he was being deceptive and both of these investigative bodies that actually had access to ALL of the information and were looking to establish culpability for failure to locate and identify this traitor before he did serious damage; failed to conclude that the failure to catch this traitor was the fault of polygraph even though there were some criticisms of the CIA management, coordination, and polygraph review structures.
I'm convinced that the reason Ames wasn't caught sooner lies in our government's asinine refusal to share information with itself
This is a paragraph from DNA Technology in Forensic Science from Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Science, National Research Council
Quote:Testing methods and data need to be made available for public scrutiny. There has been a notable dearth of published research in forensic DNA testing by scientists unconnected to the companies that market the tests. In contrast with the research approach whereby new drugs and biomedical devices undergo controlled trials of safety and efficacy, forensic science has used more informal modes of evaluating new techniques. The process of peer review used to assess advances in biomedical science and technology should be used for forensic DNA technology. (Emphasis added)
There seems to be a some notable similarities here.
Sancho Panza