During the time when Aldrich Ames was polygraphed (and probably still today), the CIA was relying primarily on the Relevant/Irrelevant technique, in which the polygrapher looks for "consistent, specific, and significant" reactions to any of the relevant questions (such as, "Have you ever disclosed classified information to anyone unauthorized to receive it?"). This procedure has no scientific basis whatsoever, and large numbers of false positives are to be expected. In such a situation, being relaxed, pleasant, and appearing cooperative may be especially helpful in passing.

For more on Ames, see Aldrich Ames's CIA Polygraph Examinations. For more on the Relevant/Irrelevant technique, see The Lie Behind the Lie Detector:

https://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf

SanchoPanza wrote on Dec 30^th, 2007 at 1:39am:

 
Here is the thing

Thats all well and good but they (soviets/russians) gave him briefings that beat the ill informed polygraph agent

Discussions with my fellow employees after taking their CSP polygraphs suggest that developing a rapport with the polygraph examiner increases the probability of passing the polygraph the first time.

"The polygraph examiner was friendly and nice with me" means the subject is more likely to pass the polygraph.  But "The polygraph examiner was curt with me" means the subject will probably have to come back for additional polygraphs.

And yet it is simply a matter of time that the subject will pass a CSP polygraph, provided they are willing to take the polygraph as many times as asked and answer the relevant questions in the negative.  (I am not suggesting that the truly guilty lie on the relevant questions.  I expect such individuals to have already been weeded out by a thorough background investigation.  You cannot short circuit the background investigation process for security clearance adjudications.)

I expect our polygrapher posters will take issue with these statements, but I speak from experience.

Here is food for thought.  How many post-employment security-screening polygraphs are conducted per year over all federal agencies that require them for access to highly-classified information (intelligence community, DOE and DOD)?  I estimate about 50,000.  If the probability of a true spy among these individuals is about 1 in 10,000 (the base rate), then the polygraph should flag about five truly guilty people per year.  The American public would be informed through the news media of about five indictments for espionage each year, in which the polygraph played an indirect role in the indictment.  Yet I am not aware of any espionage indictment that was instigated by a problematic polygraph.

Regards,
Evan S

Sergeant1107 wrote on Dec 30^th, 2007 at 10:03am:


Sergeant,     Journalists are not generally the best sources about what goes on inside the nation’s alphabet agencies.

Have you read the "Unclassified Abstract of the CIA Inspector General's Report on the Aldrich H Ames Case" or  the 1994 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report "An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence", that indicated the traitor showed consistent deception in his 1986 polygraph regarding whether or not he had been asked to work for a foreign government or that a 1993 review of this polygraph by the FBI also raised concerns as to deception dealing with unauthorized disclosure of classified material?

In his 1991 polygraph where specific information regarding the traitors activities was withheld from the examiner, Deception was indicated, when he was asked whether he was concealing contacts with foreign nationals. After several hours of testing, he continued to show deception in response to the question. At a follow-up polygraph 4 days later he did in fact show no deception but the new examiner did note that his overall level of responsiveness was down considerably from the prior test. This might have been a red flag to many examiners. 

Isn't it odd that both of these investigative bodies that actually had access to ALL of the information and were looking to establish culpability for failure to locate and identify this traitor before he did serious damage; knowing that congress loves to put heads on the chopping block, (well at least anyone’s head but their own) failed to find fault with polygraph even though there were some criticisms of the management, coordination, and review structures. 

But NO, instead of looking at the whole picture and reviewing authoritative investigative information, let's just be little frogs at the bottom of a well , pick a few isolated phrases that support our position and cite this case as evidence that polygraph doesn't work based on the claims of reporters and traitors. 

Sancho Panza

Several weeks ago Sancho quoted various passages in George and Gino’s book that clearly identified sections that encourage dishonestly when seeking a position of trust. George had adamantly maintained and unambiguously asserted he did not encourage deceitfulness and asked for some substantiation. Sancho unquestionably took the time to examine the information and provided more than enough to illustrate that in the free book that George and Gino co-authored and is offered for downloading on this terrorist and child molestation support site, they encouraged the reader in a number of sections of the book to be less than candid.  You see George and Gino, it is tremendously important to be entirely honest for the duration of a polygraph examination.  Perchance, George, that is why you were incapable of passing a polygraph examination on two occasions?   Although George claimed time and again that he was actually honest on his polygraph examinations, there is no credible evidence to suggest that he was in fact absolutely honest.  Whether he was or was not truthful is inconsequential.  What is, in my estimation critical, is that he was appropriately turned down for a position of trust with the United States Government.  Anyone after having been rebuked who would throw an international temper tantrum and would then attempt to make available information to those forces that would harm and murder innocent citizens and the criminal element (murders, rapists, burglars, child molesters) so that they may pursue their desired objective is not fit for a position of trust in the federal government or law enforcement.   

Very Funny Mr. Maschke. You provide 6 names with links and claim that these are the "Other spies documented to have passed the polygraph" Just because you wrote it down somewhere doesn’t really count as “documented” proof’

The first link to Griebl links to another place on your web site (as do the others). The really funny thing about the Griebl link is that the finding of the polygraph examiner is as follows "This individual was unusually responsive on the Polygraph. His reac-{225}tions[sic] were so pronounced that it is believed they can be definitely isolated, and for this reason it is believed that the conclusions were unusually reliable. As a result, it is believed that he was deeply involved in the espionage ring and in direct contact with Dr. Pheiffer. It is not believed from the questioning that he personally took Lonkowski over the border. It is believed that his present co-operation with the F.B.I. agents is sincere up to a certain point, but that he is still withholding much information concerning his own complicity in the espionage network."
The other names all lead to YOUR OWN forum posts where you presume or imply that these spies passed their polygraph examinations with nowhere near the substantive support that I provided to you regarding the Traitor I wrote about.  

If I may AGAIN quote the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (instead of refer you back to an previously unsupported claim) "the traitor showed consistent deception in his 1986 polygraph regarding whether or not he had been asked to work for a foreign government " and regarding his 1991 polygraph "Deception was indicated, when he was asked whether he was concealing contacts with foreign nationals. After several hours of testing, he continued to show deception in response to the question."  I submit that based on that information alone, the polygraph did not fail and that the failure occurred when those persons responsible for acting on that information failed to give it proper weight. 

Unlike yourself, this committee has no reason to be either pro polygraph or anti polygraph. The only axe they had to grind was to nail the agencies, personnel, or processes responsible for the failure to catch the traitor. They had no long standing position or website to validate. They were not trying to justify why they co-wrote a book that repeatedly tells the reader it is OK to lie and deliberately conceal information as well as offering suggestions regarding ways and means to attempt conceal criminal activity. 

In other words they weren't trying desperately trying to conceal The Lie Behind The Lie Behind The Lie detector

Sancho Panza

I disagree. In the Griebl Case the FBI was given ample information that Griebel had showed deception on his examination and then failed to give it proper weight. That is evident in the record you provided. 

In the other traitor case, Investigators were again given information regarding his deceptive responses to relevant issues and again chose not to give the information proper weight. The investigators were so worried that the Traitor would find out he was under investigation that they also deliberately withheld information that would have been relevant to any examiner who was trying to determine if he was a spy. 

However you choose to characterize the document YOU provided or these official records the language is plain. Neither of these traitors beat "Polygraph" they just beat the investigators. 

Sancho Panza