herdman14,
Regarding my credentials, I'm former active duty U.S. Army interrogator and military intelligence reserve officer. You can read more about my background and how I came to my current positions regarding polygraphy here:
http://antipolygraph.org/statements/statement-003.shtml I well understand that in DoD, DOE, and no doubt elsewhere in government, once an employee has been hired and granted a security clearance, that clearance may not be revoked based on polygraph chart readings alone. But I also know from multiple sources that applicants to the CIA, NSA, FBI, U.S. Secret Service, DEA, and other agencies that require pre-employment polygraph screening may be denied employment based on polygraph results alone, even in the absence of any disqualifying admissions.
And yes, I
would like to see national security vetting depend on
thorough background investigations and record checks, and not on pseudoscience such as polygraphy. Reliance on unreliable polygraphs actually
undermines national security rather than strengthening it. The value of any admissions obtained by means of the polygraph must be weighed against the negative utility associated with relying on an inherently unreliable procedure. But security managers rarely consider this negative utility. For more in this regard, see Chapters 1 and 2 of
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. I find your suggestion that Mahle's obsevervations on CIA polygraph policy should somehow be discounted because "she is not security officer and has nothing to do with the clearance process" unpersuasive. As a recruiter, she needn't have been a security officer to have gained an understanding of CIA hiring practices, including applicant vetting, and the extent to which polygraph results are relied upon.
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Cry me a river (Read 10249 times)
