On Thursday, 4 September 2003, the U.S. Senate Energy Committee will hold an oversight hearing on the Department of Energy polygraph program. The meeting is scheduled for 10:00 A.M. in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 366. A live webcast is also scheduled.

I've used the above web form to send the Committee the following message:

Dear U.S. Senate Energy Committee members and staff:

I am a co-founder of AntiPolygraph.org, a non-profit, public interest website dedicated to exposing and ending polygraph waste fraud and abuse. I was among those invited by the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph to deliver a presentation during their series of public meetings.

As you hear testimony on the Energy Department's polygraph policy this Thursday, I hope that you will seriously consider the option of scrapping that policy altogether. The National Academy of Sciences found polygraph screening to be completely invalid, concluding that misplaced governmental faith in polygraphy poses a danger to national security objectives.

The notion, suggested by some, that polygraph screening should somehow be limited to those with access to the most sensitive information is just plain silly. The polygraph should be scrapped altogether.

Polygraph screening has never caught a spy, nor is it likely ever to do so. As Dr. Drew C. Richardson, formerly of the FBI Laboratory Division, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, even if polygraph screening had some validity (and it does not), anyone can be taught to beat this kind of test in a few minutes.

You don't have to go to spy school to learn how to beat the polygraph. This information is readily available on-line.

AntiPolygraph.org makes available a free e-book titled The Lie Behind the Lie Detector that will be helpful to you as you examine the DOE's polygraph policy. You can download it as a 1 mb PDF file here:

http://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of polygraph validity, citing sources including the NAS report.

Chapter 2, on federal polygraph policy, includes a detailed, well-referenced discussion of the DOE's polygraph policy.

Chapter 3 explains just how the polygraph procedure "works" (and doesn't), including the Test for Espionage and Sabotage format used by the DOE. Sources for this chapter include Department of Defense Polygraph Institute documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter 4 explains precisely how to pass (or beat) a polygraph examination. We made this information publicly available in order to help the truthful to protect themselves against the risk of a false positive outcome. But spies, saboteurs, and terrorists may also use this information to fool the polygraph. Although polygraph examiners typically boast that they can detect such countermeasures, no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to do so, and the available research evidence suggests that they can't.

AntiPolygraph.org has also assembled a great deal of documentation that may be useful to you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have of me.

I may be reached by e-mail to <maschke@antipolygraph.org>. My home phone number (I'm an American working in The Netherlands) is XXXXX. You can also reach me at AntiPolygraph.org's voice mail number (in the U.S.): 206-666-4271.

Sincerely,

George W. Maschke
AntiPolygraph.org

The witnesses for the hearing will be Deputy Secretary of Energy Kyle E. McSlarrow and Dr. Stephen E. Fienberg, who headed the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph. A trusted source reports that "both [Senators] Domenici and Bingaman [respectively, the Energy Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member] are hopping made over [Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's] handling of the polygraph program and his shameless rejection of the NAS report."

The following article by Environment and Energy Daily reporter Lauren Miura, cited here in full, will be of interest:

Quote:

Can't get the webcast (must be a lot of folks watching) and can't find a link to a sound feed at capitolhill.org.
But I understand through print media that McSlarrow intends to state that DOE will be reducing their reliance on polygraphs.

George

Regarding your letter to the committee; you forgot to tell them how you were wronged by the polygraph.  I think it's only fair you let them know where your agenda sprouted.

Saidme wrote on Sep 4^th, 2003 at 7:26pm:


It occurs to me, Saidme, that you might benefit from a  visit to Stephen's Guide to the Logical Fallacies.  In particular, check out Attacking the Person (argumentum ad hominem).

Please don't feel bad, though.  This most basic of logical fallacies (attacking the messenger instead of the message, in an apparent belief that doing so actually responds to and counters the opponent's argument) is far and away the most common argument technique exhibited by polygraphers on this site.  Fortunately, it's fairly obvious to even the casual observer, and I'm sure it would be obvious to the Committee, as well.

It comes down to this:  what, exactly, does the origin of George's "agenda" have to do with the accuracy of what he's saying?  You need to give a specific answer to this question in order to avoid the "ad hominem" fallacy mentioned above -- simply saying "his feelings towards the polygraph are the reason he's opposed to it" won't cut it.  They're two separate things.

Such a lack of understanding of logic does go a long way towards explaining blind faith in the polygraph...

Skeptic

Quote:


George,
I think your assessment is essentially correct.  However, this decision carries with it implicit acknowledgement of the NAS's findings, and thus carries with it some political danger.  While Domenici may call off the dogs now, the fact remains that the polygraph's "infallibility" mystique has been badly tarnished.

The biggest problem, of course, is the continuing impression that the polygraph is an effective tool "of last resort", one that evidently causes collateral damage but gets the job done when it absolutely has to be done.  This is a myth that really needs to be addressed: is it truly appropriate to treat the polygraph as the "ultimate weapon" when it comes to security?  It would seem that the DoE thinks it is, since they're keeping the use of the polygraph for the most sensitive positions.

Unfortunately, the NAS's own findings might lend credence to this belief: their conclusions could be taken to mean that being hyper-sensitive about polygraph results will catch the bad guys, even if a lot of good guys are caught, too.  If one believes it's more important to prevent bad guys from getting into positions of ultimate trust than to not falsely finger a lot of innocent people, this position can look rather attractive.

I also agree with George that proponents of the polygraph are likely hoping to take the heat off and weather this storm now, so as to expand polygraph testing in the future.  It is to be hoped that this will not happen.

Skeptic

Orolan,

The notion, suggested by Kyle McSlarrow and other polygraph proponents that a failed polygraph "test" in and of itself will not have an adverse affect upon the person "failing" the "test" is ridiculous. It's clear that McSlarrow and the DOE's counterintelligence staff are still under the delusion that polygraph screening has diagnostic value as a test of truth versus deception.

As Drew Richardson noted in a Washington Times op-ed piece published shortly after release of the NAS report:

"The jury is in and the evidence is clear and compelling. The American people should insist and our executive and legislative branches of government should ensure that the technological and sociological embarrassment we have come to know as polygraph screening should be immediately stopped. Not one more innocent applicant or employee should be falsely accused and not one more spy should be given cover through having passed a polygraph exam. The notion (as will be suggested by some in government agencies using polygraph screening) that this is just one tool among many being used to address problems is wrong and dangerous mumbo-jumbo. The results of polygraph screening examinations are either believed or they are not. If they are believed, they are acted upon and, furthermore, these actions, if based upon erroneous polygraph results, will continue to lead to the sorts of grave injury to country and citizens as previously noted."