On 22 July 2003, Senators Charles Grassley and Patrick Leahy introduced Senate Bill 1440, the "Federal Bureau of Investigation Reform Act of 2003." Title III of this bill would establish an FBI counterintelligence polygraph program.

Section 303(b)(1) directs the Attorney General, in prescribing regulations for the polygraph program, to "take into account the results of the Polygraph Review" of the Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of Sciences. But the main conclusion of that review (The Polygraph and Lie Detection, National Academies Press, 2003) is that "Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for...employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies" and that "[o]verconfidence in the polygraph--a belief in its accuracy not justified by the evidence--presents a danger to national security objectives" (p. 219, original emphasis).

As Dr. Kathryn Blackmond Laskey emphasized at the National Academy of Sciences' 8 October 2002 press conference announcing the polygraph review committee's findings, polygraph screening such as that contemplated by Senate Bill 1440 has never caught a single spy. On the other hand, spies like Karl Frantisek Koecher, Larry Wu-tai Chin, Aldrich Hazen Ames, and Ana Belen Montes all beat the polygraph. Far from enhancing national security, Title III of S.B. 1440 will undermine it.

It is ironic that Senators Grassley and Leahy should direct the Attorney General to prescribe regulations for a polygraph screening program taking into account the findings of the NAS report, when that report finds precisely that such screening programs should not be implemented! Have these Senators gone daft?

Here is the full text of Title III of S.B. 1440:

          TITLE III--FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH PROGRAM 
 
      SEC. 301. DEFINITIONS. 
 
        In this title: 
        (1) Polygraph program.--The term ``polygraph program'' 
      means the counterintelligence screening polygraph program 
      established under section 302. 
        (2) Polygraph review.--The term ``Polygraph Review'' means 
      the review of the scientific validity of the polygraph for 
      counterintelligence screening purposes conducted by the 
      Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph 
      of the National Academy of Sciences. 
 
      SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM. 
 
        Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this 
      Act, the Attorney General, in consultation with the Director 
      of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director of 
      Security of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall 
      establish a counterintelligence screening polygraph program 
      for the Federal Bureau of Investigation that consists of 
      periodic polygraph examinations of employees, or contractor 
      employees of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who are in 
      positions specified by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
      Investigation as exceptionally sensitive in order to minimize 
      the potential for unauthorized release or disclosure of 
      exceptionally sensitive information. 
 
      SEC. 303. REGULATIONS. 
 
        (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall prescribe 
      regulations for the polygraph program in accordance with 
      subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code 
      (commonly referred to as the Administrative Procedures Act). 
        (b) Considerations.--In prescribing regulations under 
      subsection (a), the Attorney General shall-- 
        (1) take into account the results of the Polygraph Review; 
      and 
        (2) include procedures for-- 
        (A) identifying and addressing false positive results of 
      polygraph examinations; 
        (B) ensuring that adverse personnel actions are not taken 
      against an individual solely by reason of the physiological 
      reaction of the individual to a question in a polygraph 
      examination, unless-- 
        (i) reasonable efforts are first made independently to 
      determine through alternative means, the veracity of the 
      response of the individual to the question; and 
        (ii) the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
      determines personally that the personnel action is justified; 
        (C) ensuring quality assurance and quality control in 
      accordance with any guidance provided by the Department of 
      Defense Polygraph Institute and the Director of Central 
      Intelligence; and 
        (D) allowing any employee or contractor who is the subject 
      of a counterintelligence screening polygraph examination 
      under the polygraph program, upon written request, to have 
      prompt access to any unclassified reports regarding an 
      examination that relates to any adverse personnel action 
      taken with respect to the individual. 
 
      SEC. 304. REPORT ON FURTHER ENHANCEMENT OF FBI PERSONNEL 
                   SECURITY PROGRAM. 
 
        (a) In General.--Not later than 9 months after the date of 
      enactment of this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
      Investigation shall submit to Congress a report setting forth 
      recommendations for any legislative action that the Director 
      considers appropriate in order to enhance the personnel 
      security program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
        (b) Polygraph Review Results.--Any recommendation under 
      subsection (a) regarding the use of polygraphs shall take 
      into account the results of the Polygraph Review.

Saidme continues to make the anti-polygraph case for us.  Evidence schmevidence!

Cmon guys, at least I said have a good weekend.

Crystal,

False accusations such as you encountered are not uncommon. You should definitely appeal the results in writing. See Chapter 5 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector for tips on how to proceed. In Chapter 3 of the same book, you'll find a detailed explanation of how polygraph operators infer truth versus deception (it's sheer quackery), and in Chapter 4 you'll find tips on how to protect yourself against a second false positive outcome.