Skeptic,

"killing off a large portion..."  ROFLMAO. True. This is yet another reason why it is much more harmful for current employees.  False positives have very real consequences to many innocent loyal employees.  OTOH, screening of prospective employees is seen as less damaging.

The need for secrecy is a hysteretic phenomina. So long as the polygraph is seen as more effective if the public is deceived about it's effectiveness, the secrecy is continued.  Were secrecy to be dropped presumable the polygraph, in all it's applications, would become a lot less effective. Perhaps that is why they are fighting so hard to maintain the illusion. Still, that horse is in the process of exiting the barn.

-Marty

Marty wrote on Oct 9^th, 2002 at 12:03am:


Marty,

One of this website's objectives is to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded polygraphy. Any educated person who gets on the Internet to research polygraphy is now likely to quickly find information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures. And there's nothing the polygraph community can do to stop it.

I agree, both that they have the right to look into past drug use and that it's a rather stupid exercise.  You can't always expect governments to act rationally. They tend to take on public fads and fears.

My point about the NAS report was that it was condemning the drug history questions usefulness more than the polygraph's value.  I gather from NAS's argument that were the polygraph 100% effective they would object even more. They have a point, it's just not particularly related to the polygraph's accuracy in that example.

-Marty

Who's lying?!

From the NAS/NRC polygraph report (graciously transcribed by Skeptic):

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From the polygraph committee's 17 October 2001 public meeting:

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Perhaps the classification level of these supposed countermeasure studies was raised from secret to keep them away from the National Academy of Sciences?

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Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.......... gosh they're nice and straight now.

Former CIA and DOE counterintelligence boss Ed Curran, who brought greatly expanded reliance on polygraph screening to both organizations, has once again shown that intelligence is not necessarily a prerequisite for rising to the highest levels of the counterintelligence community.

The following is an excerpt from Shankar Vedantam's article " Can Polygraphs Detect Spies?" in today's (9 Oct. 2002) Washington Post:

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Mr. Curran didn't even have a clue that the scientists who conducted the National Academy of Sciences research review were not themselves subject to being polygraphed! (Or perhaps he thinks of scientists as interchangeable parts, like nuts and bolts?)

I just started to read this website after two unsucessful attempts to pass the FBI pre-employment screening polygraph test.  My first one was inconclusive and my second one came back "not withing acceptable parameters."  I am appealing the decision via certified return receipt mail.  I realize the chance of appeal is slim to none but this will begin the process of clearing any "suspicions" which might be cast upon my integrity.  I have never read this site until yesterday. During my second polygraph, the operator was almost ranting and raving on how I must confess to visiting such websites because of my polygraph results.  Now I finally know what he was talking about concerning "countermeasures."   I also stayed very calm and told the truth.  I now know why my examiner was so angry with me, it was all a show and I did not "confess" to any of his allegations.  Needless to say, ignorance is not bliss.  When my appeal is over, I will describe my ordeal in detail.  I am also a federal law enforcement officer.

My point of my first log-in.  After digesting many pages of the NAS report, one aspect strikes me very clearly.  If problems are encountered during the polygraph process, IT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED.  No conclusions of guilt or negative employment decisions should be base only on polygraph interpretation.  I have read in the papers about the polygraph being part of a "total fabric of security" which also includes intensive background checks.  If I am so suspicious and untrustworthy, why am I still in my present sensitive position in the Department of Justice.  I am in my position because I have passed three intensive background checks in both the Department of Defense and Department of Justice.  I am reinvestigated every five years.  I have always performed with the highest sense of integrity and I am well respected by my peers.  I invite the FBI to do their intensive investigation and see if I live up to my billing.  Unfortunately, I will never be given the chance because I am considered to be part of the acceptable "friendly fire" losses because "no better choice is available."  Why not do what they used to do before 1994?   Trust in a good old fashion hard nosed background investigation.   I am the same person I was before the test.  I am now going to be very interested in the uses of polygraph in the future.  I cannot condemn all polygraph for there are aspects represented in the report that leave specific uses possible with more research to measure their usefulness.  I just concur that if it is going to be used as a "pre-screening tool", any discrepencies should be investigated and adjudicated one way or another, not just throw away the applicant because it is too much bother or money.  The applicant's integrity is also being thrown away without any method of appeal under current policies.  I look forward to educating myself on the polygraph now.  I intentionally did not read anything about it before my interviews so I could honestly state that I did not research it.  I was still accused anyway.  If I am asked during the appeal, I will truthfully state that I have researched and not hide in the closet.  I know that I will be kissing my employment opportunity good-bye by at what price do I start to sell my soul?  I am used to doing the right thing, even if it is hard and cost me money or opportunity.  I do not have any bad feelings toward the FBI, just a little disappointment in the system.  I have a great job and I will be retiring in ten years under federal law enforcement retirement.  I will never regret applying because at least I tried to join the system to improve it.  I hope to help improve the system so that my children can enjoy a different type of application process should they want to apply to the FBI or any government agency in the future.

P.S.  No one in our organization is required to pass a lie detector for employment.  We have our fair share of people who do wrong things.  As we investigate their failings, it has been the conclusion that a polygraph would not have prevented or foreseen their problems. Many of those problems are found during background reinvestigations which occur on a regular basis.  Our organization also has a tremendous amount of loyal, ethical, and trustworthy individuals who I trust with my life everyday.  We are proud to serve the American public without much fanfare.

Fair Chance wrote on Oct 10^th, 2002 at 1:20am:


First, do not take the accusations during interrogation personally. Examiners are rated on their confession rate which is one of the few things that are at all reliable about the polygraph. And yes, for applicants to new positions they tolerate and rationalize a high false positive rate. It's too bad the process is so abusive. Thank you for your sevice in the DOJ though.

=Marty