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George,

I agree on one of your points and disagree on another.  As far as DI outcomes, I believe that based on the high percentage of post-test admissions, I can put a high level of confidence on the validity of the DI cases.  However, I must admit that since the true base rate of NDI subjects in screening cases is not known, it is entirely possible that some false negative (FN)  subjects are getting by.  

PDD-Fed

George,

You asked...

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Gee George, I don't know.  I have never calculated that.  I just know that the vast majority of the time I run a DI test, the subject confesses to the specific area he/she was DI to.  I then send him/her on their way and test the next person.  I decided long ago to leave the calculations to you "scientific" types... 8)

PDD-Fed
 

Public Servant,

(area #5 (final)):

You write:


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Yes, as you report, I did previously generally disclose my financial relationship with Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc (BFLI).  Specifically, I am an employee and a minor stockholder.  I did this, not because of any conflict I might have in regard to my critical commentary of various aspects of polygraphy (particularly polygraph screening), but because as a spokesperson for BFLI, I want those who might read my thoughts regarding brain fingerprinting (e.g., posts #1 -#4) to evaluate this information knowledgeably and critically, fully aware of any potential conflict of interest I might have as a result of my present professional association.  Although I had several opportunities for differing types of employment following my Bureau career, I chose to do what I am now doing in part because I believe very strongly in the technology and services we are and will provide and also because I believe that as I criticize, I have a responsibility to help develop and offer what I believe to be a positive and valid alternative approach to some of the problems facing us.

With regard to my criticism of various aspects of polygraphy in light of my connection to an alternative technology, I feel not only justified but also compelled to continue these criticisms and related activities.  My rationale is as follows:  

1.      My criticisms predate (and have been consistently made) my financial interest in an alternative technology by  approximately a decade.

2.       My severest criticisms on this site and elsewhere have been reserved for general polygraph screening.  This is an application that brain fingerprinting is not designed for nor will be used for, in concert with or as a replacement for current polygraph procedures.

3.      It could well be argued that criticizing polygraph techniques is neither in either my personal nor BFLI’s direct financial interest.  The large government agencies that have polygraph screening programs might well be less inclined to support brain fingerprinting research and operational practice as a result of my critical commentary of  their existing practices and  programs.  AND

4.      The PRINCIPAL REASON  that I have publicly and loudly voiced these criticisms is that I am completely convinced that the nation’s security is compromised through present polygraph screening practices and that thousands of individuals have been victimized in the wake of these programs over the decade I have voiced these concerns. I believe my views are fairly adequately summarized in a post I recently made in another thread:

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Regards,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant wrote on Aug 16^th, 2002 at 5:12am:


P.S.,
To my mind, the two are not mutually exclusive.  One may certainly promote forms of recognition testing (useful in conjuction with decent police work, and with built-in protections for the innocent) while, at the same time, acknowledging the glaring, dangerous and harmful flaws with current polygraph screening practices--and trying to ameliorate them.

Basically, it all comes down to protecting our society through due process and scientifically valid testing.

Skeptic

Drew and Skeptic,

I believe I was unclear in my last post.  I meant to commend Drew for his constructive pursuits in improving/ replacing existing investigative technology and techniques.  While I disagree with much of his criticism of the polygraph and feel the advocation of countermeasures is ethically flawed, I was commending him for actually doing something constructive.  My main criticism from the last post was directed not at Drew, but at those who seek to undermine existing technology and techniques, yet offer no suport or effort to improving available technology so it meets the needs of law enforcement and national security while further reducing the chances of false positives.

Drew, you have suggested in previous posts that, as a specific issue examiner, I should join you in calliing for the end to screening exams.  First of all, I am in no position to do so --far less so than Dr. Yankee was.  Secondly, my experience as a specific issue examiner tells me the exam is very effective (though I have acquiesed that as the issues get broader, more problems could arise).  Lastly, as I see it, you have not offered any alternative to the screening exam, as either investigative tool or deterrent.

Since I like to bring up ideas to evoke thoughtful discussion, here's a hypothetical to which I would love to hear Drew's response:  If Dr. Yankee's suggestion that you succeed him had come into fruition, what do you envision the path taken by DoDPI, and federal polygraph policy as whole, would have been?

Regards,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

You pose an interesting question whose answer allows for some important distinctions.  You ask me to speculate if I were (had been) Director of DoDPI what path(s) would I envision DoDPI and the federal polygraph community might have taken.  You couch your question in a brief anecdotal story I mentioned involving Dr. Bill Yankee.  Let me answer by beginning with another featuring another well known former DoDPI employee (former Chief of Research) and occasional contributor to this message board, Dr. Gordon Barland.

The first time I met Gordon was in the mid 1980s at what I believe was then called an Advanced Polygraph Seminar.  This was a month long school, then hosted by the FBI and held at the University of Virginia at its main campus in Charlottesville, Virginia.  During that month, Gordon taught a weeklong block of instruction of psychophysiology to mid-career federal polygraph examiners.  I attended his presentation and amongst other things recall a portion of Gordon's final comments to the class.  After having been  highly complemented by one of the students regarding his teaching and subject matter knowledge, Gordon, with the rather appealing dry sense of humor and self deprecating wit that I would see many times in subsequent years, indicated that "In the valley of the blind the one-eyed man is king."  At the time I merely thought his comment to be a rather clever quick-witted response and an appropriately modest one.  Only sometime later would I consider the comment a bit more figuratively.  The valley of the blind has in years gone by come to represent to me the lack of education within one of Gordon's main valleys, the world of polygraphy.

And now back to your question.  Although I suspect you would have expected me to answer focusing on the abolishment of polygraph screening and the considerably greater use of information-based formats with specific-issue testing (clearly things I would not object to ), I think I would have been more than happy to have seen the groundwork laid for the badly needed enhancement of basic scientific education for polygraph examiners.  That enhancement would not and could not have come solely or even largely through DoDPI resources (personnel and facilities), but through the very simple but sorely needed changes in the matriculation requirements for the basic examiner course.  Because I have discussed this topic at length within other posts and specifically with regard to what I believe is necessary, I won't restate the particulars.  That particular change though, I believe, is foundational to all other meaningful change(s) that might occur and any new paths that might be undertaken.

And this leads us to one final related topic.  Perhaps I can do a favor for those at DoDPI who might not expect one and who, for obvious political considerations, are unable to openly address the issue themselves.  When I last had association with DoDPI, its Director, Dr. Bill Yankee had no less desire to see these basic educational changes than I did or do now.  The problem in attaining these goals was in no way Bill Yankee’s lack of desire or with DoDPI’s personnel (instructional staff), but that DoDPI was not sufficiently the master of its own fate.  The federal polygraph community, acting through its various program heads, both in terms of this community's formal review of DoDPI's curriculum and through the educational background of the student's sent by its  individual agencies for basic training, all but undermined any effort to make serious educational enhancements.  Although Dr. Yankee had hoped curriculum review would be performed by those with the background for such review (i.e., the celebrated academic review panel he assembled), that never really came to fruition, and as far as I know, has completely gone by the wayside in subsequent years.  That led to (from my perspective) a very untenable and unworkable situation largely blocking any real progress and almost guaranteeing maintenance of the status quo for another generation of polygraph examiners.  I don’t pretend to know if that interaction (DoDPI Director/Staff and the operational program heads of the federal agency polygraph programs) remains, but until it changes and the tail is no longer wagging the dog in the world of polygraph academics, little would have or will change.  The awarding of unearned degrees and even the real enhancement of DoDPI staff credentials will not suffice for  and eliminate the need for the aforementioned change in professional entry level requirements for polygraph examiners.

In fairness to the heads of the federal polygraph programs, I should acknowledge that they are (in part) absolutely no more able to determine the background of employees they send to DoDPI for basic examiner training than is DoDPI able to determine whom they receive.  This of course is due to the overall hiring practices of the federal agencies themselves.  I would suggest two possible alternatives to remedy this ongoing problem.   

When I was hired by the FBI as a Special Agent, it was within the scope of what was then referred to as the "Science Program."  I was hired with the notion that I would eventually work, following an initial field investigative assignment, as a forensic chemist and agent examiner in the FBI Laboratory.  As the Bureau would not consider having someone representing it as a forensic chemist who did not have a background in chemistry, I suggest that likewise any agency/bureau that has individuals acting as "forensic psychophysiologists" not do so without requisite background in psychophysiology (and that a program be created in order to fulfill this specialty hiring need).  In order to handle the immediate lack of (what I consider to be) well qualified candidates for basic polygraph examiner training, I would suggest that DoDPI require remedial training/education (what would amount to at least a full load semester of basic psychology, physiology, statistics, research design) that would be both rigorously taught and whose successful completion be requisite for matriculation into basic examiner training.  DoDPI could likely be staffed to teach such a program itself or to evaluate certification from recognized major universities with psychology, physiology, and statistics departments that might be contracted to offer such remedial education.

And finally to answer your question…  Although I don’t feel myself to be lacking in either vision or clearly defined goals, because of the structure that existed at the time, I would surmise very little would have changed due to any involvement I might have had.  In other words, I don’t believe the Director of DoDPI had the needed authority that should properly accompany the serious responsibilities that he is tasked with.  I hope this situation has or will be remedied and that someone of Dr. Yankee’s capabilities and vision will ultimately occupy the position.

Public Servant,

As always, thank you for your latest reply.  Needless to say, my response to your treatise would be likewise lengthy, so I will try to break down that response by subject and largely in the order in which you presented various issues.

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If I have in any way suggested to you that I would support the continuation of general polygraph (applicant and employee) screening examinations under the guise of "research is ongoing", I have been more unclear and arcane than I previously thought possible.  Under no circumstances would I suggest citizens continue to be victimized while DoDPI (or anyone else) plays in a laboratory with these fishing expeditions.  These tests are completely without any theoretical support and should be immediately  stopped.  Once this has been done, a serious debate should take place as to what is in the interest of national security (not the same as in the interest of national security programs).  

Should further research be merited (very doubtful at this point) dealing with a process which completely lacks (and holds no particular promise for) any theoretical basis as a diagnostic tool, that research should likely be done by a group other than DoDPI (an entity which has way too heavily depended upon the existence and continuation of polygraph screening over the years to be considered sufficiently non-biased to lead such research).  Any research performed should be considered ONLY after having been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Again, first things first though...Present polygraph screening programs should immediately be stopped.  If I accomplish nothing else through this exchange, I hope that I have eliminated any confusion I might have created with regard to my position on this last point...

Regards,

Drew Richardson