Skeptic,

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I certainly agree with you when it comes to encryption.  However, psychological tests are a different matter.  Most psychological tests, be they personality tests such as the MMPI-2 or forensic tests, were developed on populations of naive test takers.  Once the tests have been developed, attempts are made to safeguard against those trying to fake good or otherwise manipulate or invalidate them.  The MMPI-2, for example, contains a Lie scale and a Frequency scale, among others, to alert the examiner to such attempts.  

But if someone were to purchase the test booklets, scoring protocols, and analysis books; if they knew which questions belong to which scales and how they are answered in the normal or deviant manner; if they were to plan what type of profile they wish to project and studied sufficiently well, then the psychologist's task at determining their true psychological profile would be more difficult.  This is why the psychological community tries to prevent the dissemination of that type of information to the potential test takers.

Is the information classified?  No; certainly not by the Government.  But it just common sense that to disseminate that type of information to the test taker is not in society's best interest.  Hence, the efforts of the psychological community to restrict the information to the scientific community.  

Please don't misinterpret what I'm saying.  Obviously the tests undergo extensive validation testing, studies are conducted to determine how naive and not-so-naive subjects attempt to manipulate the results, articles are published, textbooks are written, and the information is generally in the public domain.  Nonetheless, many psychological tests assume that the average person taking the test is relatively naive about the details of the test and precisely how it is interpreted.  To the extent that assumption is not met, the validity of the test may decrease.

Does it mean that if the person taking the test were extremely knowledgeable, he'd be able to mislead the psychologist?  I would think it would shift the odds, but would not guarantee success.  A lot would depend upon the forensic psycholgist's skill at administering and evaluating the test, his knowledge of the case facts, his knowledge of the subject's background, and his clinical impression of the subject himself, and his interviewing skills.  

I haven't touched upon the ethics of teaching someone how to manipulate a forensic test.

Peace,

Gordon

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Your defense of the polygraph here might be better helped if you were to bring intellectual honesty, critical thought, and reasoned argument to the debate, rather than dodging the substantive questions put to you.

Batman,

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No problem, Bat...and don't worry about any fingerprints you may have left--no evidence you were ever there to begin with...

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No argument with you, Bat, but appears the great Beech is only half right...I think he missed the psychosis...   

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You have, of course, subtly changed the subject with the above.  We were talking about security screening proceedures, and in order to make your point, you have now widened the scope to general psychological testing.

While I'll not dispute that widespread dissemination of information regarding the MMPI-2 does serve to compromise the test, you've ironically hurt your own case with the anology.  Aside from individuals and corporations that have financial interest in using the MMPI-2 for employment screening, most psychologists I'm aware of consider such purposes an abuse of the test.  It wasn't designed for employment or security screening, nor has it been validated for such.  Further, its proper use involves it being only one facet of a thorough psychological profile and assessment.  Thus, I believe your analogy to polygraphy is a better one than you intended.   

An important distinction, Oof course, is that anyone who wants to read up on the validity and theory behind the MMPI-2 can easily do so, through the peer-reviewed psychological literature.  Can you claim the same for R/I testing?  If so, would you care to point us to references?

Skepti

Skeptic,

I'm sorry if I misunderstood you.  I thought you were talking about the polygraph generally.  On several occasions George has raised the issue of whether any accepted forensic test can in any way depend upon secrecy for its effectiveness.  I had that in mind when I brought up psychological tests.  I was thinking of forensic applications of tests (both psychological and polygraphic), not security screening.  The point I was intending to make is that both the CQT and many psychological tests were originally designed for use with relatively naive subjects.

I presume that the validity of both the CQT and a number of forensic psychological tests would be inversely proportional to the subject's knowledge of the tests' construction, what items belong to which scales, the scoring systems, etc., and directly proportional to the examiners' knowledgeability, experience, and skill in detecting countermeasures, access to collateral and background information, etc.

Peace,

Gordon

Gordon,

You write:

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Foreign intelligence services' knowledge of polygraph technology and procedures is not dependent upon any cooperative agreement with the U.S. Government, or arrangements with U.S. polygraph schools. A great deal of information has been published about polygraphy, and that open source information is available not only to friends and allies, or countries that pose no realistic threat to the U.S., but to any government or organization. (And polygraph instruments can be readily obtained, despite U.S. export controls.)

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Gordon, every article you've ever written for Polygraph is also readily accessed by any intelligence agency in the world. The American Polygraph Association has recently made it cheaper and easier by making the first 30 volumes available on CD-ROM.

I haven't asked you to cooperate in an endeavor to present foreign intelligence services with "knowledge of our security screening programs and procedures and how to circumvent them." I've asked you general questions related to the scientific basis for CQT and R/I polygraphy. I don't see any legitimate security concern that would prevent you from addressing, for example, the following questions (which you've thus far dodged):

• ...if you would use the relevant/irrelevant format with sophisticated subjects (i.e., those who understand the polygraph procedure), then on what scientific basis do you expect to be able to distinguish truth from deception using this (thoroughly discredited) technique? For the informed, truthful subject who heeds your advice and does not employ countermeasures but instead admits to his/her knowledge of the trickery on which "control" question "test" polygraphy depends, the promise of being treated to a relevant/ irrelevant "test" instead is hardly reassuring.
• Can anyone in the polygraph community cite any peer-reviewed study whatsoever indicating that the Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I) technique works any better than a coin flip, a Magic 8-Ball, or a ouija board (i.e., chance)?!
• Is it your position that the Relevant/Irrelevant polygraph technique is a "forensic test?" If so, perhaps you could provide us with other examples of forensic tests whose validity (like that of the R/I "test") is completely unsupported by any peer-reviewed research whatsoever?
• Perhaps you could also tell us what the sensitivity and specificity of the R/I "test" is for the detection of deception? If you can't, then perhaps you could give us examples of other forensic tests that have unknown sensitivity and specificity?

There is no national security concern that prevents you from addressing these questions, Gordon. I think it is intellectually dishonest of you to suggest that such is the case. It is increasingly apparent that the reason you won't substantively address these questions is that the answers would cause embarrassment to you and the polygraph community.

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What has changed since Weir wrote -- and Ansley published -- articles detailing the polygraph screening procedure then in use by the NSA? That information became immediately available to anyone who cared to peruse Polygraph, including the intelligence services of Cold War adversaries. Has information about the R/I technique (and even its theoretical basis) become more sensitive now that the Cold War is over?

In a sense, perhaps it has. Nowadays, the polygraph community seems to be much more concerned about the American people learning about polygraphy than it ever was about foreign intelligence services learning about it.

Gordon, you say that polygraph testing "evolves." With regard to the Relevant/Irrelevant screening "test," it appears that any "evolution" has occurred in the absence of any new federal research. The Defense Security Service's answer to a Freedom of Information Act request I filed for all DoDPI information on the Relevant/Irrelevant screening "test" indicates that DoDPI has done no research whatsoever on this technique. (See the message thread DSS Withholds R/I Screening Documentation.)

Gordon, forgive me if your final question was merely a rhetorical one. I'm going to address it. You asked, "Do you think that just because some details were published more than a quarter century ago, the Government ought to keep you (and hence every intelligence service worldwide) updated on every change as it occurs?"

I think that if applicants for federal employment (as well as current employees) are going to have their honesty and integrity assessed on the basis of the Relevant/Irrelevant polygraph technique (or any other polygraph technique, for that matter), and the U.S. Government is to take adverse action in whole or in part on the basis thereof (as it routinely does), then due process requires that those against whom adverse action is taken be provided access to the methodology that was used by the U.S. Government to stigmatize them, and to challenge that methodology, whether in an administrative hearing, or in a court of law.

PDD-Fed,

When I describe the Relevant/Irrelevant technique as a "thoroughly discredited" methodology, I am not quoting any individual, but summarizing what I've observed. The R/I technique is completely unsupported by any peer-reviewed research whatsoever, and to the best of my knowledge, has no defenders in the scientific community. The polygraph community itself has largely abandoned the R/I technique in favor of the CQT. John Reid and Fred Inbau exclude the R/I technique from their classic book, The Polygraph (Lie-Detector) Technique and James Allan Matte similarly excludes it from his more recent reference work, Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph. And over the past thirty years, the American Polygraph Association quarterly, Polygraph has published only a few articles on the R/I technique. (I believe they can be counted on one hand.) The most important of these articles is Raymond J. Weir's 1974 article, "In Defense of the Relevant-Irrelevant Polygraph Test" (Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 119-166). That Weir felt the need to write an apology for the R/I technique is an indication of the low regard in which it was held within the polygraph community even 28 years ago.