Visitors to this site may be interested in a letter I wrote to Commentary Magazine, published in its July issue, responding to an article entitled: "How Inept is the FBI?", by Gabriel Schoenfeld. Schoenfeld's response, where he discusses a polygraph-induced CIA debacle, is also worth reading.
Probably even more interesting is a spirited exchange between Notra Trulock and Schoenfeld on Trulock's role in the Wen Ho Lee investigation.
Here is the link. I suspect this link will only be good for the month of July.
http://www.commentarymagazine.com/letters.htm#C Here is the text of my letter:
To the Editor:
As a former FBI counterintelligence agent who—due solely to polygraph charts—was falsely accused of engaging in espionage for Israel, I found Gabriel Schoenfeld’s article to be on target. In my own case, a furious two-year investigation ended with a grudging exoneration.
Mr. Schoenfeld is one of the depressingly few writers to recognize the costly delusion of using the polygraph to protect national security. He correctly notes that traitors have defeated the device repeatedly—most recently Ana Belen Montes, who was spying for Cuba while serving as the Pentagon’s top analyst of Cuban affairs. Incredibly, one of the conditions of her plea bargain is that she submit to regular polygraph tests. Linking this back to Wen Ho Lee and Chinese espionage, there are disturbing indications, noted by the Washington Post (October 19, 2000), that the CIA spurned a potentially invaluable 1995 walk-in purporting to be a Chinese missile expert because he “failed” a polygraph.
Despite not having what Mr. Schoenfeld calls “a thinking man’s approach to law enforcement,” under the right conditions the FBI is capable of spectacular work born of thoroughness and determination. Where the target does not fit neatly into its investigative templates, however, or where imagination and agility are more important than thoroughness, the FBI’s stultifying bureaucracy and ossified thinking are debilitating obstacles.
Mr. Schoenfeld asks whether an indirect link exists between the blunders of the Wen Ho Lee investigation and the case of the mole Robert Hanssen. For me the issue is larger, and already answered by Mr. Schoenfeld: the organization learns nothing and forgets nothing. For example, while the Aldrich Ames case and now the Ana Belen Montes case (and others) should have demonstrated the susceptibility of the polygraph to defeat (the false-negative problem, that is, the device’s failure to recognize lies in all cases), my own experience should have demonstrated the dangers of embarking on monumentally wasteful investigations instigated by polygraph results suggesting deception (the false-positive problem, that is, the device’s failure to recognize truthful responses in all cases). Instead, in the wake of the Hanssen case the FBI has inexplicably concluded that the polygraph, which has never caught a single spy, ought to be embraced even more.
Incidentally, the original polygraph results that exculpated Wen Ho Lee were themselves re-characterized by the FBI to conform to their subsequent suspicion of his guilt. All this typifies an organization that is more prosecutorial than objective and that resists change, accountability, and critical self-evaluation.