The Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs, better known as the Webster Commission, has delivered its report to the Attorney General, and it may now be downloaded as a 1.14 MB Adobe Acrobat (PDF) file from the U.S. Department of Justice website at:
http://www.usdoj.gov/05publications/websterreport.pdf Substantive discussion of polygraph policy begins at p. 67 of the report (p. 79 of the PDF file).
The key portion, the recommendation, is as follows:
Quote:RECOMMENDATION
The FBI Should Implement A Counterintelligence Polygraph Program And Create An Infrastructure To Support The Program The FBI should continue to conduct full-scope tests on applicants and should adopt a counterintelligence test in reinvestigations of employees and non-FBI personnel with SCI
and special access clearances.This approach focuses on personnel who may pose the greatest risk to national security and minimizes the risk of false positives. [footnote 24: Our recommendations concerning polygraphy for the most part comport with changes the Bureau made following the detection of Hanssen's espionage.However,those changes are often embodied in interim or draft policy statements,which we believe should receive final approval.]
Bureau training is currently insufficient for counterintelligence testing,which requires technical skills for eliciting information,developing themes,and understanding CI issues, skills that differ from criminal or full-scope testing skills.As the Bureau moves into specific-issue CI testing, it should develop quality control and assurance programs for this discipline.
The Bureau should upgrade the technical instruments used in its polygraph program. Improved technology and computer driven systems will ease data storage and transmission
of results for Headquarters review.The systems will also permit the FBI to keep statistics and conduct audits.
Adverse personnel actions should not be taken solely on the basis of polygraph results.This judgment is consistent with current FBI policy,which establishes a procedure for reviewing examinations that produce "no opinion," inconclusive,or "deceptive" results.
That procedure appears to comport with the due-process rights that Executive Order 12968 affords federal employees who have been denied access to classified information.
The FBI should anticipate employee concerns by developing an education program to explain the polygraph's security role and alleviate concerns about "lifestyle witch hunts"
and intrusive screening.
Apparently, however, the report makes no recommendation on how the FBI might alleviate concerns about polygraphy being a pseudoscientific fraud that is without theoretical foundation and has no validity, even as it acknowledges at p. 80 that polygraphy is "not a science."
In addition, the report completely ignores the issue of polygraph countermeasures, nor does it address the significant false positive rate in the Bureau's pre-employment screening process.
Pages: 1
Webster Commission Report On-line (Read 3500 times)
