Gordon,

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On the basis of what evidence do you make this statement?

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While polygraphers may succeed in manipulating many subjects such that the truthful respond more strongly to the "control" questions and the deceptive to the relevant, the lack of standardization and control that beset CQT polygraphy prevent it from having any diagnostic value.

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CQT polygraphy most certainly is a charade, Gordon: it fundamentally depends on the polygrapher lying to and deceiving the subject throughout the procedure, as is well-documented in Chapter 3 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

Perhaps if you look closely enough, you'll see the handwriting on the wall that spells polygraphy's demise here on AntiPolygraph.org.

George,

Worthy of reply though it is, your last post is off topic for this thread.  I really want to reply to beech trees, Fred F and Mark Mallah regarding their on-topic posts, however inadequately, before I leave.

I would point out, however, that you were the first to raise the issue that belief in the polygraph is necessary.  Therefore, I would ask you what evidence you have to support your assertion (in a different thread).

Peace,

Gordon

beech trees,

I'm aware of quite a few spies and would-be spies who have been detected by routine security screening polygraph exams.  When I get the time, I would like to list them all.  Until then, let me point you in the direction of a major spy it detected.  This is a copy of a posting I made some time ago on a different list, so my apologies if the format is poor when copied onto this bulletin board.

The role of the polygraph in detecting Harold J. Nicholson's espionage activity is described in the FBI's affidavit in support of complaint, arrest warrant and search warrants located at:
http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/nich-aff.html.  The applicable paragraphs are:

[Beginning of extract]

The Investigation

Polygraphs

 10. On or about October 16, 1995, and October 20, 1995, NICHOLSON underwent polygraph examinations administered by CIA polygraphers as part of his routine security update. A computerized review the examination results indicated a .97 (out of 1.0) probability of deception on two questions: (1)
Are you hiding involvement with a Foreign Intelligence Service? and (2) Have you had unauthorized contact with a Foreign Intelligence Service? During one of the examinations, a CIA polygrapher deemed NICHOLSON's response "inconclusive" to the following question: "Are you concealing contact with any Foreign Nationals?"

 11. On or about December 4, 1995, NICHOLSON underwent a third polygraph examination administered by a CIA polygrapher. A computerized review of the examination revealed an .88 probability of deception on the following
questions: (1) Since 1990, have you had contact with a Foreign Intelligence Service that you are trying to hide from the CIA? and (2) Are you trying to hide any contact with a Foreign Intelligence Service since 1990? The CIA examiner noted that NICHOLSON appeared to be trying to manipulate the test by taking deep breaths on the control questions, which stopped after a verbal warning.

 12. By reviewing CIA records and NICHOLSON's frequent flyer records and financial records from 1994 through early 1996, the FBI uncovered a pattern of twice yearly foreign travel, followed by unexplained deposits and payments to NICHOLSON's accounts.

[End of extract.  My comment follows.]

From this, it would appear that the polygraph provided the first evidence of his espionage, and that an full investigation started as a result of the polygraph outcomes.

Peace.

Gordon

Gordon,

Your information about Nicholson is incorrect.  CIA Director Deutch was asked directly whether suspicion fell on Nicholson because of the polygraph, and he hedged quite a bit.  That suggests to me that it was not the polygraph that caught him (since he did not affirm that it did when given the opportunity), but some other source he did not want to reveal.  Maybe a recruitment or defector  

I don't have his quote available with me now, but I will attempt to dig it up.  Apologies in advance because I lost the newspaper source in which it appeared.  I imagine it can be tracked down.

Also, nothing in the FBI affidavit indicates whether the polygraph confirmed or first uncovered Nicholson's activities.  I think your suggestion that it first uncovered his activities is completely unsupported by the section you included.

Gordon,

I agree that there is some complexity to the analysis, but it is not entirely subjective.  Certainly we know that the polygraph has done grave harm in the form of Ames, Chin, Montes, and CIA intelligence operations in Cuba (even before Montes).  This is certainly a high pile of garbage.  All of it can't be blamed on the polygraph, but some of it can.  It is going to take a lot of construction work to erect a benefits pile that reaches higher than that.  So far I have not seen them, nor have you really detailed any.


Do you have any supporting data on these security violations?  My experience and assessment is that examiners with "deceptive" charts want to validate them in any way possible with a confession at best, but they'll take a damaging admission on security, even if they have to manufacture one.  And I can tell you this: there is nary a soul in the intelligence community who can withstand a full-on scrutiny as to whether he or she has ever violated some security procedure at some point in their career.  For example, people talk to their spouses.  Even the most scrupulous inadvertently reveal things that a foreign intelligence service might find of some valule.  These and other security related peccadillos happen all the time in hundreds of innocuous ways.


While the information of policy makers may be more complete (if they take advantage of their access), their analysis is heavily politicized.  Theirs is not a dispassionate analysis, nor can scientific integrity simply defer to their judgment.

As a general comment, I am troubled by what I see as you hiding behind claims of national security, protecting classified information, et al.  As George has pointed out more eloquently than I'm about to do right now, a scientific technique that shies away from peer reviewed scrutiny and critique can't claim to have much scientific integrity.  "Trust us, it works, and we have the supporting data but can't tell you" does not pass scientific muster, even if its concerns are legitimate.

Also troubling is that it strikes a decidedly anti-democratic tone.  Where's the accountability?  Are we to rely on the word of a small group of people who claim that their machine detects lies and protects national security, but when pressed for further elaboration, claim that they can't reveal it on national security grounds, we just have to believe them.  This is dark.  

Thank you for participating in this discussion.

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Mr. Mallah has already questioned the validity of your proof. I would have to add a healthy degree of doubt as well. There is no indication when the 'computerized review' took place on Mr. Nicholson's polygraph test. I will contact the Special Agent who's sworn affadavit you quote in order to ascertain when the review took place. In the meantime, at least one investigative journalist also bolsters the assertion that you are wrong on whether or not a polygraph exam caught Mr. Nicholson. Susan McCarthy writes in part:

Spies Aldrich Ames and Harold J. Nicholson passed routine CIA polygraph exams. In fact, it's not clear that any spies have ever been caught by polygraph testing. "It's inconceivable that [a spy] won't know how to beat the test," Lykken says. "So the spy won't be caught, and a few innocent people will have their careers ruined, and the secretary of energy will say that we did everything we could. I think it's a scandal."

The complete article is here.

I look forward to other cases you cite that demonstrate a failed polygraph was the precursor to rooting out a spy.

Gordon,

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It would be more correct to say that I am not aware of the existence of any screening measure that is capable of catching (detecting) spies at better than chance levels. This is not to say that no screening measure has any utility in making personnel security determinations. Certainly, such measures as financial record checks, criminal records checks, background investigations, and yes, polygraph interrogations (in the form of admissions obtained from naive subjects who don't understand that polygraphy is a fraud) have some utility.

Your initial characterization of my position regarding polygraphy was more to the point: "If I understand your position correctly, you believe that the polygraph is counterproductive to the national security  because spies can so easily be trained to beat it, it gives a false sense of security to security personnel, and it causes too many false positives."

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Whether polygraphy depends on a subject's belief in it is germane to the discussion at hand. My understanding of CQT theory is that the expectation that the truthful will respond more strongly to the "control" questions and the deceptive to the relevant questions depends on the subject's belief that deception will be detected, and that the "stim test" is used to reinforce that belief.

In any event, it has been argued that the main utility of polygraph screening is the admissions obtained therefrom. For example, former CIA and DOE counterintelligence chief Edward J. Curran, explaining on the CBS 60 Minutes II segment "Final Exam" what good the polygraph is, after acknowledging that it is not scientific, stated:

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It seems logical to suppose that the subject who doesn't believe in the lie detector will be less likely to make damaging admissions/confessions than the subject who does.

Perhaps if you ever get around to addressing the questions raised in the message thread Theory of CQT-Polygraphy (Attn: Gordon Barland), which you've shrugged of for nearly a year, you could provide a theoretical explanation for why belief in the polygraph does not affect accuracy.

You also stated:

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To what extent does our advice damage the national security? I think you confuse the vested interests of the federal polygraph community with the national interest. It seems to me that public information about countermeasures can only "damage" the national security to the extent that national security officials place any reliance on the pseudoscience of polygraphy. We've documented some of the damage done to national security by this misplaced reliance in Chapter 2 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. I think that far from damaging national security, our publicly pointing out that the polygraph emperor is naked will ultimately strengthen it.