If I may add how about a more comprehensive background investigation?  I couldn't agree with George more that if one is proficient in their application of countermeasures that it will be counterproductive to the national security.

Gordon,

I'm not aware that any screening measure exists that is capable of catching spies, and it's high time the U.S. Government stopped pretending to have found such a method in the polygraph.

Because CQT polygraphy has no validity and is easily beaten through the use of countermeasures, and because it is likely to misdirect investigative resources by wrongly casting suspicion on the innocent, counterespionage efforts would be enhanced by scrapping the polygraph.

What do you mean by today's reality.  Unless I'm misunderstanding, background investigations have been around for a long time and will continue to do so.  Please let me know if I'm misunderstanding anything.

George,

I'm glad to see you don't think background investigations are very effective at catching spies.  We agree on that point.

My point is that a number of spies and would-be spies HAVE been detected by the polygraph.  The polygraph's failures at doing so are widely trumpeted; its successes are largely unsung.  

I believe that the polygraph is the single most effective screening procedure for catching spies.

Peace,

Gordon

Quote:


I'd like to learn more about these cases, ones in which spies have been caught with the polygraph. Would you mind posting any that you feel are demonstrative? Thank you,

bt

George,

You said 
Quote:


    I agree that most major spies we've caught were turned in by somebody from a foreign intelligence.  But, as you know, it is extremely difficult to recruit anybody in a foreign intelligence service (FIS).  As with our own intelligence services, the vast majority of such people are loyal to their country, hard working, security conscious, and dedicated patriots.  

    Most American intelligence personnel who became spies after the 1960s were not recruited by an FIS; they volunteered their services to the other side.  Same thing with the vast bulk of FIS personnel who gave us information about who our spies were: they were not recruited through our efforts, they volunteered their services, usually by defecting.

    As such, counting upon FIS personnel to tell us who our spies are is reactive, not proactive.  It's not good security policy to sit back and pray for a defector.

Peace,

Gordon

Gordon,

As they say in medicine:  First, do no harm.

By allowing spies to go undetected while ravaging the lives of innocent people, and lulling us into a false state of security, the polygraph most certainly inflicts harm.  Even without introducing another screening technique, elimination of the polygraph will improve national security.  Just like a doctor who discontinues prescribing medication whose side-effects exceed in harm the disease being treated.

Please also not the distinction between defectors and recruitments.  Recruiting a foreign intelligence officer or someone "in place" to provide valuable information is not a passive exercise.  Neither, for that matter, is encouraging and facilitating defections.  Nor should we exclusively rely on those channels.  They are, however, far more powerful and successful than polygraphs in uncovering spies.