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L72cueak
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Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Mar 6th, 2002 at 6:45pm
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You gentlemen have quoted people and declared they have “lied” and have gone as far as to admonish them.  It is clear that your publication is not written in a fair and balanced manner and you have lied in your publication in an attempt to solidify your opinion that countermeasures can’t be detected effectively.  For instance, you said:  

“Indeed, in it’s 30-year history, Polygraph, the quarterly publication of the APA, has not published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures”. (Page 135, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, 2nd edition).

The statement is a LIE and is misleading.  In an article published in Polygraph, 1999, 28 (2), titled, “A Case Study in PDD Countermeasures” (London & Krapohl), London clearly described not only how s/he detected counter-measures but how s/he employed counter-coutermeasures to confirm his/her suspicions.  The examinee then confessed he engaged in countermeasures (cheated).  London & Krapohl’s article clearly explained how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures.

You also stated, “Had he not made the admission he would have passed.”  

This also is a LIE and is misleading.  Most examiners are prohibited from rendering a No Deception Indicated or Deception Indicated opinion if suspected countermeasures were employed.  If suspected countermeasures were employed (either confirmed via admission or not) most examiners will not report that the examinee “passed” the exam.
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #1 - Mar 6th, 2002 at 11:28pm
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L72cueak,

Thank you for sharing your criticisms, which are welcome. We bear in mind Benjamin Franklin's admonition that our critics are our friends, for they show us our faults.

You write:

Quote:
You gentlemen have quoted people and declared they have "lied" and have gone as far as to admonish them.


Actually, I think in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector we've only made reference to one person having lied, namely David M. Renzelman, who is the chief of the Department of Energy's polygraph program. The lie in question, which relates to his publicly stated rationale for directed-lie "control" questions, is documented at p. 35 and is explained in greater detail in my article, "The Lying Game: National Security and the Test for Espionage and Sabotage."

When you speak of admonishment, I suppose you're referring to my admonishment of Mr. Renzelman in my recent post, DOE Polygraph Chief David M. Renzelman Caught in a Lie. This post involves a different public lie, and is also well-documented.

If you dispute that Mr. Renzelman lied in either instance, please explain.

With regard to the American Polygraph Association quarterly Polygraph not having ever published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (see p. 136, not 135), in the article by London & Krapohl you cite, no methodology is presented beyond a vague suggestion in the article conclusion that a relatively large reaction to a single "control" question and lack of "habituation" over several chart presentations may trigger suspicion.

For the benefit of readers without ready access to the article in question, here is how London describes his "detection" of the subject's ("John's") countermeasures in the main body of the article:

Quote:
Following the pretest, John sat quietly in the chair as the sensors were placed on him. On the first chart, John's breathing appeared to be slow, but not uncharacteristic of other subjects tested in the past. There were no notable responses until the examiner asked the first comparison question (CQ) (3C6) [reference to illustration deleted]. The cardiograph and electrodermal tracings started moving upward and the response appeared normal. As the pens continued rising beyond that expected of a normal response, London became concerned about its authenticity. There may be no scientific explanation for the sense that something was wrong, other than the response was simply out of proportion with the general trend of other responses. London continued presenting the test questions, and when asked the next CQ, (C9) [reference to illustration deleted] there was no response. This seemed odd because if John's psychological set was truly on the comparison questions, where was the response to C9?

From the beginning of Chart II, [reference to illustration deleted] examiner London watched John closely to see if he was doing anything to help create responses. John did not appear to move, and there were no indications that he was manipulating his responses. When he was asked 3C6, the response looked like a mirror image of 3C6 on Chart I. Now there were two identical responses to the same question 3C6 [reference to illustration deleted] and different from any other question on the test. London suspected that John was creating the responses but needed more evidence. On Chart III, [reference to illustration deleted] John reacted again to 3C6 with the same intensity and appearance as on Chart I and II. It was clear now that John was practicing Cms, but still there was no sign of any movement. London wondered how long John would keep manufacturing a response at 3C6, so it was asked again on Chart III. Once more John created a response similar to the previous ones on 3C6.

Considering the evidence, London confronted John on purposely using Cms during testing. Since it was still unclear how he produced the Cms, London decided to use a direct approach without mentioning terms associated with Cms, or trying to guess what he was actually doing. John would be looking for an interrogation weakness and certainly take advantage of any vague accusations. After removing the sensors, London sat down in a chair next to him.

"John, I know what you are doing," London said firmly. John paused silently and then began his denials with poor verbal responses and behaviors often associated with deception. London used a host of logical themes while avoiding any reference to a specific Cm. After a while, John admitted he used a combination of Cms by biting his tongue and contracting his sphincter muscle each time he was asked 3C6.


If you see in London & Krapohl's article any methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please explain it, and please be specific.

If London & Krapohl meant to present a methodology for detecting countermeasures, and not just a case study (as their title, "A Case Study in PDD Countermeasures" suggests), then perhaps they would care to accept Drew Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge.

You raise a good point with regard to our statement, "Had he not made the admission he would have passed."  The subject would have passed based on numerical scoring of his charts, but the polygrapher might have countermanded that based on his unverified suspicion that the subject had employed countermeasures. In the message thread Countermeasure considerations for the innocent, Gordon Barland mentioned that federal polygraphers may be at liberty to render an opinion that a subject has employed countermeasures in the absence of an admission. I think that some clarification of this point is in order for the 3rd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, and I thank you for calling it to our attention.

Please don't hesitate to mention anything else in the book or on this website that you think is false, misleading, or otherwise unfair.
« Last Edit: Mar 7th, 2002 at 1:17am by George W. Maschke »  

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L72cueak
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #2 - Mar 7th, 2002 at 6:13am
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Sir,

You also challenged Dr. Barland’s integrity by saying, “Dr. Barland forgot to mention…” (pg. 138)  Dr. Barland did not say that because doing so would have been a false statement – admissions are not needed to render an opinion that tracings have been manipulated.  I do not support your position that Mr. Renzelman lied, nor am I saying that he did not.  My point was that I thought it only fair to point out the fact that you gentlemen have engaged in the same type of behavior that you accused Mr. Renzlemen and others in the polygraph community of (providing false and misleading information).

In your response you said: “If you see in London & Krapohl's article any methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please explain it, and please be specific”.
 
On page 131 in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, you described cardio countermeasures.  You suggested that a person should “constrict your anal sphincter muscle…” in an attempt to enhance your cardio response to the “control” question.    

The problem with your advice is the examinee has no way of knowing when they’ve reached the “pronounced sub-maximal” level.  The reason they can’t determine the “pronounced sub-maximal” level is because they have no way of knowing how pronounced their responses were to the other questions on tests (relevant questions, irrelevant questions, etc.)  When they’ve exceeded the “pronounced but sub-maximal” level it draws an examiner’s attention to that response as having been manufactured and an examiner will suspect countermeasures.  

“John” obviously exceeded the “pronounced sub-maximal” level which attracted London’s attention.  Obviously, London then engaged in some “methodology” which further solidified his suspicion.  The methodology was pointed out very clearly in the article.  

1)      London suspected “John” manufactured some of his reactions on the “control” questions.
2)      He compared the suspicious response on 3C6 to the other questions on “John’s” chart and concluded they looked manufactured because they were out of proportion.
3)      London engaged in counter-countermeasures by changing the position of 3C6 which confirmed his suspicion.

In your response to my post you also said, “The subject would have passed based on numerical scoring of his charts.”  Again Sir, that statement is false.  To illustrate my point, if an examinee coughed, sneezed, moved his fingers, flexed his arm or moved his legs, that would produce an artifact on the chart.  If the artifact appeared in a scoreable spot, that spot would not be scored – because it contained an artifact.  Engaging in the “anal pucker” (a movement just like those mentioned above) produces an artifact as well.  Therefore, that scoreable spot and/or the entire chart would not be suitable for numerical scoring.  Being that it was not suitable for numerical scoring there is no way one could arrive at a conclusion that the person “passed”.  

An admission is not needed from an examinee to render an opinion that the examinee engaged in suspected countermeasures.  To illustrate my point, the “anal pucker” produces artifacts (as in “John’s” case).  Moving the fingers that the EDA plates are attached to produces artifacts as well.  When those fingers are moved it causes the tracing to leave the screen of the computer at a very sharp angle.  The examiner does not have to “see” the examinee’s finger move to say that the tracing contained an artifact.  The examiner also does not need to obtain an admission from the examinee to say the tracing contained an artifact.  If an examiner does not need an admission to render an opinion that the EDA tracing contained an artifact – why would he need an admission to some form of countermeasure that produced artifacts as well?    

When people engage in countermeasures they are cheating – plain and simple.  It is no different than a person trying to cheat their way through a drug test or cheating their way through some type of written examination.  If I was an adjudicator in a hiring process and a person cheated on any of the various examinations I would conclude that the person obviously cannot be trusted.  

Perhaps you will acknowledge now that there was in fact at least one published article in Polygraph which “explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures”.  Surely you must understand there is a reason why there was only "one" article that has been "published."  If the U.S. Government developed counter-coutermeasures to some espionage method, I suspect there would not be many published articles describing the methodology.  Also, you should retract your statement that numerical scoring of the charts would have resulted in a “passed” call.  It is inappropriate to numerically score charts that contain suspected countermeasures - therefore, there is nothing to countermand.  The only thing that can be done is report to the adjudicator that the examinee cheated on the test.

Respectfully,

   





  
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George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #3 - Mar 7th, 2002 at 10:59am
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L72cueak,

You write:

Quote:
You also challenged Dr. Barland’s integrity by saying, "Dr. Barland forgot to mention…" (pg. 138)


Yes. We are suggesting that Dr. Barland attempted to mislead scientists and engineers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory into believing that DoDPI had developed some better-than-chance method for detecting polygraph countermeasures.

You also write:

Quote:
"John" obviously exceeded the "pronounced sub-maximal" level which attracted London's attention.  Obviously, London then engaged in some "methodology" which further solidified his suspicion.  The methodology was pointed out very clearly in the article. 

1)      London suspected "John" manufactured some of his reactions on the "control" questions.
2)      He compared the suspicious response on 3C6 to the other questions on "John's" chart and concluded they looked manufactured because they were out of proportion.
3)      London engaged in counter-countermeasures by changing the position of 3C6 which confirmed his suspicion.



The only thing that "confirmed" London's suspicion is John's admission that he used countermeasures. As for the rest, we have hunches, suspicions, and a subjective judgment that a response is "out of proportion," all of which might well have been set aside absent the confirmatory admission. This is no methodology for detecting countermeasures, and it doesn't seem that London & Krapohl meant to present it as such, as in their article abstract they merely write:

Quote:
The prospect of subjects using countermeasures (Cms) to alter the outcome of the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD; polygraph) examination has concerned polygraph examiners for years. This paper presents a case study of a subject who planned, practiced, and executed a combination of Cms during three different PDD screening examinations. It provides a unique learning opportunity to study the source, training, and methodology of confirmed Cms used to manipulate the PDD process, two PDD examiners, and the physiological tracings.

Keywords: case study, countermeasures


London & Krapohl don't pretend to teach counter-countermeasures in this article, and I believe it remains a fair statement that "in its 30-year history, Polygraph, the quarterly publication of the American Polygraph Association, has not published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures [as are described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector]!"

You also write:

Quote:
Engaging in the "anal pucker" (a movement just like those mentioned above) produces an artifact as well.


Where is this documented in the polygraph literature?

Quote:
When people engage in countermeasures they are cheating - plain and simple.  It is no different than a person trying to cheat their way through a drug test or cheating their way through some type of written examination.


Nonsense, my friend. Polygraph "testing" is a pseudoscientific fraud, and there is every reason for a truthful person to use countermeasures to protect himself against a false positive outcome.

Quote:
...you should retract your statement that numerical scoring of the charts would have resulted in a "passed" call.  It is inappropriate to numerically score charts that contain suspected countermeasures - therefore, there is nothing to countermand.  The only thing that can be done is report to the adjudicator that the examinee cheated on the test.


We'll take that under advisement. Perhaps London would have reported suspected countermeasures absent John's confirmatory admission, perhaps not.

In any event, I think we should clarify in the next edition that a polygrapher may report that an examinee "cheated on the test" whether or not he can prove it.

With regard to your suggestion that any counter-countermeasures methodology the U.S. Government may have developed must remain secret, I would counter that any robust counter-countermeasure cannot depend on secrecy (in the same way that robust encryption cannot rely on the algorithm being a secret). In the same way, any robust lie-detection technique cannot depend on the examinee's ignorance of how it works (as is the case with CQT polygraphy, which in any event has not been proven by peer-reviewed research to work at better than chance levels under field conditions). The available evidence suggests that the U.S. Government has no reliable counter-countermeasures for the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector and that the most effective technique developed thus far is to dupe the examinee into making an admission.
« Last Edit: Mar 7th, 2002 at 12:25pm by George W. Maschke »  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #4 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 4:17am
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Sir, thank you for your reply.  Have you looked at “John’s” charts that were included with the article?  As soon as I look at that spot I doubt it’s authenticity and suspect countermeasures (CM).  I don’t need an admission to help me arrive at that conclusion.  The simple reason a CM call can be made is because the CM effort clearly exceeded the “pronounced but sub-maximal” level.  Why did it exceed that level?  Because “John” had no way of knowing what level to try and achieve.  He had no way of knowing if the pronounced level he delivered on the “control” question beat out the ones he delivered on the relevant or irrelevant questions.  You clearly advise your readers to try and achieve that level.  You go as far as to advise your readers that, “a little goes a long way.”  Why do you advise them to be cautious in their application of that technique?  Could it be that there may be consequences for people like "John" who get caught?  Perhaps you'll be fair in your next edition and advise your readers of the consequences of such behavior.  You should also tell them that they don't have to admit to it for a CM call to be made and there case may be unfavorably adjudicated as a result.  To illustrate the point, a person who trys to beat a urinalysis by adulterating his/her urine specimen with a foreign substance (bleach for instance) need not confess to the adulteration so the adjudicator can take action against him/her.  

Respectfully,  

P.S. I will address your questions in your last post when I have additional time.
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #5 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 5:30am
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L72cueak,

Thank you for your participation in this forum.

Quote:
The simple reason a CM call can be made is because the CM effort clearly exceeded the “pronounced but sub-maximal” level.


Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of “detecting” countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?

It sounds to me like “if you think the guy looks guilty and he passes with extremely high scores, he must have used countermeasures.” If this simplistic methodology is actually being employed, one would expect that a tremendous number of examinees who would otherwise be judged “truthful” by this pseudoscience are being falsely accused of employing countermeasures.
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #6 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 6:34am
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You wrote: “Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of “detecting” countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?”

No, why would one “score” charts that contain CMs.  Doing so would be as silly as trying to score a deep breath tracing or finger movement on the hand with the EDA plates.  One numerically evaluates charts to arrive at a conclusion of no deception indicated (NDI), deception indicated (DI), or No Opinion (also known as inconclusive).   

You also wrote: “It sounds to me like if you think the guy looks guilty and he passes with extremely high scores, he must have used countermeasures.”

I don’t know how many times I have to repeat myself gentlemen, but if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?  Your website has assisted the polygraph community greatly in detecting the CMs you have written about and has brought us to that point of not scoring them.  I wonder if you gentlemen could post portions of the charts in question on your web site?  Let the public see what happened when “John” tried the “anal pucker” CM referenced in your publication.  One does not need an objective scoring system to see that “John’s” response exceeded the level you advise people to try and achieve, they only need to apply some common sense.  I’ll ask you the same thing I asked the other gentleman: Why do you advise your readers to be cautious in their application of the “anal pucker” CM and advise them to deliver a “pronounced but sub-maximal” level?  Also, how does one know that s/he has delivered a level that is greater than the response given on the relevant questions?    


  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #7 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 7:04am
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Why not take the challenge? You will go a long way towards proving your point if you did.
  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #8 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 7:11am
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Thank you for the offer Sir; however, I am not in a position to participate in such a challenge.
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #9 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 2:14pm
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L72cueak,

I look forward to hearing from you where it is documented in the polygraph literature that "engaging in the 'anal pucker'...produces an artifact..."


In the meantime, let me address the questions you've put to me and to Gino.

First, you asked if I've looked at the polygraph charts included with London & Krapohl's article. Yes, I have.

You also asked why we advise our readers to be cautious in the application of the anal pucker. This proviso is based largely on anecdotal evidence we've received that submaximal effort is adequate to produce a significant response on the cardio (and perhaps electrodermal) channels. It seems prudent to do no more than is necessary.

You also ask, "Could it be that there may be consequences for people like 'John' who get caught?" We don't know whether applying maximal effort on an anal sphincter contraction would increase the chances of the polygrapher accusing the subject of attempted countermeasures, but it seems plausible that it might. In any event, we're not aware of any published research indicating that polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better than chance levels, and the available research (see the two studies by Honts et al. referenced in the bibliography) suggests that such countermeasures can be effective and that even experienced polygraphers cannot detect them.

You admonish us to "be fair in [our] next edition and advise [our] readers of the consequences of such behavior." Again, we're aware of no research suggesting any correlation between a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures and actual countermeasure use. What we can say in fairness is that federal polygraphers may report that a subject has employed countermeasures absent any admission from the examinee, as Gordon Barland explained in the message thread, Countermeasure considerations for the innocent.

In reply to Gino's questions, "Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?" you replied, "No, why would one "score" charts that contain CMs?"

Is your "no" in response to both of Gino's questions? That is, no, you don't know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures and no, you don't know of any studies indicating that this method works better than chance? If so, then it seems that the method of countermeasures detection you have in mind amounts to little more than "I know them when I see them."

And you also asked Gino, "I don't know how many times I have to repeat myself gentlemen, but if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" Again, you've given us no reason to believe that you (or the polygraph community at large) have any reliable methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in our book. What you're really saying is not "if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" but rather, "if one suspects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" In your lexicon it seems that suspected countermeasures = detected countermeasures.

You also asked Gino, "how does one know that s/he has delivered a level that is greater than the response given on the relevant questions?" One doesn't (though one can avoid creating a pneumo response when answering the relevant questions, which aren't quite so frightening once one understands "the lie behind the lie detector"). As we've noted elsewhere, we have made information on polygraph countermeasures available  to assist truthful people who wish to protect themselves against the risk of a false positive outcome, not to help liars beat the system.

You suggested that we post portions of the charts from the London & Krapohl article and "let the public see what happened when 'John' tried the 'anal pucker' CM referenced in [our] publication." I think posting low resolution scans for discussion purposes here constitutes fair use, and I'm happy to oblige.

It should be borne in mind that London & Krapohl report, "When a ["control" question] was asked, John slowly bit down on his tongue and/or tightened his sphincter muscle." We don't know which one or combination was applied with regard to any one asking of the "control" question. It should also be borne in mind that this case study, with n being equal to one, has zero statistical significance.

The first four graphics show the 1st and 2nd chart presentations, and the last four show the 3rd.

















Edited on 15 October 2014 to make links to images use HTTPS.
« Last Edit: Oct 15th, 2014 at 10:05am by George W. Maschke »  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #10 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 10:02pm
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I asked you why you advised your readers to be cautious in the application of the ‘anal pucker’ by advising them to try to do it at a level that produces a ‘pronounced sub-maximal level?

You said: “This proviso is based largely on anecdotal evidence we've received that submaximal effort is adequate to produce a significant response on the cardio (and perhaps electrodermal) channels. It seems prudent to do no more than is necessary.”

pru·dent   Pronunciation Key  (pr d nt)
adj.
1.      Wise in handling practical matters; exercising good judgment or common sense.
2.      Careful in regard to one's own interests; provident.
3.      Careful about one's conduct; circumspect.

Why would one have to worry about being ‘prudent’ if the ‘anal pucker’ is so effective?  If the polygraph community can’t reliably detect CMs, why worry about being prudent?  What is there to be careful about?   
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #11 - Mar 8th, 2002 at 10:38pm
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Thank you for posting the charts in question.  Please direct your attention to Figure 3 (chart 3) and compare the responses to question 3C6 to the rest of the questions on that chart.  Then compare those same two responses to those on charts 1 & 2 (Figures 1 & 2).  If you would like an 'objective' way to make the comparison, take a measuring device and measure the amplitudes of the EDA tracing on 3C6 (Figure 3) and compare it to the amplitudes of the EDA tracings of 3C6, figures 1 & 2.  Do you agree or disagree that the amplitude on 3C6, figure 3, is significantly different than all the other questions on the charts?  It should not be too difficult to arrive at the correct answer since the EDA response on 3C6, figure 3, completely exceeded the top portion of the chart.  'John' delivered a 'pronounced' level - that is for sure!  However, 'John' failed to produce a 'little that goes a long way.'  By the way, where is is documented in the literature that a 'little" will go a long way? 

Gentlemen, I agree that everyone that employs CMs is not going to get caught.  If your publication is to be fair and balanced you should at least be able to acknowledge that everyone that employs CMs will not pass their exam either. 

You should also be able to acknowledge that if suspected CMs were employed, most examiners will not 'score' the charts and WILL NOT say they "passed.'

You listed the following quote in a letter to the Seretary of Defense: 

    "If a problem has no solution, it may not be a
    problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped
    with over time." (Shimon Perez)

Cms are obviously a problem for the polygraph community; however, they are being coped with.  'John's' case is just one of many 'real world' examples of how they are being dealt with.  I'm sure the Gov't will not disclose the amount of CM cases detected, but you sir also can't produce and 'real world' evidence that CM help people in their effort to beat the system.

Respectfully,

  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #12 - Mar 9th, 2002 at 12:35am
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Please correct me if I am wrong,  or take the time to enlighten me further on this topic:

Isn't the main reason that John's polygrapher suspected him of using countermeasures because he made the mistake of using countermeasures on only one of the control questions (the same control question on multiple exams), rather than employing them on all control questions? 

Quote:
From the beginning of Chart II, [reference to illustration deleted] examiner London watched John closely to see if he was doing anything to help create responses. John did not appear to move, and there were no indications that he was manipulating his responses. When he was asked 3C6, the response looked like a mirror image of 3C6 on Chart I. Now there were two identical responses to the same question 3C6 [reference to illustration deleted] and different from any other question on the test. London suspected that John was creating the responses but needed more evidence. On Chart III, [reference to illustration deleted] John reacted again to 3C6 with the same intensity and appearance as on Chart I and II. It was clear now that John was practicing Cms, but still there was no sign of any movement. London wondered how long John would keep manufacturing a response at 3C6, so it was asked again on Chart III. Once more John created a response similar to the previous ones on 3C6.
 


And since he only used countermeaures on one of the questions,  his responses looked suspicious because they were totally unproportional in comparison to his reactions on the other control questions?

So,  if John were to have employed the biting tongue/anal pucker technique on ALL control questions,  (as The Lie Behind the Lie Detector suggests to do) rather than just on ONE chosen control question,  the examiner would have no suspicions based on the fact that his heightened reactions on the controls would be uniform throughout the exam?

Am I missing something here? On to something here?

I could easily understand how a polygrapher would become suspicious if there was a tremedous reaction to only one control question throughout the test--a reaction that seems to be totally unproportional.  But,  if the examinee reacts tremendously to all the control questions (resulting from the use of countermeasures),  doesn't the examiner just have to take it as being that the person reacts with levels of that magnitude? 

Are there "reaction magnitude" standards that can be applied to all people, uniformly throughout (for example,  no one should react in the GSR over a certain level)?  Or does each person differ (for example, the max GSR for person A can be significantly higher than max GSR reaction for person B)?


I would think that each person has a peak that they can reach on reactions based on their natural body reactions,  and that countermeasures can take each person OVER their natural reaction potential.  So if this is the case,  the natural reaction trend that is layed out on the polygraph paper will look unproportional where a countermeasure is used on one question throughout the exam (because the other control question reactions will show the persons natural stress reaction pattern,  but the single countermeasure question will appear totally unproportional to the persons natural pattern).

But, on the other hand,  if the individual employs the countermeasure on each and every control question, from the start to the end, and on every test,  then the examiner would have no choice but to accept it as the natural reaction of the individual to control questions (even though it was heightened by countermeasures)....?

Is anyone following me here?  Am I missing something?



  
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L72cueak
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #13 - Mar 9th, 2002 at 3:14am
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You said: “Isn't the main reason that John's polygrapher suspected him of using countermeasures because he made the mistake of using countermeasures on only one of the control questions (the same control question on multiple exams), rather than employing them on all control questions?”

No, that is not why.  The main reason was because when he did it on the last chart it was a tremendous reaction compared to what he delivered when it was asked previously (see the charts that were posted).  The two tremendous responses on the last chart are not even close to being similar to the other responses he delivered to the same question on the previous charts. 

You also said, “And since he only used countermeasures on one of the questions,  his responses looked suspicious because they were totally out of proportion in comparison to his reactions on the other control questions?”

No, they were simply out of proportion to what he delivered on the SAME “control” question on previous charts. 

You also said, “So, if John were to have employed the biting tongue/anal pucker technique on ALL control questions,  (as The Lie Behind the Lie Detector suggests to do) rather than just on ONE chosen control question, the examiner would have no suspicions based on the fact that his heightened reactions on the controls would be uniform throughout the exam?”

Wrong again…look at the charts sir.  He employed CMs on 3C6 every time – only one of the questions - and he could not keep it looking the same every time.  If you read London’s article s/he wondered “how long John could keep manufacturing a response  at 3C6.”   Even a lay person can see they are out of proportion.  You may not be able to see the question marking 3C6 on the bottom of the charts.  3C6 was asked on all 3 charts.

The reason the guy got caught was because he had no way of knowing “how hard” he was employing the CM.  He can’t see the screen.  Also, the reason why he didn’t employ CMs on ALL the CQ was because he didn’t recognize all of them as CQ.  This guy practiced and practiced and practiced and was not able to pull it off.   
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #14 - Mar 9th, 2002 at 11:26am
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L72cueak,

You asked,

Quote:
Why would one have to worry about being ‘prudent’ if the ‘anal pucker’ is so effective?  If the polygraph community can’t reliably detect CMs, why worry about being prudent?  What is there to be careful about?


As I explained above, while we don't know whether applying maximal effort on an anal sphincter contraction would increase the chances of the polygrapher accusing the subject of attempted countermeasures, it seems plausible that it might.

You asked, "By the way, where is is documented in the literature that a 'little' will go a long way?" I am aware of no published references regarding this. Our suggestion that the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort is based on anecdotal evidence only.

You also opined:

Quote:
Gentlemen, I agree that everyone that employs CMs is not going to get caught.  If your publication is to be fair and balanced you should at least be able to acknowledge that everyone that employs CMs will not pass their exam either.


Of course, what you meant to write is that not everyone that employs countermeasures is going to get caught. We don't claim that everyone who employs countermeasures will "pass" their polygraph "test," but there is no reason to believe that the polygraph community has developed a better-than-chance methodology for detecting the countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, or that a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures has any correlation with actual countermeasure use.

You seem to attach a significance to London & Krapohl's case study that isn't there: it seems that for you, John's admission that he employed countermeasures validates some vaguely-defined method for detecting countermeasures. Again, with the number of subjects in this study (n) being equal to one, no statistical significance may be drawn from it.

Moreover, any counter-countermeasure approach based on case studies of subjects who admit to having employed countermeasures when challenged is liable to be tainted by confirmation bias.

You also write:

Quote:
You should also be able to acknowledge that if suspected CMs were employed, most examiners will not 'score' the charts and WILL NOT say they "passed.'


As I noted above (perhaps you missed it?):

Quote:
Again, we're aware of no research suggesting any correlation between a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures and actual countermeasure use. What we can say in fairness is that federal polygraphers may report that a subject has employed countermeasures absent any admission from the examinee, as Gordon Barland explained in the message thread, Countermeasure considerations for the innocent.


We'll be making that point clear in the next edition.

You also write:

Quote:
Cms are obviously a problem for the polygraph community; however, they are being coped with.  'John's' case is just one of many 'real world' examples of how they are being dealt with.  I'm sure the Gov't will not disclose the amount of CM cases detected, but you sir also can't produce and 'real world' evidence that CM help people in their effort to beat the system.


How is the polygraph community coping with the problem of countermeasures? It seems to me that they are doing so by pretending to have developed a reliable-but-secret method of countermeasure detection.

With regard to real world evidence that countermeasures can help deceptive persons to pass a polygraph "test," we have the example of Aldrich Ames, who twice used countermeasures to help pass CIA screening exams while spying for the Soviet Union/Russia. We also have the example of Larry Wu-tai Chin, who passed his CIA polygraph examinations while spying for China. Did he use countermeasures? Perhaps. I don't know.

CIA polygraphers were also deceived by a network of Cuban double agents who all passed their CIA polygraph interrogations. As former CIA agent Robert D. Steele writes in his article, "Creating a Smart Nation: Information Strategy, Virtual Intelligence, and Information Warfare":

Quote:
Most distressing, and typically American, has been the substitution of technology for thinking, of bodies for brains. Two examples will suffice. A simple example is found in the field of counterintelligence, where reliance on the polygraph machine ultimately has resulted in the destruction of the field of counterintelligence. Two of my classmates in the clandestine service were video-taped doing dead drops in Cuba because all of the Cuban agents had been doubled, and all of them had passed the CIA's polygraph tests.


Did these Cuban agents use countermeasures? I don't know, but it seems plausible.

In any event, we do have peer-reviewed research that suggests that countermeasures may help deceptive persons to pass a polygraph "test" and that polygraphers cannot detect these countermeasures at better-than-chance levels.

If the polygraph community would have us believe that it has some methodology for detecting countermeasures, it will have to prove it. Claims that "we know how, but we can't tell you" ring hollow.
« Last Edit: Apr 9th, 2004 at 10:49am by George W. Maschke »  

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