It is a change of subject.  You shift the burden in every discussion and still have yet to assert what the accuracy rate is for CQT polygraph under field conditions.

My assertion about squabbling over methods is not ludicrous but a well-known fact that this ideological camp supports GKT and only prescribes ill comments to CQT.

The reason CQT polygraph has not been unanimously accepted as a scientific method has nothing to do with its current accuracy rate or its scientific basis.  It has to do with the squabbling between ideological camps as to who's question format is better.

As I noted in my post of 1 April above, "No sensitivity or specificity can be determined for CQT polygraphy (an uncontrolled, unstandardized, unspecifiable procedure) based on the available peer-reviewed field research." If you disagree, could you tell us, based on peer-reviewed research conducted under field conditions, what the sensitivity and specificity of CQT polygraphy is and refer us to the standardized protocol for the CQT that was used in this research?

The reason CQT polygraph has not been unanimously accepted as a scientific method has nothing to do with its current accuracy rate or its scientific basis. It has to do with the squabbling between ideological camps as to who's question format is better.

I think it's completely absurd for you to suggest that the large majority who did not agree that CQT polygraphy is based on scientifically sound pyschological principles or theory and the overwhelming majority who agreed that the CQT can be beaten reached those opinions because of partisan loyalty to some supposed "ideological camp" that supports the GKT. Nor do I see any reason for supposing that any alleged bias on the part of Iacono and Lykken accounts for the results of their peer-reviewed survey.

Clearly, CQT polygraphy's lack of support amongst the scientific community is attributable to something more than just "squabbling between ideological camps as to who's question format is better."

In Iacono & Lykken's survey of SPR members, only 36% of respondents with an opinion answered affirmatively when asked, "Would you say that the CQT is based on scientifically sound psychological principles or theory?" And 99% of respondents with an opinion agreed with the statement, "The CQT can be beaten by augmenting one’s response to the control questions."

As Lykken notes at p. 135, none of these studies are definitive, and reliance on polygraph-induced confessions as criteria of ground truth results in overestimation of CQT accuracy, especially in detecting guilty subjects, to an unknown extent. Do you mean to suggest that these four studies are adequate for determining the sensitivity and specificity of CQT polygraphy?

 
So what? This doesn't support your laughably implausible assertion that "[t]he reason CQT polygraph has not been unanimously accepted as a scientific method has nothing to do with its current accuracy rate or its scientific basis. It has to do with the squabbling between ideological camps as to who's question format is better."

 

No, not off the top of my head. I would assume that most diagnostic tests would be validated with laboratory studies. This is not feasible with CQT polygraphy because fear of consequences is a significant variable that is generally absent in the laboratory setting.

Podlesny, J. A., & Raskin, D. C. (1978). Effectiveness of techniques and physiological measures in the detection of deception. The Society for Psychophysiological Research, Inc., 15(4), 344-359.

Control-question (CQ) and guilty-knowledge (GK) techniques for the detection of deception were studied in a mock theft context. Subjects from the local community received $5 for participation, and both guilty and innocent subjects were motivated with a $10 bonus for a truthful outcome on the polygraph examination. They were instructed to deny the theft when they were examined by experimenters who were blind with respect to their guilt or innocent. Eight physiological channels were recorded. Blind numerical field evaluations with an inconclusive zone produced 94% and 83% correct decision for two different types of CQ test and 89% correct decisions for GK tests. Control questions were more effective than guilt-complex questions, and exclusive control questions were more effective than nonexclusive control questions. Behavioral observations were relatively ineffective in differentiating guilty and innocent subjects. Quantitative analyses of the CQ and GK data revealed significant discrimination between guilty and innocent subjects with a variety of electrodermal and cardiovascular measures. The results support the conclusion that certain techniques and physiological measures can be very useful for the detection of deception in a laboratory mock-crime context.

Raskin, D. C., & Hare, R. D. (1978). Psychopathy and detection of deception in prison in a prison population. Psychophysiology, 15, 126-136.

The effectiveness of detection of deception was evaluated with a sample of 48 prisoners, half of whom were diagnosed psychopaths. Half of each group were "guilty" of taking $20 in a mock crime and half were "innocent". An examiner who had no knowledge of the guilt or innocent of each subject conducted a field-type interview followed by a control question polygraph examination. Electrodermal, respiration, and cardiovascular activity was recorded, and field (semi-objective) and quantitative evaluations of the physiological responses were made. Field evaluations by the examiner produced 88% correct, 4% wrong, and 8% inconclusives. Excluding inconclusives, there were 96% correct decisions. Using blind quantitative scoring and field evaluations, significant discrimination between "guilty" and "innocent" subjects was obtained for a variety of electrodermal, respiration, and cardiovascular measures. Psychopaths were as easily detected as nonpsychopaths, and psychopaths showed evidence of stronger electrodermal responses and heart rate decelerations. The effectiveness of control question techniques in differentiating truth and deception was demonstrated in psychopathic and nonpsychopathic criminals in a mock crime situation, and the generalizability of the results to the field situation is discussed.

What is your point? Do you mean to suggest that I'm holding CQT polygraphy to an unfairly high standard?

Again, you'll find the information provided to those surveyed cited (it's paraphrased in the journal article) at pp. 179-181 of A Tremor in the Blood. The description of the probable-lie CQT is largely cited from Raskin, a leading CQT proponent. Given the survey's high response rate, it would appear that most of those surveyed disagreed with your view that the information provided was inadequate for them to render an opinion on whether the CQT is based on scientifically sound principles or theory.

I did not lie about my drug use, i have never used them. I did not lie about selling drugs, i have never sold them. I am not nor have I ever been a member of a group whose purpose was the destruction of my country. I have never been contacted by a member of a non- U.S. government for the express purposes of selling secrets. I am most certainly not a traitor to my country and yet your beloved polygraph has branded me so. My life has been ruined by that infernal machine and for you to maintain that the polygraph has an acceptable accuracy rate makes me very angry. For my position I don't care if the damned thing is 99% accurate, which it is not, it was wrong when it labelled me a drug selling, dope using, traitor and if it screwed me I can only imagine how many countless others it has harmed. The polygraph can not and should not take the place of old fashioned investigative work, it has no place in the preemployment process of the federal government.

The accuracy of any given method is established by the "obtained" accuracy results.  If a study is accepted though peer-review, then inferences can be made about the accuracy of the method by those results.  The bias you speak of is directly dependent on the number of cases that where discriminated against because they lacked the criterion to be included.

No, J.B., I did not "once again assert Lykken's opinion." I referred to an inconvenient (for polygraph proponents) fact that Lykken has pointed out: "in Patrick & Iacono's study, only one of the 49 guilty subjects could be confirmed as guilty independently of a CQT-induced confession, and his charts were classified as inconclusive."

Your suggestion that Lykken's discussion of Patrick & Iacono's study amounts to a refutation of it is evidence that you haven't read Patrick & Iacono's study. If you had, you would know that Lykken's observations on the matter of sampling bias are entirely consistent with the conclusions drawn by Patrick & Iacono, which are implicit in the title of their article, "Validity of the control question polygraph test: The problem of sampling bias." (Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, 229-238)

Your reasoning that "when something has not been proven statistically better then [sic] a given percentage then it has been proven to be equal to or less then [sic] the specified percentage" is a logical fallacy of the argument to ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam) variety.

That something has not been proven to work better than chance does not mean that it has been proven to work no better than chance. If you cannot grasp this elementary concept, then my further debating with you the topics you proposed to discuss when you started this message thread is pointless, really.

You seem to pooh-pooh the matter of sampling bias when confessions are used as criteria for ground truth. However, I don't think there is any rational ground for ignoring it, as I've explained above in my post of 17 April. It's significant with regard to what conclusions may be reasonably drawn based on the data obtained in the studies.

sample statistic = population parameter ± bias ± sampling error
· bias is systematic and each instance tends to push the statistic away from the parameter in a specific direction
· Sampling bias 
· non probability sample 
· inadequate sampling frame that fails to cover the population 
· non-response 
· the relevant concept is generalizability 
· Measurement bias 
· response bias (question wording, context, interviewer effects, etc.) 
· the relevant concept is measurement validity (content validity, criterion validity, construct validity, etc.) 
· there is no simple indicator of bias since there are many kinds of bias that act in quite different ways 
· sampling error is random and does not push the statistic away in a specific direction 
· the standard error is an estimate of the size of the sampling error 
· a 95% confidence margin of error of ± 3 percentage points refers ONLY to sampling error, i.e., only to the error due to random sampling, all other error comes under the heading of bias 

PURPOSEFUL SAMPLING 
Purposeful sampling selects information rich cases for indepth study. Size and specific cases depend on the study purpose. 
There are about 16 different types of purposeful sampling. They are briefly described below for you to be aware of them. The details can be found in Patton(1990)Pg 169-186. 

Criterion sampling Here, you set a criteria and pick all cases that meet that criteria for example, all ladies six feet tall, all white cars, all farmers that have planted onions. This method of sampling is very strong in quality assurance. 
References

Patton, M.Q.(1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods. SAGE Publications. Newbury Park London New Delhi

With regard to Patrick & Iacono's article, you write, "I never once indicated that Lykken's view differed from that of Patrick & Iacono." Sure you did: in your post of 20 April when you wrote, "You might ask why Lykken would refute Patrick & Iacono's study when they are from the same ideological camp?"

You might ask why Lykken would refute Patrick & Iacono?s study when they are from the same ideological camp? Because the results turned out in the positive for the CQT.

   
You insist that your assertion that "when something has not been proven statistically better then [sic] a given percentage then it has been proven to be equal to or less then [sic] the specified percentage" is not a logical fallacy. I don't have the patience to take you through this step-by-step, but I suggest that you carefully consider what you wrote (which is perhaps not what you really meant).

'..contradictory claim'- "A claim is proved true if its contradictory is proved false, and vice-versa." I am saying that there is proof, found in the four studies you illustrated as support for your statement, that polygraph has been proven to work better then chance in peer-reviewed field research. By definition of this argument, my claim has been proven true and unless you can provide refuting evidence that your assertion is true then yours is false. If you could provide contrary evidence to support your assertion, then my claim would be a 'contrary claim' and not a 'logical fallacy'.

Finally, you suggest that the four peer-reviewed field studies cited in Lykken's A Tremor in the Blood show "that polygraph has been proven to work better then [sic] chance in peer-reviewed field research." Your argument seems to be essentially an argument to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam), suggesting that the results obtained in these four studies must prove CQT validity works better than chance because the articles were published in peer-reviewed journals and the accuracy rates obtained in them exceeded 50%.

For numerous reasons that we've discussed above, I disagree with this conclusion. Again, as Lykken notes at p. 135, none of these studies are definitive, and reliance on polygraph-induced confessions as criteria of ground truth results in overestimation of CQT accuracy, especially in detecting guilty subjects, to an unknown extent. In addition, chance is not necessarily 50-50.

Moreover, as Dr. Richardson eloquently explained, CQT polygraphy is completely lacking in any scientific control whatsoever, and as Professor Furedy has explained, it is also unspecifiable and is not a genuine "test." Lacking both standardization and control, CQT polygraphy can have no meaningful accuracy rate and no predictive validity.

Not all arguments from expert opinion are fallacious, and for this reason some authorities on logic have taken to labelling this fallacy as "appeal to false authority" or "argument from questionable  authority". For the same reason, I will use the traditional Latin tag "ad verecundiam" to distinguish fallacious from non-fallacious arguments from authority.

    We must often rely upon expert opinion when drawing conclusion s about technical matters where we lack the time or expertise to form an informed opinion. For instance, those of us who are not physicians usually rely upon those who are when making medical decisions, and we are not wrong to do so. There are, however, four major ways in which such arguments can go wrong:

      1. An appeal to authority may be inappropriate in a couple of ways:

         A. It is unnecessary. If a question can be answered by observation or calculation, an argument from authority is not needed. Since arguments from authority are weaker than more direct evidence, go look or figure it out for yourself.

         The renaissance rebellion against the authority of Aristotle and the Bible played an important role in the scientific revolution. Aristotle was so respected in the Middle Ages that his word was taken on empirical issues which were easily decidable by observation. The scientific revolution moved away from this over-reliance on authority towards the use of observation and experiment.

         Similarly, the Bible has been invoked as an authority on empirical or mathematical questions. A particularly amusing example is the claim that the value of pi can be determined to be 3 based on certain passages in the Old Testament. The value of pi, however, is a mathematical question which can be answered by calculation, and appeal to authority is irrelevant.

         B. It is impossible. About some issues there simply is no expert opinion, and an appeal to authority is bound to commit the next type of mistake. For example, many self-help books are written every year by self-proclaimed "experts" on matters for which there is no expertise.

      2. The "authority" cited is not an expert on the issue, that is, the person who supplies the opinion is not an expert at all, or is one, but in an unrelated area. The now-classic example is the old television commercial which began: "I'm not a doctor, but I play one on TV...." The actor then proceeded to recommend a brand of medicine.

      3. The authority is an expert, but is not disinterested. That is, the expert is biased towards one side of the issue, and his opinion is thereby untrustworthy.

         For example, suppose that a medical scientist testifies that ambient cigarette smoke does not pose a hazard to the health of non-smokers exposed to it. Suppose, further, that it turns out that the scientist is an employee of a cigarette company. Clearly, the scientist has a powerful bias in favor of the position that he is taking which calls into question his objectivity.

         There is an old saying: "A doctor who treats himself has a fool for a patient." There is also a version for attorneys: "A lawyer who defends himself has a fool for a client." Why should these be true if the doctor or lawyer is an expert on medicine or the law? The answer is that we are all biased in our own causes. A physician who tries to diagnose his own illness is more likely to make a mistake out of wishful thinking, or out of fear, than another physician would be.

      4. While the authority is an expert, his opinion is unrepresentative of expert opinion on the subject. The fact is that if one looks hard enough, it is possible to find an expert who supports virtually any position that one wishes to take. "Such is human perversity", to quote Lewis Carroll. This is a great boon for debaters, who can easily find expert opinion on their side of a question, whatever that side is, but it is confusing for those of us listening to debates and trying to form an opinion.

         Experts are human beings, after all, and human beings err, even in their area of expertise. This is one reason why it is a good idea to get a second opinion about major medical matters, and even a third if the first two disagree. While most people understand the sense behind seeking a second opinion when their life or health is at stake, they are frequently willing to accept a single, unrepresentative opinion on other matters, especially when that opinion agrees with their own bias.

         Bias (problem 3) is one source of unrepresentativeness. For instance, the opinions of cigarette company scientists tend to be unrepresentative of expert opinion on the health consequences of smoking because they are biased to minimize such consequences. For the general problem of judging the opinion of a population based upon a sample, see the Fallacy of Unrepresentative Sample.

    To sum up these points in a positive manner, before relying upon expert opinion, go through the following checklist:

       * Is this a matter which I can decide without appeal to expert opinion? If the answer is "yes", then do so. If "no", go to the next question:

       * Is this a matter upon which expert opinion is available? If not, then your opinion will be as good as anyone else's. If so, proceed to the next question:

       * Is the authority an expert on the matter? If not, then why listen? If so, go on:

       * Is the authority biased towards one side? If so, the authority may be untrustworthy. At the very least, before accepting the authority's word seek a second, unbiased opinion. That is, go to the last question:

       * Is the authority's opinion representative of expert opinion? If not, then find out what the expert consensus is and rely on that. If so, then you may rationally rely upon the authority's opinion.

    If an argument to authority cannot pass these five tests, then it commits the fallacy of Ad Verecundiam.

Resources:

       * James Bachman, "Appeal to Authority", in Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by Hans V. Hanson and Robert C. Pinto (Penn State Press, 1995), pp. 274-286.

       * Appeal to Authority, entry from philosopher Robert Todd Carroll's Skeptic's Dictionary.