In the highlight of the meeting, Dr. Richardson proposed a mock experiment to test the veracity of the polygraphers' claims. He suggested that he could train 2-3 members of the panel in polygraph countermeasures in a short time period. He then challenged the 4-5 esteemed polygraphers in the room to polygraph a number of the committee members and come up with reliable results. The polygraphers would be allowed, he said, to go into a private room and collaborate and attempt to determine who was using countermeasures using their secret techniques. He wagered that the polygraphers would be defeated, that they would be unable to detect the attempts at countermeasures better than chance, and that they would falsely accuse one or more subjects who knew nothing about countermeasures! To no one's surprise, none of the polygraphers chose to accept the challenge.
In another unsupported statement similar to Dr. Ryan's, DOE polygraph chief David Renzelman commented from the audience that all DOE polygraphers have been trained in recognizing polygraph countermeasures and that there had been a number of recent examples where a determination of "countermeasures used" was made by an examiner and a subsequent confession followed.
Note: In The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, we make it abundantly clear that the only way that polygraphers can reliably detect countermeasures is to bluff subjects into admitting their usage. This happens most often in the post-test interview.
I concur 100% that anyone making such an admission is stupid and probably not intelligent enough to employ these simple techniques anyway. I considered speaking up and adding my own comments. In particular, I wished to ask how these polygraphers can say with straight faces that they caught numerous individuals who followed our advice and then attribute behavior to the examinees that clearly runs contrary to one of our most important caveats. I decided against it, because those on the NAS panel are clearly capable of drawing this conclusion themselves. Dr. Richardson replied to Renzelman's boast with, "So then you'll take my challenge."
Clearly agitated at his card having been pulled, Renzelman angrily snapped in response "Did I interrupt you when you were speaking?" He then proceeded to continue on describing how polygraphers have an effective-but-secret "counter-countermeasures" program. He did not at any point address Dr. Richardson's challenge.
Dr. Andy Ryan once again spoke from the audience during this segment, suggesting that he believes that there is a correlation between attempts at countermeasures and other undesirable behavior.
One of the committee members responded by pointing out that those who seek federal law enforcement positions tend to be those who have pursued them their whole lives and could be expected to do nearly anything if it meant getting the job.
Note to Dr. Ryan and all the others: People practicing countermeasures are not subversive or otherwise dishonest. They are simply intelligent.
Who are these individuals? First, these are people who have researched polygraphy. I hope Dr. Ryan is not saying that the government should not hire anyone who has looked up what is involved in a polygraph "test" on the Internet. If intelligent, naturally curious people are being turned away in favor of those who believe in "trust us, we're the government..." we are all in trouble.
Second, after researching polygraphy, these individuals have come to the conclusion that polygraphy is unreliable and that they stand a substantial chance of "failing" even if they tell the truth. This is the conclusion a vast majority of intelligent researchers will come to, since the polygraph has never shown better than chance accuracy under field conditions and all the studies purporting high accuracy rates were done not by impartial scientists but by those with a vested interest in polygraphy.
Last, these people have chosen to employ simple techniques to protect themselves from a false positive outcome. I find this hardly a breach of integrity, especially since the flawed "test" depends on numerous deceptions on the part of the examiner. Dr. Richardson also noted that because of countermeasures, polygraphs have a negative, not a neutral effect on national security. He continued by stating that anyone who uses simple countermeasures to pass a counterintelligence polygraph essentially receives a five year insulation from suspicion.
Next, Dr. Richardson presented some very interesting information from an unpublished study done by DoDPI. The study apparently shows that blacks have a substantially greater chance of being falsely accused of deception by polygraphers than whites. I eventually plan to reproduce the charts that Dr. Richardson handed out and display them on this website.
Dr. Andy Ryan attempted to counter this study by noting that the study had been done using student examiners, not those who graduated from the DoDPI program.
Note: If, as Dr. Ryan implied, what we see in this study is due to examiner errors, how come the examiners are making far more errors with exams conducted on blacks? If false positives are occurring simply because of examiner errors, they should be expected to occur equally for tests on all races. In my opinion, this explanation just does not seem plausible. Speaking of DoDPI studies, during the meeting Dr. Richardson also repeated a statement that he had made publicly before. He said thatthe Department of Defense Polygraph Institute is hardly a disinterested party and has absolutely no business conducting validity studies on polygraphy. This, he said, was akin to "having big tobacco companies placed in control of lung cancer research." DoDPI research, he said, should be limited to studies testing the "effectiveness of using question #3 before question #4, etc." General studies on predictive validity, etc., should be done by impartial scientific institutes, not by those who depend on polygraphy to make a living.
Dr. Richardson's presentation closed with a segment on "Brain Fingerprinting." He turned the floor over to Dr. Larry Farwell, the pioneer of the technique. Brain Fingerprinting definitely appears to have some promise. Dr. Farwell noted that he had achieved 100% accuracy during a study identifying FBI agents from a group of non-agents. Dr. Farwell noted that it is important to remember that his techniques are not applicable to screening situations (like drug testing, etc.). Rather, they simply determine whether a certain piece of information is familiar to a certain individual. Nonetheless, this technology does appear to have significant promise in the counterintelligence arena. If specific information known only to members of a terrorist group (and not the general public) is uncovered by investigators, brain fingerprinting tests could be conducted to determine with a high degree of accuracy whether or not this information is familiar to suspects.
Dr. Larry Farwell discusses Brain Fingerprinting
Overall, Dr. Richardson's talk was extremely informative and enlightening. I look forward to hearing him speak publicly in the future once again (should he choose to do so).
Pages: 1
10/17 NAS Presentation by Dr. Drew C. Richardson (Read 19759 times)
