Dan Mangan wrote on Nov 13^th, 2019 at 1:01am:


All good questions Dan but it’s pretty obvious that old Ray here is just jumping through his ass trying to prove something that is, in the end, not provable. The polygraph is not now, nor has it ever been, accurate and reliable as a lie detector - simply because there is NO reaction that ALWAYS indicates deception. So it’s basically as simple as this – you can’t score a “lying reaction“ when there is no such thing!

Ray, you would have made for one hell of a tap-dancing act on Ted Mack's Original Amateur Hour.

By all means, continue with your apologetics. You're off to a good start.

But, we great unwashed GEICO cavemen out here in rank-and-file polygraph-operator land are on tenterhooks waiting for your plain-English explanation of how these Magic 8 Ball polygraph algorithms really work.

Or, is it all a bunch of spun-up synthetic test-tube tripe...

In any case, Ray, in your professional opinion, in the past quarter-century of the exuberant and reckless use of push-button polygraph "test"scoring, how many individuals would you (yourself) estimate have been crappity smacked over?

Hundreds? Thousands? Millions?

Please expound.

Greetings,

For those who may wish to read the whole (somewhat admittedly slightly angsty) thing, here is a link.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/7rpiedrl0qh56r6/Nelson2019SepOctBODReport.pdf?dl=0

In short, the BOD did partially walk back a requirement to use algorithms for evidentiary exams (the only place they were required). There remains a requirement to report probabilistic results for evidentiary exams.

Reasons for this have nothing to do with any case experience, and nothing to do with experience related to any of the different computer scoring algorithms.   

Prior to 1.8.3 the APA made no mention of computer algorithms or probabilistic results, leaving polygraph professionals free to rely solely on manual test data analysis - which may include numeical scoring methods with visual/subjective feature extraction of the type necessary prior to the widespread availability of computers and may even include the type of subjective eye-ball analytics that Mr. Williams was trained in way back in the 1970s. 

The reasons for the walk-back have to do with some people feeling like the cart was before the horse on 1.8.3, with many polygraph professionals still completely unfamiliar with discussions of probabilistic results and still largely unaware of how computer algorithms work. Oddly, those professionals will use the computerized polygraph of today (analyze data today) in largely the same way that Mr. Williams and others would have used and analog instrument (by looking at the squiggly lines with one's eye-balls). Problem is that different "experts" can sometimes "see" things differently. And so the quest is for an objective and reproducible, albeit probabilistic, solution. 

In reality, polygraph examiners do use algorithms. It is a mistake not to use them. It is also a mistake not use manual scoring methods. But there are always growing pains, and there is always some push-back from old school practitioners when technology and automation are introduced. (I can just imagine some old-time airline pilots complaining "that's not really flyin' if ya have to use a auto-pilot. Ya gotta be able to read them steam-dials or you dunno what yer doin'." 

Experteeism is fun, and probably feels more economically and professionally secure than tech and automation. But tech and automation is how things go. So my position is that all professionals should acquaint themselves with advancing technologies. Professions and industries that stay in the past are eventually completely disrupted by robots that attempt to make things better, faster and cheaper - but can more or less completely miss the value of human experience. 

So, if we don't want the robots to be in charge of us, then we may want to be in charge of the robots. Mr. Mangan is a well-known advocate for "experteeism" as a basis of all polygraph results. As I stated earlier, experteeism is fun and feels economically safe (viable), whereas automation and technology tend to be equalizers. That is, it "feels" economically safe - but may not be as secure as people think. As it goes, professionals who make no use of advancing tech are at increased risk for disruption. 

Also, in reality, there are some transitional issues to address. These needs include education for older polygraph examiners - some of whom may still need to learn to think probabilistically (because ll scientific tests are fundamentally probabilistic - and therefore not expected to be infallible). Some local associations and some training programs may not, at this time, be fully prepared to meet those educational needs. The catch is that resources to meet . need are usually not allocated until the need is clarified - in some form of requirement. In this case, we are working to more fully develop the available knowledge and instructional materials on the different computerized analysis methods available today - even though the requirement is stayed.

Another issue to consider is that different methods of analysis may give different results - and it is up to the evaluator to try to make sense of this. The NAS (2012) Report on Scientific Evidence discussed this. They noted that it is common for analysts to evalute data using a variety of methods, and that it is felt by some that analyst sshould report all of their analytic results including those that do not concur with a reported conclusion. 

Considering that any scientific test is intended to quantify (probabilistically) some phenomena that cannot be subject to perfect deterministic observation (which would negate the need for a test), and also cannot be subject to direct physical measurement (which requires both a physical phenomena and a defined unit of measure), the purpose of any test is to create a basis of information to support a conclusion about the phenomena of interest. As it turns out in psychology and social sciences, the only way to attempt to quantify many very interesting phenomena is via some testing procedure that yields probabilistic results. Anyway, what often happens in polygraph is that examiners will report only one of the results - avoiding mention of any alternate analytic solution. My guess is that some attorneys would be very interested in the existence of a result differed from the one reported. With normal polygraphs conducted on coopertive persons, we tend to see different analysis methods concur approximately 90% of the time. When they do not concur, it is an interesting question as to what the possible causes may be. We can, at times identify the most likely cause of the observed difference. 

Yet another of the issues to address when considering the use of computerized analysis is the question of who is responsible for the result. The 737MAX situation is an interesting learning and discussion context for all areas of science and tech that may involve the interaction of autonomous (semi-autonomous) systems human professionals. When human lives are on the plan the human pilots are ultimately responsible, but there is also a point where people may want to ask and know exactly what kind of enginerding decisions were made in the design of the MCAS and why it acts the way it does. Ultimately, human care still requires human expertise - just in case the confusers get computed. 

Human experts will always matter. Ask anyone on US Airways 1594 - all of whom survived because the pilot had grey hair. But certainly, when I travel by air, I want the pilot to use autopilot - so that they are not fatigued during the landing (seems that take off and landing are the most dangerous parts). 

And so, computer algorithms are not gone. In fact they remain highly reliable and very useful (less subject to expection bias and other forms of bias and unreliability than old-school eye-ball analysis. Some algorithms are reasonably well documented as to how they work and what they do. We have written replication code for 7 different models. And, unfortunately, there are some black-box problems for which perhaps one human on earth may know what they do. 

We will eventually know a bit more than we do at present. Of course, we'll never know everything - because, well, it's a big universe, and people are kinda complex. 

In the meantime, the walk-back on 1.8.3 is only partial, and there still exists a requirement that evidentiary polygraphs are supported by probabilistic, not merely categorical results. How an examiner may obtain that probabilistic solution is limited to a few methods - involving both computer algorithms and the ESS-M.

Feel free to contact me directly if there are questions or interest in rational discussion. 

Peace,

/rn

Doug Williams wrote on Nov 4^th, 2019 at 12:24pm:


I often wonder what Drew Richardson would have to say about all this. I remember after I was convicted on that set-up called OPERATION LIE BUSTERS, Drew  had some very strong words about the restrictions that were placed on me for the period of my supervised release. I think Dr. Drew even said something to the effect that if I chose to give a public demonstration of the STING TECHNIQUE in violation of the restrictions placed on me, then he would gladly act as my subject for this demonstration. I miss Drew!

Doug Williams wrote on Nov 3^rd, 2019 at 5:21pm:


How about it? Does anyone else out there in the anti-polygraph community or even the haven’t-quite-made-up-my-mind-yet community care to help me out with my proposal for a lawsuit and a motion to safeguard the records of my case in the interests of national security? Am I onto something here or am I once again charging at windmills as I have done so often in the past four decades?

Dan Mangan wrote on Nov 4^th, 2019 at 12:35am:


I understand completely Dan and I really do appreciate your honesty. But please know that I will never stop fighting and the more they try to do to stop me, the more intense my desire to utterly destroy that evil industry and hold the thugs and charlatans who perpetrate that evil fraud up to the contempt and ridicule they so richly deserve becomes.

Doug, I feel your pain. I really do.

I hesitate to get more involved. Here's why...

Whenever I get too chatty on AP or elsewhere on the 'net, wherein I voice my concerns about the bogus elements of polygraph "testing," I routinely get mysterious inquiries from would-be test-takers who claim they need special *help* with particular questions.

So far, not a single one of those curious birds has been able to pass my "sincerity" test . Naturally, I take a pass. 

But it gets scary nonetheless.

Having worked behind prison walls for over five years, and given what you endured, I'm most cautious to say the very least.

Not-so-fun fact: A couple of years ago, George made a trip to Massachusetts, which is my home state.  I was hoping to meet up with him, have a beer, compare notes, and have a few laughs along the way.

Turns out that I was sternly advised by a couple of sympathetic feds -- who know of my polygraph-realist stances -- that such contact could be detrimental.

In short, at this stage of the game, I don't need the aggravation.

I'm essentially retired and living comfortably. (Polygraph was my second career.)

Bottom line: Sometimes the bastards win. 




I will continue to speak the truth about the risks, realities and limitations of polygraph "testing."

Dan Mangan wrote on Nov 3^rd, 2019 at 3:51pm:


Well said Dan and to that point I think there should be some way to hold the thugs and charlatans in the US government polygraph industry who have been perpetrating this fraud accountable.  I’m working on two things at present - one is an idea I have to try to get some attorneys interested in class action and individual lawsuits to sue the polygraph examiners for fraud by claiming to be able to detect deception with a polygraph while knowing all along that this is not possible and further that by their prosecution of me they have admitted that the polygraph is worthless as a lie detector if the charts can be eaten so easily manipulated by anyone taking the test to come up with the desired results – pass or fail - pick whichever one you like. Check this out when you get a chance and see if you can help me fine tune it also if you know any attorneys that might be interested in working on this please ask them to chime in. http://www.polygraph.com/sue-the-bastards.html

I’m also working on a motion to ask the judge to at the very least safe guard all the records of the discovery in my case and forward them to the DOJ/IG and the DHS/IG for further review. I really believe there’s an issue with national security here if the government continues to rely on a polygraph instrument after having prosecuted me for proving how easily it can be beaten by anyone with a modicum of intelligence and preparation. I would welcome any comments you have on either of these ideas I have here. http://www.polygraph.com/the-motion.html

Here are a few tidbits from the APA magazine piece in which Ray Nelson walks back the use of computerized algorithms for scoring a polygraph "test"...

"...there is no form of physiological activity that is unique to deception, meaning that the polygraph test does not so much detect deception..."

“One APA member summed up the [algorithm] difficulty nicely...'I don’t use algorithms because I don’t know how they work.' "


"...APA accredited polygraph training programs have provided little or no information on algorithms because there is no requirement to use computer algorithms, and because people don’t know enough about them."


"...it makes little sense to use a method, technology or tool that is not reasonably well understood, and for which accountable answers cannot be provided as to how a decision was made."

"From [an] ethical perspective there may be serious problems with transferring responsibility for human decision-making to a black-box machine process.

I find it amazing that this kind of sober introspection regarding the use of polygraph "test" scoring algorithms is only now making its way to APA members. 

One has to wonder how many lives have been ruined over the past quarter-century by the exuberant and reckless use of such statistical alchemy.

Poor old Raymond - he’s finally beginning to wrestle with the very stubborn fact that it’s damn difficult to use the polygraph to detect deception when there is no reaction that ALWAYS, (or even most of the time), indicates deception. Now that’s a real problem when you’re trying to figure out a scoring algorithm. Another problem is the problem of “countermeasures“- a problem that I am responsible for and I’m proud of it – I think it was Webb himself who once said that a primary indicator of the use of countermeasures was a “perfect“ polygraph chart. So, in other words, you have a person who does a good job and produces too perfect a chart, that’s evidence, (in the eyes of the polygraph examiner), that they have manipulated the chart tracings and were attempting to “beat“ test.

Doug, this most intriguing exercise in apologetics -- authored by none other than OSS3 co-creator Ray Nelson himself -- starts with the third paragraph of Ray's column, which can be found on page 30 of the APA magazine (page 38 of the pdf) and continues throughout his piece. 

Please tell us what you think about Ray's cautionary tale.

Perhaps Ray will chime in.   (cue crickets)

Hey Dan, it’s good to see you posting again but I can’t seem to find the passage 
you were citing about their movement away from scoring algorithms. Could you give us a quick synopsis of it please? Thanks, Doug Williams

Speaking as a longtime member of the American Polygraph Association, frequent president-elect candidate and perennial change-agent, I find this development to be highly disturbing.

Personally, I wonder if somebody got burned by an algorithm, and then made the APA feel some very intense heat.

After nearly a quarter century of ballyhooing the merits of push-button polygraph "test" scoring, it seems that the American Polygraph Association is suddenly having some very troubling second thoughts.

Learn more on pages 30-33 of the actual APA magazine, (not PDF page numbers), which can be downloaded here:   

https://www.polygraph.org/assets/docs/Misc.Docs/Magazine%2052%2C5%20Preview%202....

As an aside, I would think that the APA's newly woke stance of black-box concerns has deep ramifications for the joint EyeDetect/polygraph claims of very high "confidence levels" as they relate to "test" outcomes.