Dan Linnaeus has
posted to X new details about the leaked and as-yet not publicly published documents that he saw on the private Telegram channel from which the two published documents seem to have originated:
Quote:TIMING ⏱️ The public leak from the Iranian social media channel, consisting of a single document detailing the U.S. military’s observations of Israel’s movements and preparations, was preceded by a considerably larger spill in a relatively closed environment just a few days earlier.
This spill spans hundreds of documents across multiple agencies, highly likely including documents pre-April 2023 that were already known breaches, as opposed to solely unknown ones from that period. However, it also exposed late 2023 and 2024 material, some as recent as September. It spans multiple theaters across numerous agencies, indicating wide systemic breaches.
This is inclusive of a document list, a three and a half minute video scrolling through the opening pages (1-2) of the breached documents, and a two and half minute video scrolling through documents and much of their contents. These contents read authentic, with correct classification markings, tiers, consistent control numbers, and detailed handling protocols.
It includes highly sensitive and classified material marked TS, SCI, TK and NOFORN, inclusive of CIA reports, NSC assessments, JCS pre-class drafts and J2 USAF ELINT operations reports, DOD Modernization Strategies, CNMF assessments, CTF-153 plans, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense internal review drafts for acquisitions documents, R&E documents, Secret Service Reports on TCO laundering operations, Special Advisory Council on ME Affairs Pentagon reports ….
….it's vast. This list is gleaned just from going back momentarily to the source to check if it’s still up and skimming through some of the cover pages to get a sense of the scope and breadth of the security breach. It’s unlikely that one could provide a more detailed sense of what is involved without going through the list in a manner that compromises them and inadvertently participates in the breaches.
But most of the spilled material is selective and controlled, with only the first page or a few pages released. Beyond the obvious threat imbued in such a move it appears aimed at demonstrating operational security has been compromised, forcing the U.S. and allied partners to reassess and potentially delay or halt ongoing operations.
This is noteworthy, as Barack Ravid, a known conduit for the U.S. administration’s official leaks reported on the October 17 spill, sayin that senior U.S. officials told him that they are treating this as “an extremely serious incident, but noted that they believe the leak will not impact Israel’s operational plans.”
In short, there appears to be the public message and a private message from the propagators: ‘You don’t know what we know,’ appears to be the public signal. But privately the message appears to be ‘We have compromised your entire operation and should you engage, you don’t know how prepared we may be.’
So finally: Is it plausible that the Israeli operation against Iran has been delayed pending opsec assessments, despite the assessments of ‘senior U.S. officials’ shared with the public through their official conduit, Barack Ravid? Moreover, who in the U.S. stands to gain from delaying, compromising or otherwise deterring an Israeli operation on Iran, or causing the US military to pull back operationally as it reassesses potential systemic breaches and attending implications? If anyone, shouldn’t they be scrutinized for their potential involvement in these leaks?
I expect that there is a Snowden-level shitstorm raging in the intelligence community over this security breach. As noted previously
on the blog, a DoD polygrapher in 2016 mentioned that in the aftermath of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations, the number of polygraph examinations administered by the Department of Defense tripled.
