wrote on Sep 5^th, 2003 at 9:09am:

I think the Energy Department's surprise announcement of a major reduction (from 20,000 to 4,500) of the number of personnel who would be subject to polygraph screening was a political masterstroke. It took the senators by surprise, and effectively served to blunt criticism of the Energy Department's indefensible decision, taken back in April, to completely ignore the conclusions of the NAS report. Senator Domenici in particular seems to be placated by this announcement. But is simply reducing the number of persons subjected to this quackery enough? Hardly. Snake oil administered in smaller doses is still snake oil. The newly announced Energy Department policy still leaves thousands subject to polygraph screening and leaves open the possibility (perhaps the likelihood) that those numbers may later grow when the political climate is more favorable. Note that the Defense Department, unlike the Energy Department, has escaped accountability for its decision to completely ignore the conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences. John P. Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, announced that decision less than a month after the NAS published its findings, and since then, efforts have been underway to remove existing limits and to increase DoD's reliance on polygraphy. (See, for example, the message thread, DoD Polygraph Program to Expand Under House Bill and the article, "Polygraph: An intelligence tool in growing demand" published in a publication of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.)

George,
I think your assessment is essentially correct.  However, this decision carries with it implicit acknowledgement of the NAS's findings, and thus carries with it some political danger.  While Domenici may call off the dogs now, the fact remains that the polygraph's "infallibility" mystique has been badly tarnished.

The biggest problem, of course, is the continuing impression that the polygraph is an effective tool "of last resort", one that evidently causes collateral damage but gets the job done when it absolutely has to be done.  This is a myth that really needs to be addressed: is it truly appropriate to treat the polygraph as the "ultimate weapon" when it comes to security?  It would seem that the DoE thinks it is, since they're keeping the use of the polygraph for the most sensitive positions.

Unfortunately, the NAS's own findings might lend credence to this belief: their conclusions could be taken to mean that being hyper-sensitive about polygraph results will catch the bad guys, even if a lot of good guys are caught, too.  If one believes it's more important to prevent bad guys from getting into positions of ultimate trust than to not falsely finger a lot of innocent people, this position can look rather attractive.

I also agree with George that proponents of the polygraph are likely hoping to take the heat off and weather this storm now, so as to expand polygraph testing in the future.  It is to be hoped that this will not happen.

Skeptic