On Thursday, 4 September 2003, the U.S. Senate Energy Committee will hold an oversight hearing on the Department of Energy polygraph program. The meeting is scheduled for 10:00 A.M. in the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room 366. A live webcast is also scheduled.

If one of your senators is a member of the Senate Energy Committee, why not call his/her Washington office to express your concerns about governmental reliance on polygraphy?

A full listing of Committee members is available here:

http://www.senate.gov/~energy/about/about_members.html

Additionally and/or alternatively, you can write to the Committee using the following convenient on-line form:

http://www.senate.gov/~energy/contact/contact.cfm

I've used the above web form to send the Committee the following message:

Dear U.S. Senate Energy Committee members and staff:

I am a co-founder of AntiPolygraph.org, a non-profit, public interest website dedicated to exposing and ending polygraph waste fraud and abuse. I was among those invited by the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph to deliver a presentation during their series of public meetings.

As you hear testimony on the Energy Department's polygraph policy this Thursday, I hope that you will seriously consider the option of scrapping that policy altogether. The National Academy of Sciences found polygraph screening to be completely invalid, concluding that misplaced governmental faith in polygraphy poses a danger to national security objectives.

The notion, suggested by some, that polygraph screening should somehow be limited to those with access to the most sensitive information is just plain silly. The polygraph should be scrapped altogether.

Polygraph screening has never caught a spy, nor is it likely ever to do so. As Dr. Drew C. Richardson, formerly of the FBI Laboratory Division, testified before a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, even if polygraph screening had some validity (and it does not), anyone can be taught to beat this kind of test in a few minutes.

You don't have to go to spy school to learn how to beat the polygraph. This information is readily available on-line.

AntiPolygraph.org makes available a free e-book titled The Lie Behind the Lie Detector that will be helpful to you as you examine the DOE's polygraph policy. You can download it as a 1 mb PDF file here:

http://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf

Chapter 1 provides a brief overview of polygraph validity, citing sources including the NAS report.

Chapter 2, on federal polygraph policy, includes a detailed, well-referenced discussion of the DOE's polygraph policy.

Chapter 3 explains just how the polygraph procedure "works" (and doesn't), including the Test for Espionage and Sabotage format used by the DOE. Sources for this chapter include Department of Defense Polygraph Institute documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter 4 explains precisely how to pass (or beat) a polygraph examination. We made this information publicly available in order to help the truthful to protect themselves against the risk of a false positive outcome. But spies, saboteurs, and terrorists may also use this information to fool the polygraph. Although polygraph examiners typically boast that they can detect such countermeasures, no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to do so, and the available research evidence suggests that they can't.

AntiPolygraph.org has also assembled a great deal of documentation that may be useful to you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have of me.

I may be reached by e-mail to <maschke@antipolygraph.org>. My home phone number (I'm an American working in The Netherlands) is XXXXX. You can also reach me at AntiPolygraph.org's voice mail number (in the U.S.): 206-666-4271.

Sincerely,

George W. Maschke
AntiPolygraph.org

I sent a letter to a senator from my state who serves on the commttee. I'll post the reply I (should) get.

The witnesses for the hearing will be Deputy Secretary of Energy Kyle E. McSlarrow and Dr. Stephen E. Fienberg, who headed the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph. A trusted source reports that "both [Senators] Domenici and Bingaman [respectively, the Energy Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member] are hopping made over [Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham's] handling of the polygraph program and his shameless rejection of the NAS report."

The following article by Environment and Energy Daily reporter Lauren Miura, cited here in full, will be of interest:


Quote:

Panel to probe DOE's use of polygraph tests Lauren Miura, Environment & Energy reporter The Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee is scheduled to hear testimony this week on the Energy Department's controversial use of polygraph tests to screen employees before working on top-secret projects at national laboratories. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said in April that DOE will continue to use lie detectors to screen employees, despite a National Academy of Sciences report released last October that said polygraph tests are too inaccurate to identify spies or other threats to national security. DOE does not use polygraph examinations on a "stand-alone basis, but as part of a larger fabric of investigative and analytical reviews," Abraham said (Greenwire April 15). Abraham's announcement prompted criticism from some lawmakers and scientists. "There is no question that DOE is under pressure because of problems involving security and lab management," committee chairman Sen. Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) said in April. "This, however, should not be the basis for continuing a polygraph program that has been studied and found wanting." Domenici and ranking committee member Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) had written a provision into the FY '02 Defense Authorization Act that required DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration to change DOE's polygraph program based on the National Academy of Sciences study. But DOE officials "entirely ignored it and they decided to retain the pre-existing policy without any change whatsoever," said George Maschke, co-founder of the non-profit group Antipolygraph.org. "If DOE is supposed to be the 'best of science', how can they use an unscientific tool against scientists and expect them to respect the department after that?" asked Alan Zelicoff, a former senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratory who recently resigned over polygraph issues. The American Polygraph Association said the NAS study failed to adequately recognize the "many successes" of the polygraph test in criminal and national security uses. "Polygraph testing, admittedly not perfect, has been and continues to be an extremely valuable tool," the group said in a statement. After the Wen Ho Lee spy controversy in 2000, DOE expanded its polygraph testing to include about 20,000 scientists in DOE's lab, weapons complex and headquarters who have access to sensitive and classified information. Lee was accused of mishandling classified information with the intent of giving it to China, but reached a plea agreement and was never formally charged with espionage. Schedule: The hearing is scheduled for 10 a.m. on Thursday, Sept. 4, in 366 Dirksen. Witnesses: Deputy Secretary of Energy Kyle McSlarrow is expected to testify, as well as Dr. Stephen Fienberg of Carnegie-Melllon University, who chaired the National Academy of Sciences study on the validity of polygraph testing.

If you can't get the webcast from the Energy Committee page, a sound feed is available on CapitolHearings.org.

Can't get the webcast (must be a lot of folks watching) and can't find a link to a sound feed at capitolhill.org.
But I understand through print media that McSlarrow intends to state that DOE will be reducing their reliance on polygraphs.

Actually, I know two others in addition to you and myself who couldn't get the Energy Committee webcast, and I don't know anyone who was able to do so. However, I was able to listen to most of it on CapitolHearings.org. (I mistakenly typed "CapitolHill.org" above. Sorry!)

The good news is that written statements submitted by the witnesses are now online:

http://www.senate.gov/~energy/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=895

In his oral remarks, Dr. Fienberg made an especially quotable statement: "The polygraph is an interrogation tool. It's not a tool to learn about truth-telling."

George

Regarding your letter to the committee; you forgot to tell them how you were wronged by the polygraph.  I think it's only fair you let them know where your agenda sprouted.

Saidme,
What was that you said about "deaf ears" ???

Perhaps you're the one who can't "hear" the polygraph's siren song?

I liked this from Mr. McSlarrow's testimony, among others:

Quote:

I am also recommending that we consider establishing a separate mechanism, within the Department but external to the Office of Counterintelligence, to evaluate any complaints lodged against polygraphers and identify and correct specific issues associated with the conduct, performance, or training of polygraphers.

Saidme wrote on Sep 4^th, 2003 at 7:26pm:

George Regarding your letter to the committee; you forgot to tell them how you were wronged by the polygraph.  I think it's only fair you let them know where your agenda sprouted.

It occurs to me, Saidme, that you might benefit from a  visit to Stephen's Guide to the Logical Fallacies.  In particular, check out Attacking the Person (argumentum ad hominem).

Please don't feel bad, though.  This most basic of logical fallacies (attacking the messenger instead of the message, in an apparent belief that doing so actually responds to and counters the opponent's argument) is far and away the most common argument technique exhibited by polygraphers on this site.  Fortunately, it's fairly obvious to even the casual observer, and I'm sure it would be obvious to the Committee, as well.

It comes down to this:  what, exactly, does the origin of George's "agenda" have to do with the accuracy of what he's saying?  You need to give a specific answer to this question in order to avoid the "ad hominem" fallacy mentioned above -- simply saying "his feelings towards the polygraph are the reason he's opposed to it" won't cut it.  They're two separate things.

Such a lack of understanding of logic does go a long way towards explaining blind faith in the polygraph...

Skeptic

The Energy Department's surprise announcement -- the evening before the hearing -- of a major reduction of the number of personnel who would be subject to polygraph screening (from 20,000 to 4,500) was a political masterstroke. It took the senators by surprise and effectively served to blunt criticism of the Energy Department's indefensible decision, announced back in April, to completely ignore the conclusions of the NAS report.

Senator Domenici in particular seems to be placated by this announcement. But is simply reducing the number of persons subjected to this quackery enough? Hardly. Snake oil administered in smaller doses is still snake oil. The newly announced Energy Department policy still leaves thousands subject to polygraph screening and leaves open the possibility (perhaps the likelihood) that those numbers may later grow when the political climate is more favorable.

Note that the Defense Department, unlike the Energy Department, has escaped accountability for its decision to completely ignore the conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences. John P. Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, announced that decision less than a month after the NAS published its findings, and since then, efforts have been underway to remove existing limits and to increase DoD's reliance on polygraphy. (See, for example, the message thread, DoD Polygraph Program to Expand Under House Bill and the article, "Polygraph: An intelligence tool in growing demand" published in a publication of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.)

wrote on Sep 5^th, 2003 at 9:09am:

I think the Energy Department's surprise announcement of a major reduction (from 20,000 to 4,500) of the number of personnel who would be subject to polygraph screening was a political masterstroke. It took the senators by surprise, and effectively served to blunt criticism of the Energy Department's indefensible decision, taken back in April, to completely ignore the conclusions of the NAS report. Senator Domenici in particular seems to be placated by this announcement. But is simply reducing the number of persons subjected to this quackery enough? Hardly. Snake oil administered in smaller doses is still snake oil. The newly announced Energy Department policy still leaves thousands subject to polygraph screening and leaves open the possibility (perhaps the likelihood) that those numbers may later grow when the political climate is more favorable. Note that the Defense Department, unlike the Energy Department, has escaped accountability for its decision to completely ignore the conclusions of the National Academy of Sciences. John P. Stenbit, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, announced that decision less than a month after the NAS published its findings, and since then, efforts have been underway to remove existing limits and to increase DoD's reliance on polygraphy. (See, for example, the message thread, DoD Polygraph Program to Expand Under House Bill and the article, "Polygraph: An intelligence tool in growing demand" published in a publication of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.)

George,
I think your assessment is essentially correct.  However, this decision carries with it implicit acknowledgement of the NAS's findings, and thus carries with it some political danger.  While Domenici may call off the dogs now, the fact remains that the polygraph's "infallibility" mystique has been badly tarnished.

The biggest problem, of course, is the continuing impression that the polygraph is an effective tool "of last resort", one that evidently causes collateral damage but gets the job done when it absolutely has to be done.  This is a myth that really needs to be addressed: is it truly appropriate to treat the polygraph as the "ultimate weapon" when it comes to security?  It would seem that the DoE thinks it is, since they're keeping the use of the polygraph for the most sensitive positions.

Unfortunately, the NAS's own findings might lend credence to this belief: their conclusions could be taken to mean that being hyper-sensitive about polygraph results will catch the bad guys, even if a lot of good guys are caught, too.  If one believes it's more important to prevent bad guys from getting into positions of ultimate trust than to not falsely finger a lot of innocent people, this position can look rather attractive.

I also agree with George that proponents of the polygraph are likely hoping to take the heat off and weather this storm now, so as to expand polygraph testing in the future.  It is to be hoped that this will not happen.

Skeptic

Quote:

The biggest problem, of course, is the continuing impression that the polygraph is an effective tool "of last resort",

I got the impression from Mr. McSlarrow's testimony that the DOE is now seeing the polygraph more as a tool "of first resort", if you will. Information gleened from polygraph exams would have to be further investigated and corroborated prior to any action being taken.
While an improvement, along with the 75% reduction in the number of people subject to polygraphs, it still isn't enough. As George said, snake oil is still snake oil.
A battle is won, but the war goes on.

Orolan,

The notion, suggested by Kyle McSlarrow and other polygraph proponents that a failed polygraph "test" in and of itself will not have an adverse affect upon the person "failing" the "test" is ridiculous. It's clear that McSlarrow and the DOE's counterintelligence staff are still under the delusion that polygraph screening has diagnostic value as a test of truth versus deception.

As Drew Richardson noted in a Washington Times op-ed piece published shortly after release of the NAS report:

"The jury is in and the evidence is clear and compelling. The American people should insist and our executive and legislative branches of government should ensure that the technological and sociological embarrassment we have come to know as polygraph screening should be immediately stopped. Not one more innocent applicant or employee should be falsely accused and not one more spy should be given cover through having passed a polygraph exam. The notion (as will be suggested by some in government agencies using polygraph screening) that this is just one tool among many being used to address problems is wrong and dangerous mumbo-jumbo. The results of polygraph screening examinations are either believed or they are not. If they are believed, they are acted upon and, furthermore, these actions, if based upon erroneous polygraph results, will continue to lead to the sorts of grave injury to country and citizens as previously noted."

Hi George
You may remember that I called this months ago and told you the number of polygraphs required in the DOE system will be reduced not eliminated.  This may irritate you but I will draw you to an important excerpt from McSlarrow's testimony:

"Federal agencies deploying the counterintelligence scope polygraph as a screening tool for initial hiring or initial access   have detected applicants for classified positions within those agencies who were directed by foreign governments or entities to seek employment with the agencies in order to gain successful penetrations within the various U.S. Government components.
U.S. agencies have also benefited from the utilization of the polygraph screen as part of periodic security evaluations and re-investigations of federal employees and contractor personnel.   Such examinations have resulted in multiple admissions in several different areas:

&#61623; Knowingly providing classified information to members of foreign intelligence services.
&#61623; Involvement in various stages of recruitment efforts by foreign intelligence services.
&#61623; Prior unreported contacts with known foreign intelligence officers.
&#61623; Efforts by employees to make clandestine contact with foreign diplomatic establishments or foreign intelligence officers.
&#61623; Serious contemplation or plans to commit acts of espionage.
&#61623; Knowingly providing classified information to foreign nationals and uncleared U.S. persons.

As a result of admissions and subsequent investigations, federal agencies have disrupted on-going clandestine relationships between employees/contractors and foreign intelligence officers, and stopped others in their beginning phases, or even before the clandestine relationships began.

If this were the end of the inquiry, it would be a relatively straightforward matter.  The probability would be that use of the polygraph screen as one tool for counterintelligence would have a value that demanded its use in the context of access to information the protection of which is critical to our national security, even taking into account questions of employee morale and the resources necessary to sustain such a program.  The value of its use in specific-incident investigations would be presumably greater still".

The often repeated assertions made on this site have been directly challenged by this government official.  I am not surprised that you and Orolan (who was recently been taken to task for being superficial in his research) have ignored this, and are selectively reporting his remarks.  I could do it, but why dont you post his testimony in total?
Is it possible that the government has access to information not originating in the fertile minds of antipolygraph activists, or disgruntled job seekers?

Breeze,

You ask why I don't post Kyle McSlarrow's testimony in total. Actually, if you look again, you'll note that on the day of the hearing, I posted a link to his statement on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee website. And the following day, we added Mr. McSlarrow's written remarks to AntiPolygraph.org:

http://antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-energy-2003/mcslarrow-statement.shtml

Deputy Secretary of Energy McSlarrow all but conceded that polygraph screening has no validity, choosing instead to base his arguments in favor of continued polygraph screening on claims of utility (i.e., admissions obtained.) But the unverifiable anecdotal evidence that Mr. McSlarrow adduced tells us absolutely nothing about the utility of polygraphy. Over the past 50-some-odd years, various instrumentalities of the U.S. Government have administered hundreds of thousands of polygraph screening examinations. It is hardly surprising that a few people would confess to all sorts of things. Indeed, there is zero statistical chance that one wouldn't get some admissions when polygraphing (or simply interviewing, without the polygraph) such large numbers of people.

The NAS report found that there is essentially no evidence on the additive validity of polygraphy (its ability to add predictive value to that which could be achieved by other means). Which raises the question, might the admissions Mr. McSlarrow referred to have been obtained by other means?

More importantly, how many innocent people wrongly suffer to "catch" these few transgressors who are stupid enough to make admissions during their polygraph examinations?

George
Some quick thoughts before I start work.
Posting a link (which most will not access) is not the same as discussing fully the content of the message, of course since the content works against your goals and philosophy this is not surprising.

McSlarrow seems to making specific reference to  polygraph success in uncovering espionage directed against our country.  You and others frequently state that this has never happened, (based on comments made by government officials favorable to your view) Do you think spies are merely "stupid enough to make admissions" or were they presented with evidence backed up with polygraph results leading to confession.

Is it possible that McSlarrow has access to classified information that you do not possess? Do you think he is so casual as to continue a polygraph policy without backup for his position that he cannot speak to specificially? Politically, it would of been far easier to scrap the program.  Its anecdotal to you because it must remain so.
Why do you continue to believe that your viewpoint is more credible than those that actually perform investigative work, see the tool in action, and value the result?
You have based your position on the fact that the CIA does not publish every investigative success.  Why would any agency with the complexity of mission that our intelligence gathering organizations deal with trumpet polygraph success? They probably would prefer that people adopted your view, and not take it seriously-possibly leading to an opening.

I guess the DOE has placed some value on those hapless spies making admissions.  Its amazing to me that you can make such sweeping judgements ( about someones intellect) without any proof what so ever.
I thought McSlarrow considered the NAS findings throughout his testimony, and your analysis of his viewpoint is simply a reflection of your bias.

The_Breeze wrote on Sep 11^th, 2003 at 4:55pm:

George Some quick thoughts before I start work. Posting a link (which most will not access) is not the same as discussing fully the content of the message, of course since the content works against your goals and philosophy this is not surprising.

Get over yourself, Breeze.  He not only posted a link, but the entire text of the address, in direct contradiction to your complaint.  Your M.O. seems to be that you never admit you're wrong (no matter how obviously you are), but in this case, you look like an idiot for continuing the argument when George clearly did exactly what you said he didn't do.

You don't have to take my advice, of course, but you really don't want to pursue such an obviously losing line of argument.  At least have the honesty and integrity to admit it when you're so clearly mistaken.  


Quote:

McSlarrow seems to making specific reference to  polygraph success in uncovering espionage directed against our country.  You and others frequently state that this has never happened, (based on comments made by government officials favorable to your view) Do you think spies are merely "stupid enough to make admissions" or were they presented with evidence backed up with polygraph results leading to confession.

Unfortunately, McSlarrow's comments don't make clear the process by which the espionage was uncovered (he himself may not know the details).  Your own questions above reveal the fact that drawing firm conclusions one way or another is unwarranted, and indeed, McSlarrow's comments (which you posted) seem to indicate admissions, not polygraph charts, were what stopped the espionage.

The bottom line is, by making inferences from what McSlarrow said you're doing exactly what you accuse others of doing: pushing your bias.

The burden of proof is upon pro-polygraph people to demonstrate that the polygraph itself caught spies.  I see nothing in McSlarrow's testimony that indicates this issue is resolved.  But please, feel free to post the relevant quote that does so.

Skeptic

Skeptic
When I make an honest mistake like pointing out that George and Orolan seemed to be cherry picking remarks from McSlarrow's testimony (since this is the thread where its being discussed) understand that I dont dwell here and lurk around the reading room.  My point remains: why ignore or gloss over his other relevant comments? So Im an idiot for not spending too much time on this site? That label is yours to wear.
I dont have an M.O.  I tell the truth based on experience and direct observation, not the whimpering of others. You can listen to anyone you want to.

Since your so generous in giving advice, as if I needed some from you, I will return the favor.  Try and not feel stupid that you have spent so much time on a cause that is having little practical impact. The tone creeps into your messages.
McSlarrow has made a decision based on facts, you have argued a point based on emotion.  Admissions seperate from polygraph? where do you make that connection since he is linking the two himself? Guess those spies just broke down on seeing the equipment? why dont you let us in on what you have seen in your vast experience.
Your strident, illogical arguements are pathetic.  
"Burden of proof"? agencies make decisions based on thier needs and thier experiences.  I dont think the DOE needs to demonstrate anything specificially to your satisfaction, thier decision is sufficient.  No one has to work for the agency, or any other that polygraphs if it is so objectionable.
The next time you feel a need to post to me you can keep it civil, your wasting my time.

(Modified after re-reading Breeze's remarks)


The_Breeze wrote on Sep 11^th, 2003 at 10:01pm:

Skeptic When I make an honest mistake like pointing out that George and Orolan seemed to be cherry picking remarks from McSlarrow's testimony (since this is the thread where its being discussed) understand that I dont dwell here and lurk around the reading room.  My point remains: why ignore or gloss over his other relevant comments? So Im an idiot for not spending too much time on this site? That label is yours to wear. I dont have an M.O.  I tell the truth based on experience and direct observation, not the whimpering of others. You can listen to anyone you want to.

Breeze,
You're not being an idiot if you make an honest mistake -- though I think it's reasonable to expect people to look around before criticizing.  Nor are you being an idiot if you think George overlooked (or ignored) points you think he shouldn't have.  You're being an idiot when you then try to defend your mistake and continue your attack, instead of retracting your remarks.

Perhaps George overlooked an important point and perhaps not.  But given the fact that he posted prominent links to the transcript from here and the home page of Antipolygraph.org, it is hardly fair to criticize him on the grounds that he's "selectively reporting [McSlarrow's] remarks" in order to advance his agenda.  He reported the remarks in toto.

You may not realize it, but you're accusing him of intellectual dishonesty, and it's not a fair accusation.


Quote:

The next time you feel a need to post to me you can keep it civil, your wasting my time.

Breeze, given your evinced tendency to post insulting and counterfactual comments regarding George and others, followed invariably by a refusal to retract your comments when you're called on them, I feel my posts to you have been the picture of civility.  There are trolls on Usenet who display more intellectual integrity than you do on this message board.

As I said before, you need to get over yourself.  No one's perfect, and admitting an error goes a long ways towards getting people to take you seriously.

Skeptic

Dr. Fienberg has also responded to Mr. McSlarrow's claimed utility for polygraph screening. In his amended written statement, he notes:


Quote:

The Deputy Secretary's testimony makes reference to the utility of counterintelligence scope polygraph screening programs employed by federal agencies in terms of admissions made. Our committee heard repeated reference to such anecdotes but found little systematic evidence to evaluate them. It is important to note that such admissions rely heavy on the polygraph as an interrogation tool and not as a device that accurately detects deception.  As such the polygraph may be no better a prop than other less costly devices.  Our report refers to this as the "bogus pipeline," a term that comes from the social science literature which has repeatedly demonstrated the value of such props in other settings.

wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 5:34am:

Dr. Fienberg has also responded to Mr. McSlarrow's claimed utility for polygraph screening. In his amended written statement, he notes:

George,

I think perhaps props deserve some "props", in the current blog vernacular. McSlarrow's description of the polygraph as "taslismatic" is consistent with this and one shouldn't discount the value of this "prop." I often run into bright people who are simply awed by the polygraph and seem to place it beyond understanding.

I don't understand this thinking as I am curious about nearly everything I don't understand (INTP).

It is something of an ethical quandry in that I don't initiate discussions of how poly's work with people that might actually have to take one. Fortunately, few people that I know are at such risk.

-Marty

Marty,


Quote:

I think perhaps props deserve some "props", in the current blog vernacular.

I am largely unfamiliar with the current blog vernacular. What do you mean by the foregoing?

wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 10:00am:

Marty, I am largely unfamiliar with the current blog vernacular. What do you mean by the foregoing?

"props" is widely used to indicate approval or strong agreement with a blog journal entry. I am unclear what the origin is - it may be shorthand for small icons that people add much like the "smileys" :)  Currently, it seems to indicate something like the "here here" one might hear from the "House of Commons." It is ubiquitous on the blogscape.

-Marty

Marty,

Thank you for the clarification!

No one is arguing here that props (including the polygraph) cannot be useful in interrogations. But as the National Academy of Sciences noted in its report, there is essentially no evidence on the additive validity of polygraphy (its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other means). And as Dr. Fienberg pointed out, the handful of purported successes of the polygraph that Kyle McSlarrow adduced are of no statistical value.

Polygraph screening is a fraud, as more and more of us who are or have been subject to it are learning. As Dr. Richardson has pointed out before, continued polygraph screening would require such a universal bluff as to be impractical over the long term.

Do you agree with Kyle McSlarrow's stated plan for continued reliance on polygraph screening?

wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 5:46pm:

No one is arguing here that props (including the polygraph) cannot be useful in interrogations. But as the National Academy of Sciences noted in its report, there is essentially no evidence on the additive validity of polygraphy (its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other means).

While true, predictive value is not established for many qualification standards. OTOH, one can argue establishing predictive value should be a precondition for highly invasive processes as the polygraph.


Quote:

And as Dr. Fienberg pointed out, the handful of purported successes of the polygraph that Kyle McSlarrow adduced are of no statistical value.

OTOH, I think it is obvious that if such information was available, it would not be prudent to publish it's detail as it would be valuable for adversaries.


Quote:

Polygraph screening is a fraud, as more and more of us who are or have been subject to it are learning. As Dr. Richardson has pointed out before, continued polygraph screening would require such a universal bluff as to be impractical over the long term.

Perhaps this is true over the long term, but it would appear that the new information discovered  from admissions remains at a fairly high level and so the "long term" may be much further out. Admission rates are likley a good proxy for the effectiveness of the polygraph "bluff."


Quote:

Do you agree with Kyle McSlarrow's stated plan for continued reliance on polygraph screening?

I don't know enough about it to make that determination assuming a purely utilitatian approach. OTOH, I have a very visceral reaction to the idea of false positives from a screening test that is deceptive on it's face. It appears Kyle has adopted a utilitarian approach and has factored in consequences such as loss of talent, etc.

-Marty

Marty wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 6:23pm:

While true, predictive value is not established for many qualification standards. OTOH, one can argue establishing predictive value should be a precondition for highly invasive processes as the polygraph.

Well, Marty, as long as you're going to rebut your own position ;)



Quote:

OTOH, I think it is obvious that if such information was available, it would not be prudent to publish it's detail as it would be valuable for adversaries.

Perhaps, perhaps not.  In fact, I would think some details would serve as a deterrent to adversaries...

Skeptic

Skeptic,

I found Kyle's rationalization nuanced and not totally without merit.

Just because they haven't provided the basis for statistical utility doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

As for info of use to adversaries, any information that were to indicate the poly either more or less reliable in actual usage would be of value in structuring an attack. Adversaries depend on a global assessment of both strengths and weaknesses in order to optimize and target.

Still, the poly as a screening tool for knowledgable examinees is offensive and irritating. Because of that, I respect the poeple that are willing to go through it to provide service to this country. It's more than I would do.

-Marty

Does anyone else find it curious that details of apparently all of polygraph screening's purported counterespionage successes to which Mr. McSlarrow referred remain classified (bearing in mind that the U.S. government has been doing this for 50+ years), and apparently none led to criminal prosecutions?

Marty wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 10:11pm:

Skeptic, I found Kyle's rationalization nuanced and not totally without merit. Just because they haven't provided the basis for statistical utility doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

Of course.  But it also doesn't mean such basis does exist, either, and since the people in question want to use the polygraph and (in some cases) have a vested interest in it, the burden is upon them to prove that utility, rather than upon others to prove the negative.


Quote:

As for info of use to adversaries, any information that were to indicate the poly either more or less reliable in actual usage would be of value in structuring an attack. Adversaries depend on a global assessment of both strengths and weaknesses in order to optimize and target.

And again, I'll say "perhaps".  Some details (such as the combination on a lock) are clearly helpful to an adversary.  OTOH, letting people know that you have a padlock on your door, and that its a 3" Masterlock made of hardened steel, and that 10 burglars have tried without success to open the lock, would likely have a deterrent effect.  Telling people what tools have been tried might or might not be a bad idea.  It all depends upon the nature of the information, and what your adversary already knows.

From a certain point-of-view, simply letting people know that we polygraph could be useful to those looking for a way in.  But look at it this way: if you are dealing with an adversary who is sophisticated enough to scientifically structure an effective breach of security, you're likely dealing with someone who is capable of doing their own studies on polygraphs and knows the weaknesses full well.  If this is the case, failing to release not just full details but *any* details regarding how the polygraph has or has not caught spies only serves to keep ourselves in the dark regarding its utility.


Quote:

Still, the poly as a screening tool for knowledgable examinees is offensive and irritating.

I agree with you, and as regards current usage, I'll throw in "detrimental to one's career and mental health".


Quote:

Because of that, I respect the poeple that are willing to go through it to provide service to this country. It's more than I would do.

Same for me.

Skeptic

wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 10:28pm:

Does anyone else find it curious that details of apparently all of polygraph screening's purported counterespionage successes to which Mr. McSlarrow referred remain classified (bearing in mind that the U.S. government has been doing this for 50+ years), and apparently none led to criminal prosecutions?

To me, that last point is especially damning.  Makes you wonder how much boasting is going on, as in "we are pretty sure we've stopped a bunch of spies, but we could never actually prove any of them were spies.  Still, we're going to claim these as polygraph successes anyway".

Skeptic

Skeptic wrote on Sep 12^th, 2003 at 11:46pm:

Of course.  But it also doesn't mean such basis does exist, either, and since the people in question want to use the polygraph and (in some cases) have a vested interest in it, the burden is upon them to prove that utility, rather than upon others to prove the negative.

I agree. In fact it would be quite impossible to prove a negative in this instance.  That said, there is no obligation (though it would certainly be desireable) to disclose any proven utility to the outside.


Quote:

OTOH, letting people know that you have a padlock on your door, and that its a 3" Masterlock made of hardened steel, and that 10 burglars have tried without success to open the lock, would likely have a deterrent effect.  ... ...  If you are dealing with an adversary who is sophisticated enough to scientifically structure an effective breach of security, you're likely dealing with someone who is capable of doing their own studies on polygraphs and knows the weaknesses full well.  If this is the case, failing to release not just full details but *any* details regarding how the polygraph has or has not caught spies only serves to keep ourselves in the dark regarding its utility.

In general, any information one discloses to an adversary, about whether something works or not, is useful to allow refocussing resources. As for the more capable adversarys, knowing the mechanics and weaknesses of polygraphs is a long way from knowing the kind of statistical information that is lacking here.

That said, I do believe and I think anecdotal and published evidence supports, some types of countermeasures, especially combined with practice on a polygraph, could be very effective. Enough so as to effectively limit the main use of the poly to a prophylactic utility. It likely is far less effective against well trained moles. Since we have caught some of these spys, it would be interesting to learn what training they recieved re polys. Don't think we will ever see that in public though.

-Marty