Gordon,

You write:


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Of course foreign intelligence services know about polygraph technology and procedures.  In some cases, they have gone through schools here in America.  In others, American schools have held courses overseas for a variety of governments and their police and intelligence services.  In most of the many cases of which I am aware, the intelligence services have been those of countries which are our friends and allies, or which pose no realistic threat to us.  In a number of cases, they are using the polygraph to help protect the intelligence which we share with them.

Foreign intelligence services' knowledge of polygraph technology and procedures is not dependent upon any cooperative agreement with the U.S. Government, or arrangements with U.S. polygraph schools. A great deal of information has been published about polygraphy, and that open source information is available not only to friends and allies, or countries that pose no realistic threat to the U.S., but to any government or organization. (And polygraph instruments can be readily obtained, despite U.S. export controls.)


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On the other hand, information posted on the Internet can be accessed by every intelligence service in the world, including those who would do us the greatest harm possible.  Instead of having to devote a great deal of manpower and money to acquire knowledge of our security screening programs and procedures and how to circumvent them, you would present them with all that information, and keep them updated on all changes that occur.  And you want me to cooperate in this endeavor??

Gordon, every article you've ever written for Polygraph is also readily accessed by any intelligence agency in the world. The American Polygraph Association has recently made it cheaper and easier by making the first 30 volumes available on CD-ROM.

I haven't asked you to cooperate in an endeavor to present foreign intelligence services with "knowledge of our security screening programs and procedures and how to circumvent them." I've asked you general questions related to the scientific basis for CQT and R/I polygraphy. I don't see any legitimate security concern that would prevent you from addressing, for example, the following questions (which you've thus far dodged):

• ...if you would use the relevant/irrelevant format with sophisticated subjects (i.e., those who understand the polygraph procedure), then on what scientific basis do you expect to be able to distinguish truth from deception using this (thoroughly discredited) technique? For the informed, truthful subject who heeds your advice and does not employ countermeasures but instead admits to his/her knowledge of the trickery on which "control" question "test" polygraphy depends, the promise of being treated to a relevant/ irrelevant "test" instead is hardly reassuring.
  
  
• Can anyone in the polygraph community cite any peer-reviewed study whatsoever indicating that the Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I) technique works any better than a coin flip, a Magic 8-Ball, or a ouija board (i.e., chance)?!
  
  
• Is it your position that the Relevant/Irrelevant polygraph technique is a "forensic test?" If so, perhaps you could provide us with other examples of forensic tests whose validity (like that of the R/I "test") is completely unsupported by any peer-reviewed research whatsoever?
  
  
• Perhaps you could also tell us what the sensitivity and specificity of the R/I "test" is for the detection of deception? If you can't, then perhaps you could give us examples of other forensic tests that have unknown sensitivity and specificity?

There is no national security concern that prevents you from addressing these questions, Gordon. I think it is intellectually dishonest of you to suggest that such is the case. It is increasingly apparent that the reason you won't substantively address these questions is that the answers would cause embarrassment to you and the polygraph community.


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In another post, you pointed out that a couple of decades ago Ray Weir and Norman Ansley published details of the R/I test.  You cited this to suggest either I or the Government were being hypocritical or disingenous at not discussing it now.   Times change.  Administrations change.  Personnel change.  Policies change.  Polygraph testing evolves.  Formats and procedures are modified.  Countermeasures are employed, and counter-countermeasures are developed.  Do you think that just because some details were published more than a quarter century ago, the Government ought to keep you (and hence every intelligence service worldwide) updated on every change as it occurs?

What has changed since Weir wrote -- and Ansley published -- articles detailing the polygraph screening procedure then in use by the NSA? That information became immediately available to anyone who cared to peruse Polygraph, including the intelligence services of Cold War adversaries. Has information about the R/I technique (and even its theoretical basis) become more sensitive now that the Cold War is over?

In a sense, perhaps it has. Nowadays, the polygraph community seems to be much more concerned about the American people learning about polygraphy than it ever was about foreign intelligence services learning about it.

Gordon, you say that polygraph testing "evolves." With regard to the Relevant/Irrelevant screening "test," it appears that any "evolution" has occurred in the absence of any new federal research. The Defense Security Service's answer to a Freedom of Information Act request I filed for all DoDPI information on the Relevant/Irrelevant screening "test" indicates that DoDPI has done no research whatsoever on this technique. (See the message thread DSS Withholds R/I Screening Documentation.)

Gordon, forgive me if your final question was merely a rhetorical one. I'm going to address it. You asked, "Do you think that just because some details were published more than a quarter century ago, the Government ought to keep you (and hence every intelligence service worldwide) updated on every change as it occurs?"

I think that if applicants for federal employment (as well as current employees) are going to have their honesty and integrity assessed on the basis of the Relevant/Irrelevant polygraph technique (or any other polygraph technique, for that matter), and the U.S. Government is to take adverse action in whole or in part on the basis thereof (as it routinely does), then due process requires that those against whom adverse action is taken be provided access to the methodology that was used by the U.S. Government to stigmatize them, and to challenge that methodology, whether in an administrative hearing, or in a court of law.