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Message started by George W. Maschke on Jun 21st, 2002 at 4:52pm

Title: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Jun 21st, 2002 at 4:52pm
In a 19 June 2002 article titled  "
2 FBI Whistle-Blowers Allege Lax Security, Possible Espionage,"
Washington Post staff writer James V. Grimaldi reports on allegations made by fired FBI contract linguist Sibel Edmonds regarding possible espionage by a co-worker on behalf of a Middle Eastern organization targeted for electronic surveillance by FBI counterintelligence. Edmonds states that the co-worker herself claimed to be a member of the targeted organization and also tried to recruit her into it. Grimaldi reports that "[g]overnment officials familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified said that both Edmonds and the woman were given polygraph examinations by the FBI and that both passed." The article does not make it clear if those examinations were about Edmonds' allegations or if they were simply the standard pre-employment polygraph examinations to which all FBI applicants must submit.

But either way, if Sibel Edmonds' allegations are true, the FBI may have been penetrated by a double agent who beat the polygraph. It would not be the first time such a thing happened. Other double agents who beat the polygraph include Karel F. Koecher, Larry Wu-tai Chin, and Aldrich H. Ames (all worked for CIA) and Ana Belen Montes, the senior DIA analyst who recently pled guilty to spying for Cuba.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by Fred F. on Jun 22nd, 2002 at 3:32am
George,

Without a doubt, this FBI blunder will need some heavy damage control. The amazing part of this story is that it appears that the woman is STILL working for the FBI, and Ms. Edmonds is fired for being "disruptive"?


Meanwhile, the investigations continue and Ms. Edmonds is targeted for breaching security. Senator Leahy needs to bring this matter to the full Judiciary Committee for evaluation and action.

Only the FBI can step on their own toes this bad. But remember, the polygraph is ACCCURATE isn't it?


Fred F.  ;)

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Jun 24th, 2002 at 5:58pm
Is there any chance this won't be "smothered in its crib"?
According to the  Washington Post of 22-06-2002
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26102-2002Jun21.html
  Senator Grassley is
raising objections to the actions of the former FBI  liason with
congressional investigation of the Waco case.   That same FBI deputy
general counsel is now,
by sheer coincidence, in charge of the intelligence panel's investigation
of the bureau's role in tracking terrorists before Sept. 11.  Grassley is
reportedly unhappy on the grounds that said liason  "continued to thwart and obstruct" the Waco investigation.  This assertion of congressional prerogative  seems
to be an unexpected good sign of a serious intention for congressional
oversight.   Or am I hopelessly naive?  Will the polygraph results
be given any credence?  Unless the FBI has adopted multivalued logic as its operational norm, the two "passes" would seem to be an obvious
contradiction (at least if they both bear on the matter at hand).

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Jun 24th, 2002 at 6:31pm
Sullivan,

The article to which you refer is
"Head of Sept. 11 Probe Allegedly Obstructed Danforth's Waco Inquiry"
by Richard Leiby and Dana Priest. Note that what Senator Grassely is objecting to is the choice of Thomas A. Kelley by the joint congressional panel investigating the events of September 11th to head it's own investigation of the FBI.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Jun 25th, 2002 at 9:23am
In "The Reasons Behind a White House Rebuke" appearing in the
Washington Post of  24-06-02  Walter Pincus analyzes White House
and Joint Committee reaction to the "leak" of the text of  NSA intercepts
of Al Qaeda.   A few points:  1) The texts released were in English,
not in Arabic, so the actual phrases used remain unspecified
2) Having the FBI investigate the Joint Committee is a role reversal,
which would seem  useful for those wishing to  impede Congressional investigation of the contradictory polygraphs in the Edmonds case
3) At the same time it would be highly impolitic for the Committee to appear resistent to such investigation.   All in all, effective maneuvering,
by both Cheney and Graham.  
       One hopes that the Joint Committee will
not be deterred in its probing of the FBI.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 14th, 2002 at 6:04pm
An new article by James V. Grimaldi titled "Senato
rs Criticize FBI, Justice"
in today's (14 Aug. 2002) Washington Post provides new detail regarding the allegations raised by Sibel Edmonds, including the name of the employee she accused: Can Dickerson, who is married to U.S. Air Force Major Douglas Dickerson.

The on-line version of the Post article also includes links to the following documents:


Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Aug 30th, 2002 at 9:19am
A CNN report  of August 29, 2002 -- available at

http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/08/29/intelligence.leaks.ap/index.html

indicates that the FBI is asking
Senate investigators to undergo polygraph examinations in regard
to the  leaks mentioned earlier in the thread.  This looks very much like a power struggle between the congressional and executive branches:
note that the executive branch (to wit, the FBI) appears to have recently given a sop to Congress in the "spontaneous" resignation of Dale Watson.  After that "carrot", now the
"stick" of polygraphing to impede and discredit further investigation of the background in the Edmonds case.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 30th, 2002 at 9:42am
I have no special insight into power politics between the executive and legislative branches of government, but I do seem to recall that it was the chairmen of both the House and Senate intelligence committees (Sen. Bob Graham, a Democrat, and Rep. Porter Goss, a Republican) who asked the Justice Department to conduct a leak investigation, pledging their full cooperation.

I don't recall any members of the intelligence committees having publicly raised any "separation of powers" objections to this investigation until they were asked if they would submit to polygraph "tests."

I don't see how the FBI leak investigation (asked for by Congress) would have a chilling effect on Congressional oversight regarding Sibel Edmonds' allegations, especially as those who have raised the issue of Edmonds' claims with the Attorney General (Senators Leahy and Grassley) are on the Judiciary Committee and not the Intelligence Committee.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Aug 30th, 2002 at 10:49am
Thanks for these clarifying observations.  I stand corrected.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Sep 3rd, 2002 at 10:32am
Just in case anyone is following the Congress - FBI "dialog" on
leaks and leakers the following Washington Post editorial may be of interest:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27682-2002Sep2.html

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Oct 28th, 2002 at 7:56pm


Last night (Sun. 27 Oct. 2002), CBS 60 Minutes featured an interview with Sibel Edmonds, who revealed alarming details of alleged FBI misconduct. A summary is posted on the CBS website under the title, Did FBI Deliberately Slow Translation? Among other things, Edmonds indicates that the U.S. State Department and Department of Defense have been penetrated by Turkish spies:


Quote:
In its rush to hire more foreign-language translators after Sept. 11, the FBI admits it has had difficulty performing background checks to detect translators who may have loyalties to other governments, which could pose a threat to U.S. national security.

Take the case of Jan Dickerson, a Turkish translator who worked with Edmonds. The FBI has admitted that when Dickerson was hired last November, the bureau didn't know that she'd worked for a Turkish organization being investigated by the FBI's own counter-intelligence unit. And they didn't know she'd had a relationship with aTurskish intelligence officer stationed in Washington who was the target of that investigation.

According to Edmonds, Dickerson tried to recruit her into that organization and insisted that Dickerson be the only one to translate the FBI's wiretaps of that Turkish official.

When Edmonds refused to go along with her plan, she says Dickerson threatened her and her family's life.

Edmonds also says that when she reviewed Dickerson's translations of those tapes, she found that Dickerson had left out information crucial to the FBI's investigation - information that Edmonds says would have revealed that the Turkish intelligence officer had spies working for him inside the U.S. State Department and at The Pentagon.

Edmonds says she complained repeatedly to her bosses about what she'd found on the wiretaps and about Dickerson's conduct, but that nobody at the FBI wanted to hear about it - she says not even the assistant special agent in charge.

The FBI has not responded to numerous attempts to seek comment on Edmonds’ allegations and other charges in Bradley’s report.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Oct 28th, 2002 at 8:55pm
On 18 October 2002, the Washington Post published an Associate Press article on Sibel Edmonds' lawsuit titled "U.S. Seeks to Withhold Information on FBI." Excerpt:


Quote:
Citing national security concerns, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft is seeking to withhold sensitive information in response to a whistle-blower's allegations of security lapses in the FBI's translator program.

In papers filed yesterday, Ashcroft asked the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to throw out a lawsuit against the Justice Department brought by Sibel Edmonds, a former contract linguist for the FBI.

The Justice Department's inspector general is investigating whether the FBI retaliated against Edmonds, who was fired last spring and subjected to a security review after she raised allegations of security lapses. The bureau cited performance issues for the dismissal.

The Associated Press reported in June that the whistle-blower's allegations range from shoddy transcriptions by unqualified translators to suggestions that one interpreter with a relative who works at a foreign embassy may have compromised national security.

The translator program has played a significant role in interpreting interviews and intercepts relating to Osama bin Laden's network since the Sept. 11 attacks.

In his filing, Ashcroft said he was applying the state secrets privilege "to protect the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States."


A DOJ press release on its invocation of the "state secrets privilege" may be read here:
 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/October/02_ag_605.htm  
 
The DOJ's attempt to dismiss Sibel Edmonds' claim seems to have more to do with embarrassment avoidance and a flight from public accountability than with any genuine national security concerns.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Oct 29th, 2002 at 2:47pm
A report dated 14 August 2002 and titled, "Senators Question FBI On New Security Breach Allegations" by Rebecca Carr of the Cox Newspapers Washington Bureau provides additional detail on Sibel Edmonds' charges, including Can Dickerson's side of the story. (Note: in Turkish, the letter "c" is pronounced like the English "j," so "Can" is pronounced like "Jan.")

Among the new details in Carr's report is that the FBI subjected Dickerson, who denies the charges, to a polygraph "test" regarding Edmonds' allegations at a time when Dickerson was 6-months pregnant.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Jan 27th, 2004 at 9:05am
The weekly New York Observer has published an article by Gail Sheehy on Sibel Edmonds' allegations titled, "Whistleblower Coming In Cold From the F.B.I." in its edition dated 26 January 2004


Quote:
Whistleblower Coming In Cold From the F.B.I.
by Gail Sheehy


Sibel Edmonds says she was shocked at the lack of security in the F.B.I.’s counterintelligence squad when she went to work there shortly after Sept. 11. But when she spoke up, she was canned. Gail Sheehy tells her story.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Last Friday, the four women from New Jersey who have faced down the F.B.I. on its failures in preventing the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, that claimed their husbands’ lives were personally invited to the bureau’s Hoover Building offices in Washington, D.C., for a second visit. Their host was none other than F.B.I. director Robert Mueller.

Cordial and fully engaged, Mr. Mueller introduced the newly appointed head of the Bureau’s Penttbom investigation (Pent for Pentagon, Pen for Pennsylvania, tt for the Twin Towers and bom for the four planes that the government was forewarned could be used as weapons—even bombs—but ignored).

The new Penttbom team leader, Joan-Marie Turchiano, politely suggested the widows present their questions.

"O.K." said Kristin Breitweiser, the group’s hammerhead, "have you solved the crime yet?"

The Penttbom leader said they had been investigating the 19 hijackers and had run down every connection. Ms. Breitweiser recalls her next words indelibly: "As far as our investigations are concerned, we can say the hijackers had no contacts in the United States."

But the scathing 800-page report on intelligence failures produced by a joint congressional investigation had already revealed that the F.B.I. had open investigations on four of the 14 individuals who allegedly had some kind of contact with the hijackers while they were in the U.S.

The Four Moms from New Jersey, or "the girls" as they refer to themselves, waste little time on niceties these days. They were the firecrackers behind the creation of the 9/11 commission, which after a year of meager progress, is finally ready to call key administration officials to testify in public hearings on some of the most important questions we have before us as a nation.

But White House delays and circumventions have hampered the effort, and the four moms see the commission flagging in its use of subpoena power to call in key Clinton and Bush administration officials for their testimony. Personal connections between commission members—like executive director Philip Zelikow and national security advisor Condoleezza Rice—undermine the commission’s purported independence. As the commission’s work draws close to its May dissolution, it appears the main question they were tasked to answer will remain unanswered: Did our guardians of national security have enough information to prevent 9/11? Why did all of our officials who swore an oath of office to lead, protect, and serve, fail to do so on the morning of 9/11?

Last Monday Ms. Breitweiser, along with three other members of the Family Steering Committee, met with commissioner John Lehman about the need for an extension of the Commission’s May deadline-after House Speaker Dennis Hastert had already declared such an extension dead in the water. Exiting the meeting, the family members were hopeful that he would join the majority of commissioners—all five Democrats, chairman Thomas Kean and one other Republican, Slade Gorton—in supporting a postponement. More recently, as Democratic presidential candidates burnish their credentials in intelligence and national security issues against Bush’s 2004 campaign, the extension of that deadline is becoming a heated issue.

While fighting a mostly losing battle for a transparent investigation, the Moms are winning on another score: Whistleblowers from agencies culpable in the failures of 9/11—long silent—are being attracted to their mission.


Sibel Edmonds read an article published in these pages last August about the 9/11 widows’ bold confrontation with Director Mr. Mueller in a private meeting last summer, and recognized kindred spirits.

"This was the first time I’d heard anybody ask such direct questions to Mr. Mueller," said Ms. Edmonds, a Turkish-American woman who answered the desperate call of the F.B.I. in September, 2001 for translators of Middle Eastern languages. Hired as contract employee a week after 9/11, without a personal interview, Ms. Edmonds was given top-secret security clearance to translate wiretaps ordered by field offices in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities by agents who were working around the clock to pick up the trail of Al Qaeda terrorists and their supporters in the U.S. and abroad. Working in the F.B.I.’s Washington field office, she listened to hundreds of hours of intercepts and translated reams of e-mails and documents that flooded into the bureau. In a series of intimate interviews, she told her story to this writer.

When she arrived, her enormous respect for the F.B.I. was initially confirmed.

"The field agents are wonderful, but they were terribly exasperated with the D.C. office," she said.

While the news was full of reports of heaps of untranslated material languishing inside the F.B.I.’s counterterrorism unit, Ms. Edmonds has claimed that translators were told to let them pile up. She said she remembers a supervisor’s instructions "to just say no to those field agents calling us to beg for speedy translations" so that the department could use the pileup as evidence to demand more money from the Senate. Another colleague she recalls saying bitterly, "This is our time to show those assholes we are in charge."

F.B.I. translators are the front line for information gathered by foreign-language wiretaps, tips, documents, e-mails, and other intercepted threats to security. Based on what they translate and the dots they connect, F.B.I. field agents act against targets of investigation-or fail to act-in a timely manner. As an agent later told the Judiciary Committee which oversees the F.B.I., "When you hear a suspect say ‘The flower will bloom next week,’ you can’t wait two weeks to get it translated."

During her six months of work for the Bureau, Ms. Edmonds said she grew increasingly horrified by the lack of internal security she saw inside the very agency tasked with protecting our national security.

In papers filed with the F.B.I.’s internal investigative office, the Department of Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and most recently with the 9/11 Commission, she has reported serious ongoing failures in the language division of the F.B.I. Washington Field Office. They include security lapses in hiring and monitoring of translators, investigations that have been compromised by incorrect or misleading translations sent to field agents; and thousands of pages of translations falsely labeled "not pertinent" by Middle Eastern linguists who were either not qualified in the target language or English, or, worse, protecting targets of investigation.

Nothing happened. Undaunted, Ms. Edmonds took her concerns to upper management. Soon afterward she was fired. The only cause given was "for the convenience of the government." The F.B.I. has not refuted any of Ms. Edmonds’ allegations, yet they have accounted for none of them.

On the morning Ms. Edmonds was terminated, she said, she was escorted from the building by an agent she remembered saying: "We will be watching you and listening to you. If you dare to consult an attorney who is not approved by the F.B.I., or if you take this issue outside the F.B.I. to the Senate, the next time I see you, it will be in jail." Two other agents were present.

"I know about my constitutional rights, but do you know how many translators would be intimidated?"

Shortly after her dismissal, F.B.I. agents turned up at the door of the Ms. Edmonds’ townhouse to seize her home computer. She was then called in to be polygraphed—a test which, she found out later, she passed. A few months after her dismissal, accompanied by her lawyer on a sunny morning in May 2002, Ms. Edmonds took her story to the Senate Judiciary Committee. As her high heels glanced off the marble steps of Congress she sensed two men ascending right behind her. Turning, she recognized the agent walk, the Ray-Bans, the outline of a weapon, and the deadest giveaway of all—a cell phone pointed straight at her, transmitting. "They weren’t secretive about it, they wanted me to know they’re there," she said. After being shadowed in plain sight many more times, she said with dark humor, "I call them my escorts."

After her meeting, Senator Chuck Grassley, the Republican vice-chair of the Judiciary Committee to whom Ms. Edmonds appealed, had his investigators check her out. Then they, along with staffers for Senator Patrick Leahy, called for a joint briefing in the summer of 2002. The F.B.I. sent a unit chief from the language division and an internal security official.

In a lengthy, unclassified session that one participant describes as bizarre, the windows fogged up as the session finished; it was that tense, "None of the F.B.I. officials’ answers washed, and they could tell we didn’t believe them." He chuckles remembering one of the Congressional investigators saying, "You basically admitted almost all that Sibel alleged, yet you say there’s no problem here. What’s wrong with this picture?"

The Bureau briefers shrugged, put on their coats, and left. There was no way the F.B.I. was going to admit to another spy scandal only months after being scorched by the Webster Report on one of the most dangerous double agents in F.B.I. history, Robert Hanssen.

"I think the F.B.I. is ignoring a very major internal security breach," said Grassley, "and a potential espionage breach."

Unlike those whistleblowers whose cause is redress of personal grievances, Ms. Edmonds impressed Grassley as passionately patriotic.

"The basic problem is, heads don’t roll," Sen. Grassley said. "The culture of the F.B.I. is to worry about their own public relations. If you’re going to change that culture, somebody’s got to get fired." He is not optimistic, however, that Congress will act aggressively. "Nobody wants to take on the F.B.I."

The translator had filed a complaint with the Inspector General of the Department of Justice on March 7, 2002. She was told then that an investigation would be undertaken and she could expect a report by the fall of 2002. Twenty-one months later, she is still waiting. She also filed a First Amendment case against the Department of Justice and the F.B.I. And a Freedom of Information case against the F.B.I. for release of documents pertaining to her work for the Bureau, to confirm her allegations. The F.B.I. refused her FOIA request. Their stated reason was the pending investigation by Justice, which, her sources in the Senate tell her, will probably be held up until after the November election.

When Ms. Edmonds wouldn’t go away or keep still, F.B.I. Director Mueller asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to assert the State Secrets Privilege in the case of Ms. Edmonds versus Department of Justice. Mr. Ashcroft obliged.

The State Secrets Privilege is the neutron bomb of legal tactics. In the rare cases where the government invokes it to withhold evidence or to block discovery in the name of national security, it can effectively terminate the case. According to a 1982 Appeals Court ruling. "Once the court is satisfied that the information poses a reasonable danger to secrets of state, even the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege ._"

In interviews conducted over recent weeks with a senior F.B.I. agent who worked closely with Ms. Edmonds, former F.B.I. counterterrorism agents, and with current and former members of Congress involved in national security issues, a picture emerged of the dark undercurrents that run beneath our best counterterrorism efforts, and the punishments meted out to those who dare to expose it.

Does Ms. Edmonds pose a danger to secrets of state? Or do the secrets buried in the nerve center of the F.B.I.’s counterterrorism squad pose a danger to Americans living under the politics of dread?


Edmonds was seen as a jewel when the F.B.I. found her only a week after September 11, 2001. With reports of stacks of untranslated "chatter" from Middle Eastern suspects and their supporters, the embarrassed Bureau couldn’t wait to hire this Turkish-American graduate student who speaks four languages, not only Turkish, Farsi (the Iranian language) and Azerbaijani, but perfect American-English. The graduate student was carrying five courses in preparation for her Master’s degree and was in mourning for her father’s recent death. "But I felt like I was being called to duty."

Inside the F.B.I.’s Washington field office roughly 200 translators sit hip to hip in one large room that is a linguistic cacophony of chatter from 185 different countries. The few Arabic translators may be flanked by a Farsi speaker on one side, an Urdu speaker on the other, and a translator of Chinese chatter behind them.

In a security briefing she was told that any documents marked "Top Secret" had to be locked up when employees went to lunch. Laptops had to be kept in a safe. Any contacts with foreign people, even social, had to be reported. She also signed a document promising to report any suspicious activities of other translators. She was impressed with the stringency of F.B.I. rules.

The Translation Department is treated by the F.B.I. as highly sensitive. Yet her badge allowed her and other translators to enter and exit the building without passing through security, and within the sanctum itself they could pass freely from floor to floor and to any agent’s office. Ms. Edmonds saw several different individuals leave the building with documents or audio tapes in their gym bags. When she called security to report it, nothing was done.

She was one of three Turkish translators working on real time wiretaps, e-mails, and documents related to 9/11 investigations. One of her colleagues was an unassuming immigrant whose first employment on entering the U.S. was as a busboy. Ms. Edmonds was dismayed to learn that he had been hired despite failing to pass the English equivalency exam. When he was chosen to go to Guantánamo Bay, to translate interrogations with the half-dozen Turkish detainees in America’s war on terror, she remembers with both compassion and disgust hearing her colleague wail, "I can’t do this!"

But it was her other colleague who gave her the greatest cause for concern-and her reports to her superiors as well as an alphabet soup of government commissions and agencies remain unanswered.

Melek Can Dickerson was a very friendly Turkish woman, married to a major in the U.S. Air Force. She liked to be called informally "Jan."

The account that follows, which comes from extended interviews with Ms. Edmonds, was related in testimony to the Senate Judiciary committee.

"I began to be suspicious as early as November, 2001" said Ms. Edmonds. "In conversation Jan mentioned these suspects and said ‘I can’t believe they’re monitoring these people.’"

"How would you know?" Ms. Edmonds remembers saying. She said Dickerson told her she had worked for them in a Turkish organization; she talked about how she shopped for them at a Middle Eastern grocery store in Alexandria.

Ms. Edmonds has told the Judiciary Committee that soon after, Ms. Dickerson tried to establish social ties with her, suggesting they meet in Alexandria and introduce their husbands to each other.

When Sibel invited the visitors in for tea, she said, Major Dickerson began asking Matthew Edmonds if the couple had many friends from Turkey here in the U.S. Mr. Edmonds said he didn’t speak Turkish, so they didn’t associate with many Turkish people. The Air Force officer then began talking up a Turkish organization in Washington that he described, according to the Edmondses, as "a great place to make connections and it could be very profitable."

Sibel was sickened. This organization was the very one she and Jan Dickerson were monitoring in a 9/11 investigation. Since Sibel had adhered to the rule that an F.B.I. employee does not discuss bureau matters with one’s mate, her husband innocently continued the conversation. Ms. Dickerson and her husband offered to introduce the Edmondses to people connected to the Turkish embassy in Washington who belonged to this organization.

"These two people were the top targets of our investigation!" Ms. Edmonds said of the people the Dickersons proposed to introduce them to.

"My husband keeps thinking he’s talking about promoting business deals," Ms. Edmonds later said of the encounter. "He has no idea the man is talking about criminal activities with some semi-legitimate front."

These are classic "pitch activities" to get somebody to spy for you, according to a Judiciary Committee staffer who investigated Ms. Edmonds’ claims.

"You’d think the F.B.I. would be jumping out of their seats about all these red flags," the staffer said.

The targets of that F.B.I. investigation left the country abruptly in 2002. Later, Ms. Edmonds discovered that Ms. Dickerson had managed to get hold of translations meant for Ms. Edmonds, forge her signature, and render the communications useless.

"These were documents directly related to a 9/11 investigation and suspects, and they had been sent to field agents in at least two cities." By accident, Ms. Edmonds discovered the breach—up to 400 pages of translations marked "not pertinent"—and insisted that those classified translations be sent back so she could retranslate them

"We discovered some amazing stuff," she remembered.

The first half-dozen translations were transcripts from an F.B.I. wiretap targeting a Turkish intelligence officer working out of the Turkish embassy in Washington, D.C. A staff-member of the Judiciary committee later confirmed to this writer that the intelligence officer was the target of the wiretap Ms. Dickerson had mistranslated, signing Ms. Edmonds’ name to the printouts. Ms. Edmonds said she found them to reveal that the officer had spies working for him inside the U.S. State Department and at the Pentagon—but that information would not have reached field agents unless Ms. Edmonds had retranslated them. She only got through about 100 more pages before she was fired.

"I didn’t go out and blow the whistle," Ms. Edmonds said. She said she first reported these breaches both verbally and in writing to a supervisor, who assured her that the F.B.I. had done a background check on Ms. Dickerson, and the matter was put to an end.

Her further inquiries to counterintelligence agents raised a small alarm. Ms. Edmonds was told that Ms. Dickerson hadn’t disclosed any links to the Turkish organization in her employment application. But nothing happened. Ms. Edmonds, despairing to another superior in the counterintelligence squad, remembers the agent saying: "I’ll bet you’ve never worked in government before. We do things differently. We don’t name names, and we usually sweep the dirt under the carpet."

She said another special agent warned: "If you insist on this investigation, I’ll make sure in no time it will turn around and become an investigation about you."

The F.B.I., contacted with these allegations, would not comment; Ms. Dickerson could not be reached for comment, but has previously dismissed Ms. Edmonds’ story as "preposterous." The F.B.I. has also previously said that it did not believe that Ms. Dickerson acted maliciously, though members of the Judiciary committee have expressed dissatisfaction with the F.B.I.’s investigation.

Going by the book was not without personal sacrifice for Ms. Edmonds. She remembered her erstwhile tea companion, Ms. Dickerson, threatening: "Why would you make such a fuss over translations? You’re not even planning to stay here. Why would you put your life and your family’s lives in danger?"

Ms. Edmonds said that after she reported this threat to Dale Watson, then executive assistant director of the F.B.I., she learned from friends in Turkey that plainclothes agents went to her sister’s apartment in Istanbul with an interrogation warrant.

Ms. Edmonds had already brought her sister and mother to Washington in anticipation of such reprisals by Turkish intelligence. But her younger sister, a totally apolitical airline employee, hasn’t spoken to her since.


After two years of futile efforts as an F.B.I. whistleblower, Ms. Edmonds
figured the widows were her last resort. The former translator had information relevant to the commission that nobody else seemed to want to hear. Shortly after the Christmas holidays, in the leer of a nationwide orange alert based on a "sustained level of intelligence chatter," she contacted Mindy Kleinberg, the only mom whose telephone number is listed. Kleinberg rallied her cohorts, Kristen Breitweiser and Patty Casazza (their fourth member, Lori Van Aucken, was taking a brief "sabbatical"). The three moms jumped in an S.U.V. and gunned it down the Garden State to meet up with Ms. Edmonds halfway to D.C. at an anonymous roadside hotel. She gave them the outlines of her story, and asked "the girls" if they could get her an audience with the 9/11 commission. Her letter and follow-up calls to Tom Kean, the chairman, had gone unanswered for a year. The moms were so disturbed by all the security lapses she described, they slipped back into the sleepless agitation that was so familiar from the months after watching on TV while their husbands were turned to ash by terrorists in the World Trade Center attack. But they eagerly agreed to help.

Last week, Ms. Edmonds met with a New York attorney, Eric Seiff, a veteran of both the New York District Attorney’s office and the State Department. He finds her case extraordinary.

"We’re familiar with people in big bureaucracies putting job security over doing the right thing, but not at this dramatic level—putting job security above national security," said Seiff. He is appalled at the invocation of State Secrets Privilege "It’s the Attorney General saying to the judiciary, ‘Not only don’t we answer to Ms. Edmonds, we don’t answer to you."

The last resort, Ms. Edmonds concluded, was the federal 9/11 commission. Maybe they would live up to their mandate to do a truly independent investigation of the security lapses that allowed our country to be invaded by terrorists supported by foreign powers, who have yet to be exposed or held accountable.

She sent a full report to one of the Democratic commission members. When this writer asked him about the commission’s interest in the issues raised by Ms. Edmonds’ report, he said: "It sounds like it’s too deep in the weeds for us to consider, we’re looking at broader issues."

It has not deterred her. And neither snow nor sleet nor mini child disasters could deter the moms from keeping their dates in Washington last Friday to do battle for Ms. Edmonds. When the 9/11 commission seemed close-minded, they met with Judiciary Committee staffers, echoing Sibel’s pleadings that Senator Grassley hold his own hearings. Senator Grassley had told this writer that his hands were tied, because, "Senator Hatch is now chairman of the Oversight Committee." The staffers said they had written to both Mueller and Ashcroft several times, asking them to come in and talk about Ms. Edmonds’ allegations. No reply. Sibel was surprised to hear them admit, ‘Senator Hatch has been an obstacle on everything we’ve tried to do.’

Then a brainstorm. What if the Senate Intelligence Committee held a joint hearing with the Judiciary Committee? Breitweiser enthused, "Great, we’ve already talked to Senators Roberts and Rockefeller [co-chairs of the Senate Intelligence Committee]. We were told by Senator Roberts that the translation issue remains ‘a serious problem.’ They said they would like to hold hearings in February of this year."

The moms’ final meeting was their hour-and-a-half private session at the J. Edgar Hoover Building. Ms. Edmonds was not welcome there. But Director Mueller, said Breitweiser, seemed genuinely interested in what the moms had to say. Asked about the Ms. Edmonds case, Mueller said he had handed it over to the Inspector General’s office. Pressed, he said, "I can’t investigate myself." Yes, but, the Moms nudged, had he looked into problems in the translation department? Mueller appeared to brush off the matter as anything but important.

"Then, I don’t understand why you asked that State Secrets Privilege be asserted here?" Kleinberg piped up. "If her case was that important, why isn’t it important enough to deserve a report?"

For the first time, the director did not look cordial. So Breitweiser switched back to an earlier subject - his cooperation with a Senate hearing on the translation issue. "So, Director Mueller, I just want to get you on the record," said Breitweiser. "If the Senate asks you to testify, we have your word you’ll go?"

The square-jawed chief spook smiled at the girls’ grasp of strategy. "You have my word," they all remember his saying, "if Senator Hatch invites me to testify, absolutely I will be there."

Now all they have to do is move the immovables. But they’ve done it before. And there is one motto shared by the Four Moms from New Jersey and the translator from Turkey: We’re not going away.

You may reach Gail Sheehy via email at: gsheehy@observer.com.

This column ran on page 1 in the 1/26/2004 edition of The New York Observer.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on May 12th, 2004 at 7:29pm
Sibel Edmonds was interviewed on the independent news program "Democracy Now!" on 29 April 2004. A transcript and on-line video are available (free) here:

http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/04/29/1513230&mode=thread&tid=25

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sssss5 on Jun 13th, 2004 at 7:19am
Hey -- where's I Smell BS 2 for this one?  You like to comment about everything else, so why don't you tell us how the mighty polygraph is going to help us determine whether or not the FBI has been penetrated by double agents?  Maybe you can't b/c they've all passed pre-employment polygraphs (I don't know, but I assume they have)?  If so, I guess there's nothing at all to this story, b/c the braniacs and their infalliable machines have said that they're all trustworthy...

Anyway, the machine is not reliable, plain and simple, and it should not be given the credibility it is.  It's a similar parallel to the whole pre-war intelligence fiasco in Iraq, and the lack of intelligence prior to 9-11.  We put too much faith and trust into "technology" (in the case of our Intel agencies, it was the belief that HUMINT was no longer required, as "listening devices," "GPS bugs," satellites, etc could do the job), and we paid for it dearly.  Had we had "boots on the ground" -- actual "spies," then maybe things would be different today.  Instead we put all of our eggs into the "technology basket." At the same time, we're still putting too much faith into the "technology" behind the polygraph, and b/c of that, good people aren't getting in, and some of the people that are getting in are questionable, at the least, (not to mention at least one who is devoid of any capacity for true analysis, logic or communication of thoughts and ideas (just read a few of "I Smell BS 2" posts and you'll see what I mean)).

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Jul 1st, 2004 at 1:18pm
Journalist Christopher Deliso recently conducted a lengthy interview with FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. In it, Edmonds discusses at length her allegation that her former co-worker, Melek Can Dickerson, was a double-agent working for an organization that was under investigation by the FBI.

Edmonds notes that Dickerson had left out any mention of any previous emlpoyment from her application for FBI employment. Yet one of the relevant questions asked in FBI pre-employment polygraph examinations is, "Have you deliberately withheld any important information from your application?"

If Edmonds' allegations are true, then it would appear that the FBI was indeed penetrated by a double agent who beat the polygraph.

The relevant portion of the interview is cited below:


Quote:
The Jan Dickerson Affair: A Brief History

CD: Right. So let's discuss your specific experiences of criminal infiltration in the FBI, for example when one of your co-workers, Jan [originally "Can"] Dickerson, and her husband tried to recruit you into a criminal network that had infiltrated high levels of the U.S. government.

SE: Alright, sure.

CD: As I understand it, Jan Dickerson was also trying to protect one criminal associate – a Turkish-speaking suspect of an FBI investigation – by blocking translations referring to him. Yes?

SE: Correct.

CD: And this was an official working out of the Turkish Embassy in Washington –

SE: No, that part is not correct. I cannot talk about the position or the job of this person –

CD: But in the other media stories about your case, he was identified as –

SE: Yes, I know. The term "official" was used in the senators' memos from their [summer 2002] meetings with the FBI, and so then when cited by the media it became automatically assumed that he was government – but since this individual has never been named, I can only describe him as working on behalf of a "semi-legitimate" organization.

CD: Okay, so tell us about Jan Dickerson, and that experience.

SE: Well, I have to be somewhat general about this, but based on unclassified sources alone you can get a pretty good idea. Melek Can Dickerson was a Turkish woman –

CD: Originally from Turkey, like you?

SE: Yes, from Turkey, and she met her husband there, Douglas – Major Douglas Dickerson, that is. He was in the U.S. Air Force, stationed in Ankara. They met in 1991 and stayed in Turkey till 1994 or 1995. Then they went to Germany, where he was stationed after, for two or three years. And then they came to the U.S. in 1999.

CD: But first, regarding Turkey: do you know what Dickerson's function was there in the USAF?

SE: He was involved with weapons procurement for various Central Asian and Middle Eastern governments from the United States.

CD: Yo! Do you mean he was procuring weapons on an intra-governmental basis, or something else?

SE: Yes, from the U.S. government for these other governments. I assume it was all legal and part of his job.

CD: Okay, but in the process he could have built up contacts and connections with various unsavory characters in regional governments and in the arms trade –

SE: He could have, but I don't know.

CD: Anyway, what kind of countries are we talking about here?

SE: Oh… I don't know all of them exactly, but I guess these would be countries like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan –

CD: All of our favorites –

SE: [Laughter] Yes, right, countries like these and some Middle Eastern countries.

CD: And what about after Turkey? When they went to Germany?

SE: Well, he was stationed there, and while in Germany, Jan Dickerson started working for this semi-legitimate organization whose members, much later, were being investigated by the FBI, when I was working there.

CD: Fascinating, And this criminal group that the Dickersons were involved in, what kind of countries did it have connections with and where were its members from?

SE: Oh, that varied. Members came from all over; when you're dealing with those huge amounts of money you get people from everywhere.

CD: Americans?

SE: Of course. But also from Europe, Central Asia, etc. And this organization had branches throughout these places, in the U.S., Germany, and several other countries.

The Fateful Visit

CD: Now let's fast-forward to November 2001, when Jan Dickerson joined you at the FBI. What were her duties?

SE: She was a "monitor," the second type of translator, because she didn't have the scores on one of her two language proficiency exams. As a monitor she was supposed to make general summary translations, not verbatim.

CD: Did you have any idea at the time about her suspect allegiances?

SE: I had no idea at first. It was only after some suspicious behavior and then her and her husband's unannounced visit to our house that everything became clear.

One day in December [2001], my husband and I were at our home in Alexandria, Va., when the doorbell rang. It was Jan and Doug Dickerson. They also lived in Alexandria, so I didn't think of it as suspicious at first. I think the point for her was to introduce her husband to mine. We invited them in for coffee, and –

CD: She started trying to recruit you for their illegal activities?

SE: No, actually she herself did not. It was the husband who started talking about this semi-legitimate organization: "Hey, have you ever heard of this group?" he said, casually mentioning this organization to my husband. He replied, "Yeah, I know about them." And I started sweating, because I knew this organization was under FBI investigation, and I was by law not allowed to discuss anything about it with my husband.

CD: But, for your husband to have heard of it, it had to have been a group that was well known to the public as something fairly innocuous, right?

SE: Yes, as I said, a legitimate front. And Dickerson asked my husband if he'd ever thought of joining the organization.

CD: So there was something socially desirable about belonging in this group?

SE: Correct. And so my husband was kind of surprised, you know, because this wasn't the sort of group just anyone could belong to. "But I thought you had to be such and such a person, with such and such connections and references to get in," my husband was saying.

And then Major Douglas Dickerson smiled and pointed at me. "All you have to do is tell them where your wife works and what she does, and they will let you in like that," he said [snapping his fingers]. They wanted to sell me for the information I could provide, basically.

CD: What did you take this to mean? You would have to hand over classified FBI information –

SE: Correct. The information I could give these people would be worth a lot of money.

CD: And what would you get out of it?

SE: Well, money, and we could leave the country, you know, live a very comfortable life wherever we wanted. We would never have to work again, they promised.

CD: So what did you do then, with him propositioning your husband right in front of you?

SE: I tried to change the subject, because anything I might say on the subject would have been against the law, considering the ongoing investigation.

CD: When you went back to work, did you bring the matter up?

SE: I reported it two days later to my direct supervisor, a former Arabic translator. He told me he would file it immediately with the security department. This was in December 2001. When nothing happened, I pursued the matter with a special agent who had also been getting suspicious about some of Jan Dickerson's translations. When we finally got through to the security department, they said they'd never been notified in the first place about my complaint. I have all of the dated documents, emails, etc., still to prove it.

CD: Did Dickerson's protection of the suspects, and their larger infiltration of the American security apparatus, did these things have a deleterious effect on bureau investigations?

SE: As a result of their penetration, certain people who had been detained were released – people who had valuable information. And other targets of this investigation, key people, were allowed to flee the country, right up through January and February of 2002.

CD: These were foreign nationals based in the United States?

SE: Correct.

CD: Did you have any awareness of this exodus?

SE: I reported some of the suspects' names higher up as I came across them in our investigation. And you know what? Within two weeks, they had all left the country. Just vanished.

The Great Escape

CD: So what happened after? As far as I know, Jan Dickerson has quit the FBI and re-located to Belgium. Was she forced out when your story broke? Did she flee? And is her husband still in the Air Force?

SE: I assume that at the time of that conversation in our house, in December 2001, Douglas Dickerson was in the USAF because finally in August of the next year, the USAF held a formal investigation and confirmed this. This was a major violation of his high-level security clearance. By law he is required to report it if his wife or family members are involved with illegal activities.

Mysteriously enough, only two weeks after the formal Air Force investigation began, they both left the country, on September 9, 2002.

CD: Why did the government just let them escape?

SE: Well, after my case began in June 2002, the judge subpoenaed them and ordered the DOJ not to let them leave the country. But the Air Force gave them a free pass – by sending Major Dickerson off to Belgium to work something with NATO, a minimum two-year assignment.

CD: With NATO? Doing what?

SE: I don't know exactly, just that it was with NATO. So before leaving, a pretty angry Doug Dickerson had to make a declaration under oath that if he was requested by the court at any time he would return, and the FBI would pay for his flight.

CD: So there is still a chance that they will face justice someday?

SE: Well, we discovered that the Dickerson's also had bank accounts in several countries, some of which didn't have the appropriate extradition treaties with the U.S. … so I don't think so, no, I don't think it's likely. They're gone.

But the really outrageous thing is that, for the whole month we were subpoenaing them, starting in June 2002, Jan Dickerson was still working away in the FBI translations department, with her top-security clearance. This even though the FBI had simultaneously admitted to a congressional committee that not only had Jan Dickerson worked for this suspect organization in the past, but that she had maintained ongoing relationships with at least two individuals under investigation.

But How Could She Have Been Hired?

CD: Why was she allowed to stay, and keep her security clearance? Were they trying to protect someone higher up?

SE: I don't know. Is it possible? Yes. But I just don't know.

But at the unclassified meeting between the senators and FBI being held then, the former were in utter disbelief when the FBI admitted Jan Dickerson had been working for this semi-legitimate organization since long before she joined the bureau. "But how!?" asked the senators. You know what their answer was? "Well, she didn't write down any previous employers on her application."

CD: What? None?

SE: Correct. She didn't just neglect to mention that job, aside from others she put down. She just left the whole box blank! As if she had never worked a day in her life!

CD: And the FBI hired her? You can't even get a job in a bar without listing previous employers!

SE: Look, it took me a year and a half to get my background check performed. And that after filling out the complete application – at the bottom of which it states that failure to fill out the form correctly will result in a cash fine and jail term for perjury. A federal crime. So based on that alone, even aside from her other activities, Jan Dickerson should have been prosecuted!

CD: But instead she was hired – and kept on even after things heated up. There's something very, very suspicious about all this, especially considering the way Kevin Taskasen was hired. Do you believe another official on the inside, part of that crime ring, brought her in?

SE: I recently met with a reliable source who confirmed that Melek Can Dickerson was hired and granted TSC [top security clearance] without having to go through a background check/investigation, and that in light of [infamous FBI double-agent Robert] Hanssen the bureau is doing all it can to keep it quiet. Still, I have plenty of unanswered questions: why? By whom?

CD: That indeed seems to be the underlying question here. Did the FBI have anything else to say under this senatorial scrutiny?

SE: They made the quite pertinent point that she [Jan Dickerson] had failed to disclose her previous associations with the suspect organization. A shocked senator said, "If you gave her top security clearance, how could she not have been made to disclose [this information]?"

You know how they [the FBI] replied? "A lack of good training" was behind Dickerson's failure to properly disclose her various relationships.

CD: That's incredible. What was the reaction from the senators?

SE: They were persistent, mentioning that beyond that, hadn't she blocked pertinent information [in translations]? The FBI replied, "Oh, well, we've confirmed this in two or three cases."

Actually, there were hundreds of cases from November 2001 to February 2002 in which she obstructed investigations with her translations – or lack thereof.

CD: Right, how exactly would she do this?

SE: Well, as a monitor, she was supposed to give general translations – or not – and if not the document could be marked "not pertinent," and basically never be seen again.

In those few months, she managed to mark every file that mentioned this, these targets, [the Turkish suspect] as "not pertinent." Hundreds of files. Finally, this special agent working on the case got suspicious, and he tasked me with re-translating all of these documents.

CD: So how did that go? Did you find any damning information?

SE: Oh, yes. There was content that directly linked the suspects with the group under investigation.

CD: How many documents did you translate?

SE: Out of the pile of hundreds, I only got to 17 pieces before I was suddenly terminated.

CD: Can you tell us how long the FBI had been investigating these targets by the time you started working for them?

SE: A long time. There's really no time limit with the big criminal and counter-intelligence investigations, versus the counter-terrorism ones. These are investigations we'd never do anything about –

CD: Why?

SE: [Laughing] Because it would hurt certain foreign relations abroad, of course … and they don't want that. So even after 3,000 people lost their lives on 9/11, those behind these very lucrative illegal activities get a free pass. And they refuse to continue important investigations because of certain diplomatic relations that 99.9 percent of Americans gain no benefits from.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 2nd, 2004 at 3:51pm
Sibel Edmonds details her allegations against Melek Can Dickerson, amongst other things, in an open letter to the 9/11 Commission. Her letter is cited here in full:


Quote:
August 2, 2004

An Open Letter to the 9/11 Panel
by Sibel Edmonds

Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Chairman Kean:

It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, during which time we have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism," and has now issued its "9/11 Commission Report" [url=http://www.antiwar.com/rep2/20040722_911Report.pdf]pdf[/url]. You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report and its recommendations with our tax money, our security and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I, as a witness to the commission, made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues I am not aware of were also omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake – our national security – we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General investigation and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission, request your response to the following questions and issues.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down or even stop translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of an "extensive backlog of untranslated documents" and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translations, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript from October 2002 provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Sen. Grassley's and Sen. Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). Apparently, this confirmed report has been substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed acount of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on Feb. 11, 2004).

Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. Your report omits any reference to this most serious issue, foregoing any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations refrain from addressing this issue, which will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why does your report exclude this information despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucrat, the "intelligence czar," in a cocoon away from the action, address and resolve this problem?

Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after Sept. 11 and placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation. Dickerson was granted top secret clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Dickerson used to work for semi-legit organizations that were FBI targets of investigation. She had ongoing relationships with two individuals who were FBI targets of investigation. For months, Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as "not pertinent." Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. With the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, she took hundreds of pages of top-secret intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. With Feghali's assistance, she forged signatures on top-secret documents related to 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her top-secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau to have this security breach and espionage case investigated and publicized, especially after the Robert Hanssen scandal. The Melek Can Dickerson case was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. It received major coverage by the press. According to Director Robert Mueller, the inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue the espionage report on Melek Can Dickerson. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents.

Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, the same people remain in charge of translation quality and security. Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and no criminal investigation has been opened. Not only does the supervisor who facilitated this criminal conduct remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. Your report omits these significant incidents, and your recommendations do not address this serious security breach and likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked from translation. Why does your report exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" solve this problem?

More than four months prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan, he received information that: 1) Osama bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four or five major cities; 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes; 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States; 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism Thomas Frields at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing 302 forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and a report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001. Furthermore, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller saying that Mueller was surprised that the Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing. Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on Feb. 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, locations, witness names, and contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004 and given to your investigators). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen. Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with specific information regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

Almost three years after Sept. 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and its possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks, the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the "use of airplanes," "major U.S. cities as targets," and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order." Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the FBI Washington Field Office in Washington, D.C. Yet your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered was one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why does your report exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by not asking him questions regarding this significant incident? (Please remember that you ran out of questions to ask during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit.") How can budget increases remedy the failures of mid-level bureaucrats at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" fix this problem?

Over two years ago, and after two unclassified sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high-level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to a lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked at FBI HQ as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everyone at FBI HQ and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic language detainees (Turks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc.). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Furthermore, these detainees were either released, detained or prosecuted based on translations by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Sen. Grassley and Sen. Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). The program 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and listed him as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, as confirmed by the FBI. The Department of Justice Inspector General provided a detailed account of these problems. I provided your investigators with a specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this.

After over two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position as sole Turkish and Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to translate sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI hiring department who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism remain in their positions. Yet your report does not mention this case or the chronic problems within the FBI translation, hiring and screening departments. Accountability for those responsible for these practices that endanger our national security is not brought up even once in your report. Why does your report exclude these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received?

In October 2001, approximately one month after the Sept. 11 attack, an agent returned a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office to have it re-translated. This special agent rightfully believed that, considering the suspect under surveillance and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed information that could prove valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, Feghali sent the agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. Feghali argued that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The special agent never received an accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. This information was also provided to the Department of Justice Inspector General.

Only one month after the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing ongoing terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconduct. After this supervisor's prior misconduct was reported to the FBI's higher-level management, the Inspector General's Office, the United States Congress, and the 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to supervisor of the FBI's Arabic language unit. Today, Mike Feghali remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving the chit-chat that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. Why does your report exclude this information despite all the evidence and briefings you received?

The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information within and between intelligence agencies. The public has still not been told of the intentional obstruction of intelligence. The public has not been told that certain information, despite its relevance to terrorist activities, is not shared with counterterrorism units. This was true prior to 9/11, and it remains true today. If counterintelligence receives information about terrorism that implicates certain nations, semi-legit organizations or the politically powerful in this country, then that information is not shared with counterterrorism, regardless of the consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents have cited "direct pressure by the State Department." The Department of Justice Inspector General received detailed evidence regarding this issue. I provided your investigators with an account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities.

After almost three years, the American people still do not know that thousands of lives are jeopardized under apolicy of "protecting certain foreign business relations." The victims' family members still do not realize that answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years have been blocked in the interest of "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations." Your hearings and your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken, unwritten practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Despite your full awareness of criminal conduct by high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations, even though you are required to do so. How can budget increases resolve these problems when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can an "intelligence czar" override these policies and practices?

I know for a fact that intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as a relatively insignificant issue. Translation units are the frontline in gathering, translating and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack will probably come in the form of a text in a foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to a translation unit headed by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down – even stops – translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in criminal activities and security breaches, and who has covered up failures and criminal conduct within the department. That message may go to an unqualified translator such as Kevin Taskesen, so it may never be translated correctly and acted upon. That message may go to an agent of a foreign organization who works as an FBI translator. If an attack then occurs, one that could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell the families of the victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit in the crucial months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and in light of my firsthand knowledge of certain cases within the Bureau's language units. As you are fully aware, the problems cited in this letter are by no means based upon personal opinion or unverified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents have been confirmed by a senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice Inspector General's report on my allegations, "none of [my] allegations were disproved." As you are fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all [my] allegations and denied none" during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, your commission's hearings, 567-page report and recommendations do not include these serious issues, major incidents and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon an incomplete and deficient report.

In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings and report have disregarded many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible" because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing "visible" because the specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms and chose not to include them in its 567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-9/11, without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever and, therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like putting a gold-lined porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth without first treating the root.

Respectfully,

Sibel D. Edmonds

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 7th, 2004 at 10:27am
The "semi-legitimate" organization that Sibel Edmonds alleges was the target of an FBI investigation, and for which she further alleges FBI contract linguist Melek Can Dickerson (who passed two FBI polygraph examinations) was an agent, seems likely to be the Washington, DC-based American-Turkish Council.

For details, see Christopher Deliso's article, "Did Pentagon Reveal Name of Edmonds’ 'Semi-Legit' Group?" on Balkananalysis.com:

http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=391

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Aug 9th, 2004 at 8:19am
A charitable (to the FBI) view of Ms. Edmonds' open letter would have it that she has merely exposed a bit of cronyism, uncovered some sleazy budgetary maneuvering, and set off some standard bureaucratic defense mechanisms.  I doubt that many who are following this case are inclined to be so charitable. Indeed the surfeit of unanswered questions, unfollowed paths, and uninvestigated evidence so well documented in her letter indicate a corruption (in the FBI and elsewhere) that is so diffuse and far reaching as to justify suspicions of high treason.  This is a scandal that makes the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss case seem tame by comparison.  

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Sep 11th, 2004 at 11:30am
Sibel Edmonds spoke at a press conference organized by Daniel Ellsberg's Truth-Telling Project on Wednesday, 8 September 2004 at the National Press Club.

In response to a question, she mentioned, among other things, the circumstances of the polygraph examination that the FBI administered to her:

"...[F]inally, two weeks, three weeks before I was fired -- again "they" -- the management -- they came to me and they said I have to take a polygraph exam -- polygraph test -- regarding my allegations. I said, "Okay, do I have to?" They said, "No... If you refuse you'll be fired. If you take and you fail you'll be fired, and if you take the polygraph and you pass...hmm...we'll see about that." So, not taking it I was going to get fired and I -- I was ready to stand by all these cases because I had evidence, I had documents. I went there and took the polygraph, and I passed the polygraph one hundred percent -- no glitch whatsoever -- and two weeks later they fired me anyway."

A number of other high profile whistleblowers spoke at the conference and signed a Call to Patriotic Whistleblowing urging public employees with access to documents wrongly classified to cover-up government misconduct to leak them. An on-line audio recording of the conference is available here:

http://dc.indymedia.org/feature/display/105059/index.php

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Nov 4th, 2004 at 4:22pm
On 23 October 2004, FBI whistleblowers Sibel Edmonds and Frederick Whitehurst were interviewed together on Scott Horton's Weekend Interview Show. The 49-minute radio program (advertisements have been cut) may be downloaded as a 5.6 mb MP3 file here:

http://weekendinterviewshow.com/audio/whitehurst2.mp3

Title: FBI Spy Allegation Ignored Based on Polygraph
Post by George W. Maschke on Jan 14th, 2005 at 11:06pm
Today, 14 January 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General released an unclassified summary of its investigation into Sibel Edmonds' allegations. The summary, titled "A Review of the FBI's Actions in Connection With Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds," may be downloaded here:

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0501/final.pdf

The unclassified summary provides details how the FBI relied on polygraph results to dicount, and fail to investigate, serious allegations of espionage within the Bureau. The following excerpt is from pp. 17-19:


Quote:
G. Polygraph Examinations

The Security Office decided that polygraph examinations would be helpful in making determinations about Edmonds' security allegations and the security violation committed by Edmonds. In a four-page request for polygraphs, drafted on February 25, 2002, the Security Officer stated that "preliminary investigation" indicated that the co-worker had not made any threats to Edmonds, but the polygraph was needed to thoroughly pursue these issues and determine whether or not the co-worker posed a security risk. The Security Officer also noted that "preliminary investigation" indicated that Edmonds had written, on her home computer, multiple memoranda containing classified information, had retained an attorney, and had threatened to go to the press. The Security Officer asked that a polygraph be conducted of Edmonds to determine whether she had written additional memoranda on her home computer or whether she released classified information to unauthorized parties.16

Based on the Security Officer's request of February 25, which was approved by the FBI, polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were scheduled for March 2002. The Chief of the FBI's Polygraph Unit e-mailed an FBI manager to say that the focus of the polygraph examinations would be to determine if classified or confidential material had been passed to any unauthorized individuals. He also stated that the polygraph examinations would focus on broad security concerns, rather than the threat that had been alleged by Edmonds.

On March 7, the day before her polygraph, Edmonds met with a higher level FBI official who listened to Edmonds repeat her allegations and then thanked her for the information. This official then contacted a manager in Edmonds' supervisory chain, who told the official that the matter was being looked into by the FBI, including by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).17 The official with whom Edmonds met took no further action.

On March 8, Edmonds took the polygraph examination. The polygraph questions asked of her related to whether she had disclosed classified information to unauthorized persons and whether she was maintaining classified information outside FBI office space. She denied those charges, and the polygrapher concluded that she was not deceptive in her answers.

The co-worker was polygraphed on March 21. The co-worker was asked about her activities. The co-worker denied having engaged in inappropriate activities. The polygrapher concluded that the co-worker was not deceptive in these answers.

The Security Officer and other FBI managers later expressed disappointment with the questions asked in the polygraphs. The Security Officer said the questions were not responsive to the allegations raised by Edmonds. An FBI manager said that the polygraphs should have been "customized" to obtain optimal results and that he was hoping the polygraphs would be more conclusive in the investigation of these allegations. The Chief of the Polygraph Unit later told the analyst that more precise questions could have been asked.

We also concluded that the polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were not ideal. In addition, we found that despite the concerns about the polygraph, the FBI never considered doing any additional polygraphs
and continued to rely on the polygraph as support for its position that Edmonds' allegations were unfounded.

-------------------------------

16Once Edmonds was notified of the polygraph, she began writing letters to FBI managers requesting a written explanation of why she was being polygraphed and what questions she would be asked. The FBI declined to provide her with anything in writing on that subject.

17That same day, Edmonds contacted FBI OPR and the OIG to report her allegations. Because the OIG opened its investigation shortly after FBI OPR was contacted, FBI OPR did not pursue the matter further.


While the report notes that "the polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were not ideal," even an "ideal" polygraph examination has no more scientific basis than astrology or tea leaf reading.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by sullivan on Jan 15th, 2005 at 9:21am
Thanks to the moderator for the link to the OIG report summary.
It may be of interest to some that Ms. Edwards now has her own
Web Site which is devoted, of course, to this matter:

http://www.justacitizen.com/

Presumably, the information posted there is subject to the
long standing gag order imposed on Ms. Edmonds and to those members
of congress (and their staffs) who have dealt with her allegations.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Mar 18th, 2005 at 12:35am
FBI whistleblower Sibel Deniz Edmonds has filed a second civil suit against the FBI. Her statement of claim provides new details regarding her allegations of misconduct within the FBI. A press release by Mark S. Zaid, one of her attorneys, is available here:

http://www.911truth.org/article.php?story=20040922144609647

Mr. Zaid also represents a number of plaintiffs who are suing the FBI and other federal agencies over their pre-employment polygraph policies.

Edmonds' 11-page statement of complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Washington, is available as a zipped PDF file here:

http://cryptome.org/edmonds-031605.zip

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 4th, 2005 at 1:11pm
Vanity Fair has published in its September 2005 issue an article by David Rose titled, "An Inconvenient Patriot" that sheds new light on Sibel Edmonds's allegations, among other things revealing that some of the FBI intercepts at issue implicate House of Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert.

Regarding the FBI's reliance on the polygraph to dismiss Edmonds's claims, Rose writes (at p. 274):


Quote:
On March 8, Sibel [Edmonds] appeared at a dingy little office in Washington's Chinatown, where she was polygraphed. According to the 2005 inspector general's report, the purpose of this examination was to discover whether she had made unauthorized disclosures of classsified information. "She was not deceptive in her answers," the O.I.G. reported.

[Melek Jan] Dickerson was polygraphed two weeks later, on March 21, and she too was deemed to have passed. But, according to an official cited in the report, the questions she was asked were vague and nonspecific: "The Polygraph Unit Chief admitted that questions directly on point could have been asked but were not." Nevertheless, then and for a long time afterward, the F.B.I. "continued to rely on the [Dickerson] polygraph as support for its position that Edmonds' allegations were unfounded."

Dickerson's polygraph test, however unsatisfactory, seems to have sealed Edmonds's fate at the F.B.I. The following afternoon, she was asked to wait in [translation-department supervisor] Stephanie Bryan's office. "[Language section supervisor Mike] Feghali saw me sitting there and leaned across the doorway," Edmonds says. "He tapped his watch and said, 'In less than an hour you will be fired, you whore.'" A few minutes later, she was summoned to a meeting with [Supervisory Special Agent Tom] Frields. They were joined by Bryan and George Stukenboecker, the chief of personnel security and the man in charge of investigating her case. Edmonds had violated every security rule in the book, Stukenbroeker said.

A bulking security guard arrived to help escort her from the building. Edmonds asked if she could return to her desk to retrieve some photos, including shots of her late father of which she had no copies. Bryan refused, saying, "You'll never set foot in the F.B.I. again." Bryan promised to forward them, says Edmonds, who never got the photos back. Edmonds looked at Frields, "You are only making your wrongdoing worse, and my case stronger. I will see you very soon," she told him. According to Edmonds, Frields replied, "Soon maybe, but it will be in jail. I'll see you in jail." (When interviewed by the O.I.G., Frields and another witness denied his making this comment.)

[Edmonds's husband] Matthew was waiting outside. "I'm not a crybaby," Sibel says. "But as I got into my husband's car that afternoon I was in floods, shaking.


A scanned PDF version of the full article is available on the weblog of the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) here:

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/files/vanityfair_clean.pdf

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by Fair Chance on Aug 7th, 2005 at 4:48pm
Dear Readers,

This seems to be more the normal than the exception.  When the decision that you are not a "team player" is made in the FBI, the behavior of supervisors and other "team" players as written in this quote is expected protocol.  The classic "those who are not with us are against us."  There are no prisoners taken.  Malcontents must be destroyed psychologically, professionally, and personnally.  The problem is that they are being taken against citizens of our own country, not enemies in war.

Rather scary for an agency dedicated to protecting your Constitutional Rights.

Regards.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Jan 7th, 2006 at 11:12am
Para. 70 of Sibel Edmonds' federal tort claim filed 16 March 2005 includes an allegation that had previously escaped my notice:


Quote:
Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that twelve other credible cases of possible espionage in the FBI/WFO/LAAU have been reported but not investigated due to fear of embarrassment as the individuals involved had already been granted a TOP SECRET security clearance by the FBI.


If hired since 1994, these twelve other individuals would have also passed FBI pre-employment polygraph examinations.

Title: New Report on Sibel Edmonds' Security Concerns
Post by George W. Maschke on Sep 29th, 2006 at 5:32am
Citing anonymous intelligence community sources, independent journalist Wayne Madsen, a former Navy officer who served with the National Security Agency, has published (on 28 September 2006) a detailed special report concerning, among other things, the security concerns raised by FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. See http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/2006_09170928.php and scroll down to the second article.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by DocHoliday on Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  :) If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by Dippityshurff on Oct 4th, 2006 at 1:33am

DocHoliday wrote on Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am:
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  :) If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian


Doc,

I know the answer to the above question.  It's because they have demons that have metastasized throughout their bodies and they now work for SATAN.  The aforementioned answer is at least as scientific as the polygraph, EH?

Proudly American!

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by DocHoliday on Oct 4th, 2006 at 2:13am
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eh? I think your on to something  ;D. Once again it's hard to believe that Polygraphy has been passed off as a science for so long, if not still to this day? Satan's rebirth would probably be in the form of a polygraph machine.

Doc Holiday :)

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Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Oct 4th, 2006 at 5:38am
DocHoliday,

Don't be too smug about the U.S. government's foolish reliance on polygraphy: the Canadian government does the same, albeit to a lesser extent. The Canadian Police College operates a polygraph school and the RCMP (the FBI's Canadian counterpart) has begun requiring applicants to submit to pre-employment polygraph screening. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service also relies on polygraphy, as do many municipal police departments, especially in the western provinces.


DocHoliday wrote on Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am:
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  :) If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian


Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by DocHoliday on Oct 4th, 2006 at 6:55am
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Maschke,

Thanks for the detailed response and links to Canadian government
Polygraph policy and guidelines.  There is definitely enough reading
material in there to last me for awhile :)  

I was aware that the Canadian Surveillance Intelligence Service (CSIS)
used the Polygraph for pre-employment screening, operations *AND*
evaluating Security Clearance.  As discussed here:
http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/90-91_e.pdf#search=%22csis%20polygraph%22

I did not realize that the polygraph was used at the municipal level.
I do wonder what uses the Polygraph has at the municipal level and how
much trust is instilled in it's results.  

Regards,

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Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by furedy on Oct 14th, 2006 at 11:46am
CANADIAN USES OF THE POLYGRAPH

Although not admissible as evidence, the polygraph is used in Canada both in its confession-inducing capacity in the case of crimes (a Toronto police polygrapher once memorably testified that he regarded himself as an interrogator with polygraphic training (i.e., the polygraph is a useful interrogatory prop), as well as in civil disputes where the polygrapher can either be “hostile” or “friendly”.  In criminal cases it’s actually useful for the Canadian polygraph industry that it is not admissible as evidence, as it is therefore also not open to cross examination.  So just as the ancient Roman critics were not able to inquire into the details of a specific entrails-reading “test”, so the specifics of a specific polygraph “test” are also shrouded in mystery, while the social disease that this piece of superstition spreads permeates all of society, as any citizen can get into a dispute with another citizen.

All the best, John

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Mar 4th, 2007 at 1:07pm
The video of the CBS 60 Minutes report "Lost in Translation," which documents the allegations of FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, which include the FBI's penetration by a polygraph-passing Turkish spy, has been posted to YouTube.com and may be viewed here:

Alternatively, the segment may be downloaded as a 300 mb MPEG file here:

http://vestigialconscience.com/Sibel60Minutes.mpg

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Mar 22nd, 2007 at 10:02am
For a good overview and update on FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds allegations of criminal wrongdoing within the Bureau, Justice Department, and elsewhere, listen to ExpertWitnessRadio.org's recent two-part interview of investigative blogger Luke Ryland. Each mp3 file is 12.5 mb:

http://www.expertwitnessradio.org/members/downloads/expertWitness-2007-03-12-Ryland.mp3

http://www.expertwitnessradio.org/archives/expertWitness-2007-03-19-RylandWeekTwo.mp3

In addition, see Ryland's "Let Sibel Edmonds Speak" blog:

http://letsibeledmondsspeak.blogspot.com

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by DocHoliday on Apr 3rd, 2007 at 3:11am
Thanks for the update George.  


Title: FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds to Tell All, Name Names
Post by George W. Maschke on Oct 29th, 2007 at 3:24pm
FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds has made the momentous decision to go public with all of her allegations of criminality and coverup within the U.S. Government, facing the risk of criminal prosecution in the process. See "FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds Will Now Tell All - and Faces Charges if Necessary - to Any Major Television Network That Will Let Her" on The Brad Blog.

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by 1904 on Oct 30th, 2007 at 1:04pm
Sheesh. Spies passing FBI polygraph tests
FBI Experts debunking the polygraph
FBI personnel blowing the whistle on the FBI
APA demigods with false Phd's
Polygraphers outing polygraphers

The house of polygraph is



Fire_1.jpg ( 5 KB | Downloads )

Title: Re: A Polygraph-Beating Double Agent in the FBI?
Post by George W. Maschke on Aug 9th, 2009 at 10:46am
FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds yesterday (Saturday, 7 August 2009), for the first time, spoke at full length and under oath about the governmental criminality she observed while working as an FBI language specialist shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. For coverage of Edmonds' revelations, see "Deposition of Sibel Edmonds Completed, DoJ a 'No Show', Bombshells Under Oath" on The Brad Blog.

Edmonds' deposition was videotaped in its entirety, and the deposition is expected to be made available on-line. In the meantime, a video report filmed outside the National Whistleblowers Center, where the deposition was taken, is available via YouTube:

[media width=425]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSvlwg3F6q0[/media]

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