Doug Williams wrote on Nov 13^th, 2017 at 6:43pm:

DIA admits to a 20-22% failure rate. Apply that to NSA - that's about 25,000 failures each and every year.  That would require a shit load of investigating.  Wouldn't it be easier to label those individuals as vulnerabilities and just do away with them? Especially, when no one is willing or able to stop you.  Sickening.

According to the approved and relevant directives, "If, after reviewing the examination results, the requesting agency determines that they raise a significant question relevant to the individual’s eligibility for a security clearance or continued access, the individual shall be given an opportunity to undergo additional examination."

If the additional examination fails to resolve all relevant questions, the Head of the DoD Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD policy.

Using the polygraph results by themselves against someone is a crime against humanity.  That is precisely why laws and regulations are written to prevent it from happening.

George W. Maschke wrote on Nov 13^th, 2017 at 4:56am:

If this is true, NSA would fall under the same restrictions as DIA.  Namely, DODI 5210.91, which forbids taking any unfavorable administrative actions based solely on the polygraph 'results'

Why is no one stopping these Agencies and their Offices of Security from committing this horrible abuse?

Fraud [frôd] NOUN - wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain.

•a person or thing intended to deceive others, typically by unjustifiably claiming or being credited with accomplishments or qualities.

Resistance will keep building until there is a revolt, as more and more innocent people lose their jobs, careers and reputations.

Anyone who has had unfavorable administrative actions taken against them based solely on the results of the polygraph should contact Dr. Maschke ASAP.

* if you are in doubt as to what constitutes an unfavorable administrative action see CFR Title 32, Part 154, subpart A - 
(bb) Unfavorable administrative action. Adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this part.
(cc) Unfavorable personnel security determination. A denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information; denial or revocation of access to classified information; denial or revocation of a Special Access authorization (including access to SCI); nonappointment to or nonselection for appointment to a sensitive position; nonappointment to or nonselection for any other position requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part; reassignment to a position of lesser sensitivity or to a nonsensitive position; and nonacceptance for or discharge from the Armed Forces when any of the foregoing actions are based on derogatory information of personnel security significance.

Assuming a base rate of 1 in 10,000, the total number of yearly polygraphs of 129,000 should yield about 13 truly guilty individuals, and we would expect these 13 people to be indicted for espionage.  Yet the numbers indicate that while one or two have been indicted per year (Hal Martin and others), we have not seen anything close to 13 indictments per year.  Of course, a failed polygraph by itself is not grounds for indictment; we would expect a failed or problematic polygraph to engender a background investigation into the problematic areas.

Perhaps a problematic polygraph is all the justification the NSA needs to fire an employee, and without any corroborating evidence.

Regards, Evan S

George W. Maschke wrote on Nov 13^th, 2017 at 4:56am:


There is absolutely no legitimate reason for the government agencies to continue to use the polygraph as a "lie detector". It is worthless!  No, it is worse than worthless when you factor in all the hundreds of thousands of people who've been falsely branded as liars and had their lives ruined. STOP THE MADNESS!

In 2016, DoD polygraph examiner Brian R. Morris reported that since Edward Snowden's 2013 disclosure of NSA documents to journalists Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras, and Ewen MacAskill, the annual number of internal polygraph examinations had tripled from the May 2010 to April 2011 level of over 43,000. That is to say, DoD (which includes the NSA) is conducting over 129,000 polygraph examinations per year.

Nonetheless, DoD and NSA polygraphers have yet to catch a spy, and former NSA contractor Hal Martin, who last year was arrested for keeping a hoard of terabytes of classified data at his home, reportedly passed at least one polygraph "test."

The New York Times now reports that the NSA is relying on the pseudoscience of polygraphy in its hunt for "the Shadow Brokers," a person or group of persons who have collected, and are making public, NSA hacking tools.

The following is cited from Scott Shane, Nicole Perlroth, and David E. Sanger's 12 November 2017 article, "Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A. to Its Core":

Quote:


Although the polygraph is only mentioned in passing, as cited above, the entire article is well worth reading.

I welcome comment from anyone with knowledge of the polygraph efforts underway at NSA to comment here, or to contact AntiPolygraph.org privately.