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Topic Summary - Displaying 5 post(s).
Posted by: xenonman
Posted on: Jun 17th, 2015 at 3:42pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Does DIA routinely polygraph all its applicants now?
Posted by: xenonman
Posted on: Jun 17th, 2015 at 3:40pm
  Mark & Quote
George W. Maschke wrote on Apr 19th, 2015 at 9:35am:
As noted on the blog, AntiPolygraph.org has obtained and published a set of leaked Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) "confirmed countermeasure" case files:

https://antipolygraph.org/blog/2015/04/18/leaked-documents-point-to-dias-inabili...

These cases provide insight into the kind of activity that results in accusations of countermeasure use. Such activities are broadly: 1) anything that affects the seat pad or foot pad tracings (like using a tack in one's shoe, pressing one's toes to the floor, or pressing down on the polygraph chair's arm rests with one's arms) and 2) deep breathing.

Does DIA routinely polygraph all applicants now?
Nothing in the case files suggests any ability to detect the kinds of countermeasures outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector or in Doug Williams' manual, How to Sting the Polygraph.

The DIA countermeasure case files suggest that the countermeasures being "detected" at DIA are largely those performed by individuals who haven't done their homework, and that actual spies, saboteurs, or terrorists who do understand polygraph procedure and proper countermeasures are unlikely to be caught.

Because DIA's countermeasure "detection" techniques are the same as taught to other federal agencies, the shortcomings associated with DIA's countermeasure detection efforts are likely to exist with respect to other federal agencies as well.

Questions? Comments?

Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Apr 19th, 2015 at 6:22pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Quote:
George, where did you get this file from?


I won't comment on the source of the DIA countermeasure case files other than to say that I'm confident that they are genuine.

By the way, this story is currently on the front page of Slashdot:

http://science.slashdot.org/story/15/04/19/1423208/dia-polygraph-countermeasure-...
Posted by: busted
Posted on: Apr 19th, 2015 at 2:45pm
  Mark & Quote
George, where did you get this file from?  Interesting stuff in here.  Let me tell you what happened to me a while back, I got caught by the CIA using countermeasures (CMs).  I posted my story a while back, see my old thread here:
https://antipolygraph.org/cgi-bin/forums/YaBB.pl?num=1308954994/45#52

I denied it of course and ever confessed to using CMs, but they knew.  I have myself to blame because I used CMs incorrectly.  The test was a relevant/irrelevant test.  I used breathing CMs during the irrelevant questions which was a big mistake (TLBTLD page 151).  I'm not sure what they saw on the charts about my breathing, but since those tubes measure breathing, it makes sense that they saw something.  When I used mental countermeasures, correctly, at a later polygraph elsewhere, I passed with ease.   Don't bother with breathing CMs folks, even if you can do it right, it is too risky since breathing is monitored no matter how you look at it.  Nothing monitors your mental thoughts, that would be impossible, so use mental CMs.  I personally like to ask myself a specific question about something really naughty I've done in the past that nobody knows about so that I create that reaction spike.

I agree that when an agency says they caught someone using countermeasures, the person has to admit to using for this to be the case.  Otherwise, it is all subjective and the spikes in the chart can be chalked up to applicant nervousness, health problems, or something else.  In all the polys I've taken, I am ALWAYS accused of hiding something or using CMs.  Polygraphers do this to EVERYONE, to see if you will fold and confess to doing so.  It is part of the routine, nothing new here.  Rule #1 about taking a poly: Never confess to anything!  I'm pretty sure many other applicants have had their polygraph charts look similar to these, but they never confessed to using CMs or anything and probably ended up "passing"!
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Apr 19th, 2015 at 9:35am
  Mark & Quote
As noted on the blog, AntiPolygraph.org has obtained and published a set of leaked Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) "confirmed countermeasure" case files:

https://antipolygraph.org/blog/2015/04/18/leaked-documents-point-to-dias-inabili...

These cases provide insight into the kind of activity that results in accusations of countermeasure use. Such activities are broadly: 1) anything that affects the seat pad or foot pad tracings (like using a tack in one's shoe, pressing one's toes to the floor, or pressing down on the polygraph chair's arm rests with one's arms) and 2) deep breathing.

Nothing in the case files suggests any ability to detect the kinds of countermeasures outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector or in Doug Williams' manual, How to Sting the Polygraph.

The DIA countermeasure case files suggest that the countermeasures being "detected" at DIA are largely those performed by individuals who haven't done their homework, and that actual spies, saboteurs, or terrorists who do understand polygraph procedure and proper countermeasures are unlikely to be caught.

Because DIA's countermeasure "detection" techniques are the same as taught to other federal agencies, the shortcomings associated with DIA's countermeasure detection efforts are likely to exist with respect to other federal agencies as well.

Questions? Comments?
 
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