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Topic Summary - Displaying 25 post(s).
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Aug 9th, 2009 at 10:46am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds yesterday (Saturday, 7 August 2009), for the first time, spoke at full length and under oath about the governmental criminality she observed while working as an FBI language specialist shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. For coverage of Edmonds' revelations, see "Deposition of Sibel Edmonds Completed, DoJ a 'No Show', Bombshells Under Oath" on The Brad Blog.

Edmonds' deposition was videotaped in its entirety, and the deposition is expected to be made available on-line. In the meantime, a video report filmed outside the National Whistleblowers Center, where the deposition was taken, is available via YouTube:

Posted by: 1904 - Ex Member
Posted on: Oct 30th, 2007 at 1:04pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Sheesh. Spies passing FBI polygraph tests
FBI Experts debunking the polygraph
FBI personnel blowing the whistle on the FBI
APA demigods with false Phd's
Polygraphers outing polygraphers

The house of polygraph is

Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Oct 29th, 2007 at 3:24pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds has made the momentous decision to go public with all of her allegations of criminality and coverup within the U.S. Government, facing the risk of criminal prosecution in the process. See "FBI Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds Will Now Tell All - and Faces Charges if Necessary - to Any Major Television Network That Will Let Her" on The Brad Blog.
Posted by: DocHoliday
Posted on: Apr 3rd, 2007 at 3:11am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Thanks for the update George.   

Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Mar 22nd, 2007 at 10:02am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
For a good overview and update on FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds allegations of criminal wrongdoing within the Bureau, Justice Department, and elsewhere, listen to's recent two-part interview of investigative blogger Luke Ryland. Each mp3 file is 12.5 mb:

In addition, see Ryland's "Let Sibel Edmonds Speak" blog:
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Mar 4th, 2007 at 1:07pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
The video of the CBS 60 Minutes report "Lost in Translation," which documents the allegations of FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, which include the FBI's penetration by a polygraph-passing Turkish spy, has been posted to and may be viewed here:

Alternatively, the segment may be downloaded as a 300 mb MPEG file here:
Posted by: furedy
Posted on: Oct 14th, 2006 at 11:46am
  Mark & QuoteQuote

Although not admissible as evidence, the polygraph is used in Canada both in its confession-inducing capacity in the case of crimes (a Toronto police polygrapher once memorably testified that he regarded himself as an interrogator with polygraphic training (i.e., the polygraph is a useful interrogatory prop), as well as in civil disputes where the polygrapher can either be “hostile” or “friendly”.  In criminal cases it’s actually useful for the Canadian polygraph industry that it is not admissible as evidence, as it is therefore also not open to cross examination.  So just as the ancient Roman critics were not able to inquire into the details of a specific entrails-reading “test”, so the specifics of a specific polygraph “test” are also shrouded in mystery, while the social disease that this piece of superstition spreads permeates all of society, as any citizen can get into a dispute with another citizen.

All the best, John
Posted by: DocHoliday
Posted on: Oct 4th, 2006 at 6:55am
  Mark & Quote
Hash: SHA1


Thanks for the detailed response and links to Canadian government
Polygraph policy and guidelines.  There is definitely enough reading
material in there to last me for awhile Smiley   

I was aware that the Canadian Surveillance Intelligence Service (CSIS)
used the Polygraph for pre-employment screening, operations *AND*
evaluating Security Clearance.  As discussed here:

I did not realize that the polygraph was used at the municipal level.
I do wonder what uses the Polygraph has at the municipal level and how
much trust is instilled in it's results.   


Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla -
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Oct 4th, 2006 at 5:38am
  Mark & Quote

Don't be too smug about the U.S. government's foolish reliance on polygraphy: the Canadian government does the same, albeit to a lesser extent. The Canadian Police College operates a polygraph school and the RCMP (the FBI's Canadian counterpart) has begun requiring applicants to submit to pre-employment polygraph screening. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service also relies on polygraphy, as do many municipal police departments, especially in the western provinces.

DocHoliday wrote on Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am:
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  Smiley If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian

Posted by: DocHoliday
Posted on: Oct 4th, 2006 at 2:13am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Hash: SHA1

eh? I think your on to something  Grin. Once again it's hard to believe that Polygraphy has been passed off as a science for so long, if not still to this day? Satan's rebirth would probably be in the form of a polygraph machine.

Doc Holiday Smiley

Version: GnuPG v1.4.4 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla -
Posted by: Dippityshurff - Ex Member
Posted on: Oct 4th, 2006 at 1:33am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
DocHoliday wrote on Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am:
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  Smiley If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian


I know the answer to the above question.  It's because they have demons that have metastasized throughout their bodies and they now work for SATAN.  The aforementioned answer is at least as scientific as the polygraph, EH?

Proudly American!
Posted by: DocHoliday
Posted on: Oct 3rd, 2006 at 7:30am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
I find it humorous that United States government agencies still have faith in a flawed technology that has led to countless security breaches  Smiley If anyone can go buy a $50 tutorial that teaches the methodology behind exploiting the system, how can the government consciously still employ it.

- Proudly Canadian
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Sep 29th, 2006 at 5:32am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Citing anonymous intelligence community sources, independent journalist Wayne Madsen, a former Navy officer who served with the National Security Agency, has published (on 28 September 2006) a detailed special report concerning, among other things, the security concerns raised by FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. See and scroll down to the second article.
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Jan 7th, 2006 at 11:12am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Para. 70 of Sibel Edmonds' federal tort claim filed 16 March 2005 includes an allegation that had previously escaped my notice:

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that twelve other credible cases of possible espionage in the FBI/WFO/LAAU have been reported but not investigated due to fear of embarrassment as the individuals involved had already been granted a TOP SECRET security clearance by the FBI.

If hired since 1994, these twelve other individuals would have also passed FBI pre-employment polygraph examinations.
Posted by: Fair Chance
Posted on: Aug 7th, 2005 at 4:48pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Dear Readers,

This seems to be more the normal than the exception.  When the decision that you are not a "team player" is made in the FBI, the behavior of supervisors and other "team" players as written in this quote is expected protocol.  The classic "those who are not with us are against us."  There are no prisoners taken.  Malcontents must be destroyed psychologically, professionally, and personnally.  The problem is that they are being taken against citizens of our own country, not enemies in war.

Rather scary for an agency dedicated to protecting your Constitutional Rights.

Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Aug 4th, 2005 at 1:11pm
  Mark & Quote
Vanity Fair has published in its September 2005 issue an article by David Rose titled, "An Inconvenient Patriot" that sheds new light on Sibel Edmonds's allegations, among other things revealing that some of the FBI intercepts at issue implicate House of Representatives Speaker Dennis Hastert.

Regarding the FBI's reliance on the polygraph to dismiss Edmonds's claims, Rose writes (at p. 274):

On March 8, Sibel [Edmonds] appeared at a dingy little office in Washington's Chinatown, where she was polygraphed. According to the 2005 inspector general's report, the purpose of this examination was to discover whether she had made unauthorized disclosures of classsified information. "She was not deceptive in her answers," the O.I.G. reported.

[Melek Jan] Dickerson was polygraphed two weeks later, on March 21, and she too was deemed to have passed. But, according to an official cited in the report, the questions she was asked were vague and nonspecific: "The Polygraph Unit Chief admitted that questions directly on point could have been asked but were not." Nevertheless, then and for a long time afterward, the F.B.I. "continued to rely on the [Dickerson] polygraph as support for its position that Edmonds' allegations were unfounded."

Dickerson's polygraph test, however unsatisfactory, seems to have sealed Edmonds's fate at the F.B.I. The following afternoon, she was asked to wait in [translation-department supervisor] Stephanie Bryan's office. "[Language section supervisor Mike] Feghali saw me sitting there and leaned across the doorway," Edmonds says. "He tapped his watch and said, 'In less than an hour you will be fired, you whore.'" A few minutes later, she was summoned to a meeting with [Supervisory Special Agent Tom] Frields. They were joined by Bryan and George Stukenboecker, the chief of personnel security and the man in charge of investigating her case. Edmonds had violated every security rule in the book, Stukenbroeker said.

A bulking security guard arrived to help escort her from the building. Edmonds asked if she could return to her desk to retrieve some photos, including shots of her late father of which she had no copies. Bryan refused, saying, "You'll never set foot in the F.B.I. again." Bryan promised to forward them, says Edmonds, who never got the photos back. Edmonds looked at Frields, "You are only making your wrongdoing worse, and my case stronger. I will see you very soon," she told him. According to Edmonds, Frields replied, "Soon maybe, but it will be in jail. I'll see you in jail." (When interviewed by the O.I.G., Frields and another witness denied his making this comment.)

[Edmonds's husband] Matthew was waiting outside. "I'm not a crybaby," Sibel says. "But as I got into my husband's car that afternoon I was in floods, shaking.

A scanned PDF version of the full article is available on the weblog of the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) here:
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Mar 18th, 2005 at 12:35am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
FBI whistleblower Sibel Deniz Edmonds has filed a second civil suit against the FBI. Her statement of claim provides new details regarding her allegations of misconduct within the FBI. A press release by Mark S. Zaid, one of her attorneys, is available here:

Mr. Zaid also represents a number of plaintiffs who are suing the FBI and other federal agencies over their pre-employment polygraph policies.

Edmonds' 11-page statement of complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Washington, is available as a zipped PDF file here:
Posted by: sullivan
Posted on: Jan 15th, 2005 at 9:21am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
Thanks to the moderator for the link to the OIG report summary.
It may be of interest to some that Ms. Edwards now has her own
Web Site which is devoted, of course, to this matter:

Presumably, the information posted there is subject to the
long standing gag order imposed on Ms. Edmonds and to those members
of congress (and their staffs) who have dealt with her allegations.
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Jan 14th, 2005 at 11:06pm
  Mark & Quote
Today, 14 January 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General released an unclassified summary of its investigation into Sibel Edmonds' allegations. The summary, titled "A Review of the FBI's Actions in Connection With Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds," may be downloaded here:

The unclassified summary provides details how the FBI relied on polygraph results to dicount, and fail to investigate, serious allegations of espionage within the Bureau. The following excerpt is from pp. 17-19:

G. Polygraph Examinations

The Security Office decided that polygraph examinations would be helpful in making determinations about Edmonds' security allegations and the security violation committed by Edmonds. In a four-page request for polygraphs, drafted on February 25, 2002, the Security Officer stated that "preliminary investigation" indicated that the co-worker had not made any threats to Edmonds, but the polygraph was needed to thoroughly pursue these issues and determine whether or not the co-worker posed a security risk. The Security Officer also noted that "preliminary investigation" indicated that Edmonds had written, on her home computer, multiple memoranda containing classified information, had retained an attorney, and had threatened to go to the press. The Security Officer asked that a polygraph be conducted of Edmonds to determine whether she had written additional memoranda on her home computer or whether she released classified information to unauthorized parties.16

Based on the Security Officer's request of February 25, which was approved by the FBI, polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were scheduled for March 2002. The Chief of the FBI's Polygraph Unit e-mailed an FBI manager to say that the focus of the polygraph examinations would be to determine if classified or confidential material had been passed to any unauthorized individuals. He also stated that the polygraph examinations would focus on broad security concerns, rather than the threat that had been alleged by Edmonds.

On March 7, the day before her polygraph, Edmonds met with a higher level FBI official who listened to Edmonds repeat her allegations and then thanked her for the information. This official then contacted a manager in Edmonds' supervisory chain, who told the official that the matter was being looked into by the FBI, including by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).17 The official with whom Edmonds met took no further action.

On March 8, Edmonds took the polygraph examination. The polygraph questions asked of her related to whether she had disclosed classified information to unauthorized persons and whether she was maintaining classified information outside FBI office space. She denied those charges, and the polygrapher concluded that she was not deceptive in her answers.

The co-worker was polygraphed on March 21. The co-worker was asked about her activities. The co-worker denied having engaged in inappropriate activities. The polygrapher concluded that the co-worker was not deceptive in these answers.

The Security Officer and other FBI managers later expressed disappointment with the questions asked in the polygraphs. The Security Officer said the questions were not responsive to the allegations raised by Edmonds. An FBI manager said that the polygraphs should have been "customized" to obtain optimal results and that he was hoping the polygraphs would be more conclusive in the investigation of these allegations. The Chief of the Polygraph Unit later told the analyst that more precise questions could have been asked.

We also concluded that the polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were not ideal. In addition, we found that despite the concerns about the polygraph, the FBI never considered doing any additional polygraphs
and continued to rely on the polygraph as support for its position that Edmonds' allegations were unfounded.


16Once Edmonds was notified of the polygraph, she began writing letters to FBI managers requesting a written explanation of why she was being polygraphed and what questions she would be asked. The FBI declined to provide her with anything in writing on that subject.

17That same day, Edmonds contacted FBI OPR and the OIG to report her allegations. Because the OIG opened its investigation shortly after FBI OPR was contacted, FBI OPR did not pursue the matter further.

While the report notes that "the polygraph examinations of Edmonds and the co-worker were not ideal," even an "ideal" polygraph examination has no more scientific basis than astrology or tea leaf reading.
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Nov 4th, 2004 at 4:22pm
  Mark & QuoteQuote
On 23 October 2004, FBI whistleblowers Sibel Edmonds and Frederick Whitehurst were interviewed together on Scott Horton's Weekend Interview Show. The 49-minute radio program (advertisements have been cut) may be downloaded as a 5.6 mb MP3 file here:
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Sep 11th, 2004 at 11:30am
  Mark & Quote
Sibel Edmonds spoke at a press conference organized by Daniel Ellsberg's Truth-Telling Project on Wednesday, 8 September 2004 at the National Press Club.

In response to a question, she mentioned, among other things, the circumstances of the polygraph examination that the FBI administered to her:

"...[F]inally, two weeks, three weeks before I was fired -- again "they" -- the management -- they came to me and they said I have to take a polygraph exam -- polygraph test -- regarding my allegations. I said, "Okay, do I have to?" They said, "No... If you refuse you'll be fired. If you take and you fail you'll be fired, and if you take the polygraph and you pass...hmm...we'll see about that." So, not taking it I was going to get fired and I -- I was ready to stand by all these cases because I had evidence, I had documents. I went there and took the polygraph, and I passed the polygraph one hundred percent -- no glitch whatsoever -- and two weeks later they fired me anyway."

A number of other high profile whistleblowers spoke at the conference and signed a Call to Patriotic Whistleblowing urging public employees with access to documents wrongly classified to cover-up government misconduct to leak them. An on-line audio recording of the conference is available here:
Posted by: sullivan
Posted on: Aug 9th, 2004 at 8:19am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
A charitable (to the FBI) view of Ms. Edmonds' open letter would have it that she has merely exposed a bit of cronyism, uncovered some sleazy budgetary maneuvering, and set off some standard bureaucratic defense mechanisms.  I doubt that many who are following this case are inclined to be so charitable. Indeed the surfeit of unanswered questions, unfollowed paths, and uninvestigated evidence so well documented in her letter indicate a corruption (in the FBI and elsewhere) that is so diffuse and far reaching as to justify suspicions of high treason.  This is a scandal that makes the Whittaker Chambers-Alger Hiss case seem tame by comparison.
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Aug 7th, 2004 at 10:27am
  Mark & QuoteQuote
The "semi-legitimate" organization that Sibel Edmonds alleges was the target of an FBI investigation, and for which she further alleges FBI contract linguist Melek Can Dickerson (who passed two FBI polygraph examinations) was an agent, seems likely to be the Washington, DC-based American-Turkish Council.

For details, see Christopher Deliso's article, "Did Pentagon Reveal Name of Edmonds’ 'Semi-Legit' Group?" on
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Aug 2nd, 2004 at 3:51pm
  Mark & Quote
Sibel Edmonds details her allegations against Melek Can Dickerson, amongst other things, in an open letter to the 9/11 Commission. Her letter is cited here in full:

August 2, 2004

An Open Letter to the 9/11 Panel
by Sibel Edmonds

Thomas Kean, Chairman
National Committee on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
301 7th Street, SW
Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Chairman Kean:

It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, during which time we have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism," and has now issued its "9/11 Commission Report" [pdf]. You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report and its recommendations with our tax money, our security and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I, as a witness to the commission, made you aware of. Thus, I must assume that other serious issues I am not aware of were also omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake – our national security – we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States Congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice Inspector General investigation and a witness for your own 9/11 Commission, request your response to the following questions and issues.

After the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down or even stop translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of an "extensive backlog of untranslated documents" and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translations, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript from October 2002 provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Sen. Grassley's and Sen. Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). Apparently, this confirmed report has been substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed acount of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on Feb. 11, 2004).

Today, almost three years after 9/11, and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. Your report omits any reference to this most serious issue, foregoing any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations refrain from addressing this issue, which will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why does your report exclude this information despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucrat, the "intelligence czar," in a cocoon away from the action, address and resolve this problem?

Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after Sept. 11 and placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the Bureau's investigation. Dickerson was granted top secret clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Dickerson used to work for semi-legit organizations that were FBI targets of investigation. She had ongoing relationships with two individuals who were FBI targets of investigation. For months, Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as "not pertinent." Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. With the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, she took hundreds of pages of top-secret intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. With Feghali's assistance, she forged signatures on top-secret documents related to 9/11 detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her top-secret clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the Bureau to have this security breach and espionage case investigated and publicized, especially after the Robert Hanssen scandal. The Melek Can Dickerson case was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee. It received major coverage by the press. According to Director Robert Mueller, the inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue the espionage report on Melek Can Dickerson. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents.

Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, the same people remain in charge of translation quality and security. Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and no criminal investigation has been opened. Not only does the supervisor who facilitated this criminal conduct remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic language units of the FBI's counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. Your report omits these significant incidents, and your recommendations do not address this serious security breach and likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked from translation. Why does your report exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" solve this problem?

More than four months prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan, he received information that: 1) Osama bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four or five major cities; 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes; 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States; 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counterterrorism Thomas Frields at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing 302 forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after 9/11 the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr. Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to Director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice Inspector General. The press reported this incident, and a report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001. Furthermore, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to Director Mueller saying that Mueller was surprised that the Commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing. Mr. Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on Feb. 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, locations, witness names, and contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided by Mr. Sarshar on February 12, 2004 and given to your investigators). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen. Mr. Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice Inspector General with specific information regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report "Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation," provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

Almost three years after Sept. 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the 9/11 attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and its possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks, the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the "use of airplanes," "major U.S. cities as targets," and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order." Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the FBI Washington Field Office in Washington, D.C. Yet your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered was one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why does your report exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even Director Mueller by not asking him questions regarding this significant incident? (Please remember that you ran out of questions to ask during your hearings with Director Mueller and AG John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit.") How can budget increases remedy the failures of mid-level bureaucrats at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of an "intelligence czar" fix this problem?

Over two years ago, and after two unclassified sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to Director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high-level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to a lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked at FBI HQ as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everyone at FBI HQ and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet, Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic language detainees (Turks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, etc.). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Furthermore, these detainees were either released, detained or prosecuted based on translations by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Sen. Grassley and Sen. Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). The program 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and listed him as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, as confirmed by the FBI. The Department of Justice Inspector General provided a detailed account of these problems. I provided your investigators with a specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this.

After over two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position as sole Turkish and Turkic language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to translate sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI hiring department who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism remain in their positions. Yet your report does not mention this case or the chronic problems within the FBI translation, hiring and screening departments. Accountability for those responsible for these practices that endanger our national security is not brought up even once in your report. Why does your report exclude these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received?

In October 2001, approximately one month after the Sept. 11 attack, an agent returned a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office to have it re-translated. This special agent rightfully believed that, considering the suspect under surveillance and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed information that could prove valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided NOT to send the re-translated information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, Feghali sent the agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. Feghali argued that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The special agent never received an accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this. This information was also provided to the Department of Justice Inspector General.

Only one month after the catastrophic events of Sept. 11, while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing ongoing terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconduct. After this supervisor's prior misconduct was reported to the FBI's higher-level management, the Inspector General's Office, the United States Congress, and the 9/11 Commission, he was promoted to supervisor of the FBI's Arabic language unit. Today, Mike Feghali remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving the chit-chat that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. Why does your report exclude this information despite all the evidence and briefings you received?

The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information within and between intelligence agencies. The public has still not been told of the intentional obstruction of intelligence. The public has not been told that certain information, despite its relevance to terrorist activities, is not shared with counterterrorism units. This was true prior to 9/11, and it remains true today. If counterintelligence receives information about terrorism that implicates certain nations, semi-legit organizations or the politically powerful in this country, then that information is not shared with counterterrorism, regardless of the consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents have cited "direct pressure by the State Department." The Department of Justice Inspector General received detailed evidence regarding this issue. I provided your investigators with an account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities.

After almost three years, the American people still do not know that thousands of lives are jeopardized under apolicy of "protecting certain foreign business relations." The victims' family members still do not realize that answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years have been blocked in the interest of "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations." Your hearings and your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken, unwritten practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Despite your full awareness of criminal conduct by high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations, even though you are required to do so. How can budget increases resolve these problems when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can an "intelligence czar" override these policies and practices?

I know for a fact that intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as a relatively insignificant issue. Translation units are the frontline in gathering, translating and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack will probably come in the form of a text in a foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to a translation unit headed by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down – even stops – translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in criminal activities and security breaches, and who has covered up failures and criminal conduct within the department. That message may go to an unqualified translator such as Kevin Taskesen, so it may never be translated correctly and acted upon. That message may go to an agent of a foreign organization who works as an FBI translator. If an attack then occurs, one that could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell the families of the victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit in the crucial months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and in light of my firsthand knowledge of certain cases within the Bureau's language units. As you are fully aware, the problems cited in this letter are by no means based upon personal opinion or unverified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents have been confirmed by a senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice Inspector General's report on my allegations, "none of [my] allegations were disproved." As you are fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all [my] allegations and denied none" during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, your commission's hearings, 567-page report and recommendations do not include these serious issues, major incidents and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote #25). Yet your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon an incomplete and deficient report.

In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your Commission's investigations, hearings and report have disregarded many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible" because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing "visible" because the specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your Commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms and chose not to include them in its 567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-9/11, without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever and, therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like putting a gold-lined porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth without first treating the root.


Sibel D. Edmonds
Posted by: George W. Maschke
Posted on: Jul 1st, 2004 at 1:18pm
  Mark & Quote
Journalist Christopher Deliso recently conducted a lengthy interview with FBI whistleblower Sibel Edmonds. In it, Edmonds discusses at length her allegation that her former co-worker, Melek Can Dickerson, was a double-agent working for an organization that was under investigation by the FBI.

Edmonds notes that Dickerson had left out any mention of any previous emlpoyment from her application for FBI employment. Yet one of the relevant questions asked in FBI pre-employment polygraph examinations is, "Have you deliberately withheld any important information from your application?"

If Edmonds' allegations are true, then it would appear that the FBI was indeed penetrated by a double agent who beat the polygraph.

The relevant portion of the interview is cited below:

The Jan Dickerson Affair: A Brief History

CD: Right. So let's discuss your specific experiences of criminal infiltration in the FBI, for example when one of your co-workers, Jan [originally "Can"] Dickerson, and her husband tried to recruit you into a criminal network that had infiltrated high levels of the U.S. government.

SE: Alright, sure.

CD: As I understand it, Jan Dickerson was also trying to protect one criminal associate – a Turkish-speaking suspect of an FBI investigation – by blocking translations referring to him. Yes?

SE: Correct.

CD: And this was an official working out of the Turkish Embassy in Washington –

SE: No, that part is not correct. I cannot talk about the position or the job of this person –

CD: But in the other media stories about your case, he was identified as –

SE: Yes, I know. The term "official" was used in the senators' memos from their [summer 2002] meetings with the FBI, and so then when cited by the media it became automatically assumed that he was government – but since this individual has never been named, I can only describe him as working on behalf of a "semi-legitimate" organization.

CD: Okay, so tell us about Jan Dickerson, and that experience.

SE: Well, I have to be somewhat general about this, but based on unclassified sources alone you can get a pretty good idea. Melek Can Dickerson was a Turkish woman –

CD: Originally from Turkey, like you?

SE: Yes, from Turkey, and she met her husband there, Douglas – Major Douglas Dickerson, that is. He was in the U.S. Air Force, stationed in Ankara. They met in 1991 and stayed in Turkey till 1994 or 1995. Then they went to Germany, where he was stationed after, for two or three years. And then they came to the U.S. in 1999.

CD: But first, regarding Turkey: do you know what Dickerson's function was there in the USAF?

SE: He was involved with weapons procurement for various Central Asian and Middle Eastern governments from the United States.

CD: Yo! Do you mean he was procuring weapons on an intra-governmental basis, or something else?

SE: Yes, from the U.S. government for these other governments. I assume it was all legal and part of his job.

CD: Okay, but in the process he could have built up contacts and connections with various unsavory characters in regional governments and in the arms trade –

SE: He could have, but I don't know.

CD: Anyway, what kind of countries are we talking about here?

SE: Oh… I don't know all of them exactly, but I guess these would be countries like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan –

CD: All of our favorites –

SE: [Laughter] Yes, right, countries like these and some Middle Eastern countries.

CD: And what about after Turkey? When they went to Germany?

SE: Well, he was stationed there, and while in Germany, Jan Dickerson started working for this semi-legitimate organization whose members, much later, were being investigated by the FBI, when I was working there.

CD: Fascinating, And this criminal group that the Dickersons were involved in, what kind of countries did it have connections with and where were its members from?

SE: Oh, that varied. Members came from all over; when you're dealing with those huge amounts of money you get people from everywhere.

CD: Americans?

SE: Of course. But also from Europe, Central Asia, etc. And this organization had branches throughout these places, in the U.S., Germany, and several other countries.

The Fateful Visit

CD: Now let's fast-forward to November 2001, when Jan Dickerson joined you at the FBI. What were her duties?

SE: She was a "monitor," the second type of translator, because she didn't have the scores on one of her two language proficiency exams. As a monitor she was supposed to make general summary translations, not verbatim.

CD: Did you have any idea at the time about her suspect allegiances?

SE: I had no idea at first. It was only after some suspicious behavior and then her and her husband's unannounced visit to our house that everything became clear.

One day in December [2001], my husband and I were at our home in Alexandria, Va., when the doorbell rang. It was Jan and Doug Dickerson. They also lived in Alexandria, so I didn't think of it as suspicious at first. I think the point for her was to introduce her husband to mine. We invited them in for coffee, and –

CD: She started trying to recruit you for their illegal activities?

SE: No, actually she herself did not. It was the husband who started talking about this semi-legitimate organization: "Hey, have you ever heard of this group?" he said, casually mentioning this organization to my husband. He replied, "Yeah, I know about them." And I started sweating, because I knew this organization was under FBI investigation, and I was by law not allowed to discuss anything about it with my husband.

CD: But, for your husband to have heard of it, it had to have been a group that was well known to the public as something fairly innocuous, right?

SE: Yes, as I said, a legitimate front. And Dickerson asked my husband if he'd ever thought of joining the organization.

CD: So there was something socially desirable about belonging in this group?

SE: Correct. And so my husband was kind of surprised, you know, because this wasn't the sort of group just anyone could belong to. "But I thought you had to be such and such a person, with such and such connections and references to get in," my husband was saying.

And then Major Douglas Dickerson smiled and pointed at me. "All you have to do is tell them where your wife works and what she does, and they will let you in like that," he said [snapping his fingers]. They wanted to sell me for the information I could provide, basically.

CD: What did you take this to mean? You would have to hand over classified FBI information –

SE: Correct. The information I could give these people would be worth a lot of money.

CD: And what would you get out of it?

SE: Well, money, and we could leave the country, you know, live a very comfortable life wherever we wanted. We would never have to work again, they promised.

CD: So what did you do then, with him propositioning your husband right in front of you?

SE: I tried to change the subject, because anything I might say on the subject would have been against the law, considering the ongoing investigation.

CD: When you went back to work, did you bring the matter up?

SE: I reported it two days later to my direct supervisor, a former Arabic translator. He told me he would file it immediately with the security department. This was in December 2001. When nothing happened, I pursued the matter with a special agent who had also been getting suspicious about some of Jan Dickerson's translations. When we finally got through to the security department, they said they'd never been notified in the first place about my complaint. I have all of the dated documents, emails, etc., still to prove it.

CD: Did Dickerson's protection of the suspects, and their larger infiltration of the American security apparatus, did these things have a deleterious effect on bureau investigations?

SE: As a result of their penetration, certain people who had been detained were released – people who had valuable information. And other targets of this investigation, key people, were allowed to flee the country, right up through January and February of 2002.

CD: These were foreign nationals based in the United States?

SE: Correct.

CD: Did you have any awareness of this exodus?

SE: I reported some of the suspects' names higher up as I came across them in our investigation. And you know what? Within two weeks, they had all left the country. Just vanished.

The Great Escape

CD: So what happened after? As far as I know, Jan Dickerson has quit the FBI and re-located to Belgium. Was she forced out when your story broke? Did she flee? And is her husband still in the Air Force?

SE: I assume that at the time of that conversation in our house, in December 2001, Douglas Dickerson was in the USAF because finally in August of the next year, the USAF held a formal investigation and confirmed this. This was a major violation of his high-level security clearance. By law he is required to report it if his wife or family members are involved with illegal activities.

Mysteriously enough, only two weeks after the formal Air Force investigation began, they both left the country, on September 9, 2002.

CD: Why did the government just let them escape?

SE: Well, after my case began in June 2002, the judge subpoenaed them and ordered the DOJ not to let them leave the country. But the Air Force gave them a free pass – by sending Major Dickerson off to Belgium to work something with NATO, a minimum two-year assignment.

CD: With NATO? Doing what?

SE: I don't know exactly, just that it was with NATO. So before leaving, a pretty angry Doug Dickerson had to make a declaration under oath that if he was requested by the court at any time he would return, and the FBI would pay for his flight.

CD: So there is still a chance that they will face justice someday?

SE: Well, we discovered that the Dickerson's also had bank accounts in several countries, some of which didn't have the appropriate extradition treaties with the U.S. … so I don't think so, no, I don't think it's likely. They're gone.

But the really outrageous thing is that, for the whole month we were subpoenaing them, starting in June 2002, Jan Dickerson was still working away in the FBI translations department, with her top-security clearance. This even though the FBI had simultaneously admitted to a congressional committee that not only had Jan Dickerson worked for this suspect organization in the past, but that she had maintained ongoing relationships with at least two individuals under investigation.

But How Could She Have Been Hired?

CD: Why was she allowed to stay, and keep her security clearance? Were they trying to protect someone higher up?

SE: I don't know. Is it possible? Yes. But I just don't know.

But at the unclassified meeting between the senators and FBI being held then, the former were in utter disbelief when the FBI admitted Jan Dickerson had been working for this semi-legitimate organization since long before she joined the bureau. "But how!?" asked the senators. You know what their answer was? "Well, she didn't write down any previous employers on her application."

CD: What? None?

SE: Correct. She didn't just neglect to mention that job, aside from others she put down. She just left the whole box blank! As if she had never worked a day in her life!

CD: And the FBI hired her? You can't even get a job in a bar without listing previous employers!

SE: Look, it took me a year and a half to get my background check performed. And that after filling out the complete application – at the bottom of which it states that failure to fill out the form correctly will result in a cash fine and jail term for perjury. A federal crime. So based on that alone, even aside from her other activities, Jan Dickerson should have been prosecuted!

CD: But instead she was hired – and kept on even after things heated up. There's something very, very suspicious about all this, especially considering the way Kevin Taskasen was hired. Do you believe another official on the inside, part of that crime ring, brought her in?

SE: I recently met with a reliable source who confirmed that Melek Can Dickerson was hired and granted TSC [top security clearance] without having to go through a background check/investigation, and that in light of [infamous FBI double-agent Robert] Hanssen the bureau is doing all it can to keep it quiet. Still, I have plenty of unanswered questions: why? By whom?

CD: That indeed seems to be the underlying question here. Did the FBI have anything else to say under this senatorial scrutiny?

SE: They made the quite pertinent point that she [Jan Dickerson] had failed to disclose her previous associations with the suspect organization. A shocked senator said, "If you gave her top security clearance, how could she not have been made to disclose [this information]?"

You know how they [the FBI] replied? "A lack of good training" was behind Dickerson's failure to properly disclose her various relationships.

CD: That's incredible. What was the reaction from the senators?

SE: They were persistent, mentioning that beyond that, hadn't she blocked pertinent information [in translations]? The FBI replied, "Oh, well, we've confirmed this in two or three cases."

Actually, there were hundreds of cases from November 2001 to February 2002 in which she obstructed investigations with her translations – or lack thereof.

CD: Right, how exactly would she do this?

SE: Well, as a monitor, she was supposed to give general translations – or not – and if not the document could be marked "not pertinent," and basically never be seen again.

In those few months, she managed to mark every file that mentioned this, these targets, [the Turkish suspect] as "not pertinent." Hundreds of files. Finally, this special agent working on the case got suspicious, and he tasked me with re-translating all of these documents.

CD: So how did that go? Did you find any damning information?

SE: Oh, yes. There was content that directly linked the suspects with the group under investigation.

CD: How many documents did you translate?

SE: Out of the pile of hundreds, I only got to 17 pieces before I was suddenly terminated.

CD: Can you tell us how long the FBI had been investigating these targets by the time you started working for them?

SE: A long time. There's really no time limit with the big criminal and counter-intelligence investigations, versus the counter-terrorism ones. These are investigations we'd never do anything about –

CD: Why?

SE: [Laughing] Because it would hurt certain foreign relations abroad, of course … and they don't want that. So even after 3,000 people lost their lives on 9/11, those behind these very lucrative illegal activities get a free pass. And they refuse to continue important investigations because of certain diplomatic relations that 99.9 percent of Americans gain no benefits from.