...you've heard there have only been one or two people at Los Alamos, one or two people at Sandia, perhaps a small handful more at Lawrence Livermore, who have had "problems" with the counterintelligence -- counterintelligence screening test that has been administered as part of the DOE program over the past six months. It is common knowledge that one of the dirty little secrets about the implementation of the polygraph program at the DOE national laboratories is that each laboratory director, or one of the senior vice-presidents of the laboratory, has personally intervened to interview each and every polygrapher and to say to those polygraphers that he, the vice-president or he, the director, will not be satisfied until and unless everyone passes the test. Looked at from the standpoint of decision theorists, what this is doing is merely shifting down the receiver-operator curve, and I'll illustrate that in a moment. But being under no illusion that the current implementation of polygraphs at the national laboratories is similar to the way polygraphs have been admitted -- administered in other counterintelligence settings, polygraphers -- and make no mistake about it -- are under pressure from the senior manage -- the senior leadership at the laboratories to pass everyone, which of course, reduces the sensitivity of the test and makes you wonder what the purpose of the test is in the first place.