I should have also included among the suggested witnesses representatives of the most relevant scientific discipline, psychophysiology. The Senate Select Commitee on Intelligence should also hear from:

The five members of the Department of Defense Polygraph Insitute's scientific advisory board whom Director Capps dismissed (and among whom there was consensus that polygraph screening is not valid):

• John Furedy (http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/~furedy)
• William Iacono (http://www.psych.umn.edu/psyfac/core/Clinical/iacono.htm)
• Ed Katkin (http://www.psychology.sunysb.edu/psy/PsyScripts/template.asp?link=katkin)
• Christopher Patrick (http://www.psych.umn.edu/psyfac/core/Clinical/patrick.htm)
• Stephen Porges

As the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (and perhaps other Congressional committeees) prepares to discuss ways to improve security in the wake of the Robert Philip Hanssen espionage case, we can expect that counterintelligence professionals will be extolling the virtues of the polygaph to them. By calling the following witnesses, and asking the following questions, members of the SSCI might obtain a fuller understanding of what it is they are meeting to consider:

• FBI Supervisory Special Agent Dr. Drew C. Richardson of the FBI Laboratory Division, to expound upon his earlier Senate testimony that polygraph screening is completely without any theoretical foundation, has absolutely no validity, and that anyone can be taught to beat this kind of test in a few minutes. (http://antipolygraph.org/read.shtml#senate-judiciary-1997);
• FBI Laboratory Director Donald M. Kerr, to explain why he failed to answer Dr. Richardson's charges on grounds of science when asked in writing to do so by Senator Chuck Grassley (http://antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-judiciary-1997/kerr-letter.shtml);
• FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, to answer under oath whether it is true that "when the FBI implemented its polygraph program in 1994, the then current special agent class had already begun its training. Nevertheless, members of the 1994 class were administered polygraph examinations and approximately half the class failed. However, the FBI simply overlooked this problem and waived the requirements of the polygraph for the 1994 class. (1st Amended Complaint in Croddy et al. v. FBI, et al. http://antipolygraph.org/litigation/zaid/first-amended-complaint.shtml)
• Former FBI Special Agent Mark E. Mallah (http://antipolygraph.org/statements/statement-002.shtml), to talk about his polygraph experience and the intensive espionage investigation that was launched against him after a false positive polygraph outcome.
• Dr. Sheila D. Reed, who developed the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (http://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-002.shtml) polygraph screening format used by DoD and DOE, but who also concluded that polygraph screening should be stopped and was stripped of her security clearance after saying so.
• Defense Security Service director Gen. Charles J. Cunningham, Jr. (ret.), to explain under oath what happened to the data collected in Dr. Reed's 3rd Test for Espionage and Sabotage validation study (which indicated that polygrapher bias plays a significant role in determining test outcomes). DSS has refused to release any information about this study under the Freedom of Information Act, but claims the amount of information withheld consists of only two 14-page reports, suggesting that Dr. Reed's voluminous research data and draft report have been destroyed.
• Former Department of Defense Polygraph Institute director Michael H. Capps, to explain why he dismissed the Institute's entire scientific advisory board in 1995;
• Aldrich Hazen Ames, to explain how he beat the polygraph while spying for the Soviet Union/Russia. Twice...;
  
  Since polygraph advocates like to claim that Aldrich Ames' charts actually did show deception, and that Ames merely succeeded in sweet-talking his way out of it, a panel of federal polygraphers chosen at random should be convened before the assembled senators to demonstrate their amazing powers by picking out the spy after Ames' unmarked charts are mixed with the unmarked charts of the 100 preceeding and the 100 following CIA employees polygraphed.;
• Former CIA lawyer Adam J. Ciralsky (http://www.antipolygraph.org/litigation/ciralsky/ciralsky-complaint.shtml), to talk about his polygraph experience at CIA;
• CIA Director George Tenet, to answer under oath whether it is true, as alleged at para. 55 of Mr. Ciralsky's above-cited complaint, that "some of the CIA's most senior officials, including Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Station, have repeatedly "failed" their own polygraphs, some as often as six times, without repercussions. These officials have remained in their posts and have not been subjected to CIC/CEG investigations."