Link: http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.20911/pub_detail.asp ;

The most interesting stuff is towards the end under "Reforming the Clandestine Services". 

Here are interesting highlights: 

The entire system for finding, training, and deploying overseas case officers of this type needs to be completely overhauled. The "farm," the legendary training ground for case officers in the woody swamps of Virginia, ought to be abandoned. It has never had much relevance to the practice of espionage overseas. 

A starting salary of a quarter of a million dollars a year (for a CIA DO Operations Officer) would be reasonable. 

He also mentions that as far as fighing terrorists goes, the CIA should mostly abandon its traditional methods of collecting intel in the field. Instead CIA Operations Officers need to pose as Jihadists and penetrate terrorist organizations and be an "insider" within the terrorist groups. Unfortunately, because of its hiring practices, the CIA probably has only a handful of officers with the ethnic background, intelligence experience and innate ability to penetrate terrorist rings in this manner. And unfortunately, at the end of the day, those capable of doing this, wouldn't do it for a mere $60,000 per year. 

On a side note, I think I remember the Director of the DO (James L. Pavitt) or Gross stating in a speech that he would never place one of his employees in such a risky situation as penetrating a terrorist group. He said that there were only a handful (meaning 4 or 5) employees even capable of penetrating a middle eastern terrorist group and he would never place his officers in such a position. 

I'm not 100% sure if it was Pavitt who said that or Gross in another speech. 

Here's a link to Pavitt's speech: 
http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=230340