

**CONFIDENTIAL**

05 6-0759 x/1

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Polygraph

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

Director of Security

16 JUL 1986

TO: (Name, title, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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1. DDA  
7D-24 Headquarters

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DDA REGISTRY

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FORM 1-79 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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16 JUL 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Support Assistant to the DDA

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM:

Director of Security

SUBJECT: Polygraph

REFERENCE: Memo to D/Security via DDA dtd 10 June 86,  
subject: Polygraph Part I/Polygraph Part II

1. As you are probably aware, we are currently ingesting the results of an IG inspection of the polygraph program and we as well as others are looking carefully at where adjustments might be appropriate. So your memorandum on this topic is certainly timely. However, your proposal has some serious fault lines:

° Putting prospective employees through two separate and distinct polygraph examinations would be overbearing and would add significantly to the processing time for successful candidates--those that we care most about.

° Part I of your proposed polygraph program is basically technical lie detection, i.e., a blip equals a lie and if you lie you die. I find this objectionable for several reasons. First, using the polygraph as a lie detector is not valid nor reliable and is therefore unprofessional. Secondly, professionals in the Agency would rightly object to submitting their candidates to such a process. Thirdly, it would be devastating to the professional image of this Agency.

° Implementing a program such as you suggest would seriously erode the political, public and professional underpinnings of our current program. The ethics and professionalism of our polygraph program is extremely important to us, the Congress and to the public at large; and it is fragile.

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SUBJECT: Polygraph

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D/Sec.  (16 Jul 86)

Distribution:

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0759x/86

10 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security

VIA: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: [Redacted] Special Support Assistant to the DDA

SUBJECT: -Polygraph Part I/Polygraph Part II

1. Proposal: To assist the recruitment and applicant processing program for new hires, I am proposing a major modification to the polygraph program, which some will argue may lengthen the process, but frankly might actually save considerable time and money. This proposal will aid considerably in identifying immediately those candidates with a high probability of washing out before EOD.

2. Proposal: Two polygraph investigations (Parts I and II) be CONDUCTED BY TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF POLYGRAPHERS at two distinct stages of the applicant process. The first polygraph examination (Part I) is given once there is the firm indication that the applicant is someone we want to hire. Part I is given by a lie detector operator, i.e. a person trained only in the use of the instrument to detect gross deception. These operators might independent contractors or employees of commercial firms under contract with the Agency to provide this service. To illustrate: when an applicant applies for a job with a company like Hechingers, he undergoes a lie detector exam which deals primarily with his integrity in his last job, and perhaps any crime (misdemeanors/felonies) in his past. The questions are simple; e.g. did you steal in your last job, do you steal now, have you ever been convicted of a crime etc. A lie detector operator handles this examination. In my proposal the Agency should have several (perhaps 12-20) of these lie-detecter operators, either as employees, IC's, or contracted out, who will not repeat not be given the sophisticated polygraph training that our permanent OS career polygrapher cadre receives. Our lie detector examiners would be given interpersonal skills training to maximize the chances for an agreeable session between examiners and examinee during the first (and only) "lie detector" exam of the applicant (Part I). The operator's task is to ask a few basic questions, to offer no feedback on the results and to deflect any discussions with the applicant of the findings of the part I exam. The questioning might go something like this: a. "Homosexuality is defined as sexual activity between members of the same sex. Have you had homosexual experiences in your adult life? When was the most recent homosexual experience?"

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b. "Drugs are defined as marijuana, cocaine, hallucinogens, amphetamines, uppers-downers etc. for non-medical purposes. Have you used drugs in the last 5 years?" What has your drug use pattern been over the past year? When was your last use of drugs?"

c. "Do you have any ongoing relationships with foreigners? Do you have foreign relatives? Are you discussing national security-related information with any Americans? With any foreigners? Are you in coordination with any foreigners in seeking employment with our organization?"


d. "Have you committed any crimes for which you have been convicted? Have you committed any crimes for which you have not been convicted?"

3. The above questioning would have as its objective the ability to screen immediately from the many applicants those considered to be a low probability for successful EOD. Certain admissions or extreme reaction on the lie detector would disqualify the applicant flat out; no "re-do's", no repeats no discussions. We many lose some good people unfortunately this way, but probably not too many. Remember, the lie detector exam does not dig into the facts behind the examinee's answers. It is simply to elicit admission and identify gross deception. For those that survive this Part I interview, the process for employment continues, as presently devised. For those who fail this Part I test, we thus determine that they have a low probability for acceptance, and the process stops. We then move along with the search for high-probability cases.

4. Part II of the polygraph program remains exactly what our polygraph program is today and comes into play at a time in the processing that is determined to be best. It is done by the professional, sophisticated polygraphers that we have "in-house" who will continue to use the sophisticated techniques presently in place.

5. Historically, the polygraph exam is used to partially determine applicant suitability or unsuitability, but now Part I will be done by "operators" and be done quickly. Applicants can come to Washington or one of our "operators" can go to locations in the states. What results from this change is a saving of precious time and funds and will eliminate and reduce, at least to some degree, our "chasing after the wrong people" only to find that they bomb out late in the processing because of information we can likely determine by the unrefined techniques of Part I; the simple lie detector.

6. I'd be very interested in the reactions your staff has to this idea when you can.



cc: D/OP  
D/OMS

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**Date** 17 July 86

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
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2. DDA	ED	18 JUL 1986
3.		
4.		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
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As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

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