Federal Polygraph Lawsuit Second Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN DOE#6 *

1275 K Street, N.W. *

Suite 770 *

Washington, D.C. 20005 *

and *

JOHN DOE#7 *

1275 K Street, N.W. *

Suite 770 *

Washington, D.C. 20005 *

and *

JANE DOE#1 *

1275 K Street, N.W. * C.A. No. 00-______

Suite 770 *

Washington, D.C. 20005 *

and *

JANE DOE#2 *

1275 K Street, N.W. *

Suite 770 *

Washington, D.C. 20005 *

v. *

FEDERAL BUREAU OF *

INVESTIGATION *

Washington, D.C. 20505 *

and *

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE *

1800 G Street, N.W. *

Washington, D.C. 20223 *

and
*

JOHN AND JANE DOES#151-200 *

Defendants *

* * * * * * * * * * * *

COMPLAINT

(Jury Trial Requested)

The plaintiffs John Doe#6, John Doe#7, Jane Doe#1 and Jane Doe#2, bring this action against defendants the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Secret Service, for injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702 and

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

VENUE

2. Venue is appropriate in the District under 5 U.S.C. § 703 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

PARTIES

3. Plaintiff John Doe#6 is a citizen of the United States and the State of Illinois and resides in the State of Illinois. He was an applicant for employment as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. Plaintiff John Doe#7 is a citizen of the United States and the State of California and resides in the State of California. He was an applicant for employment as a Special Agent of the United States Secret Service.

5. Plaintiff Jane Doe#1 is a citizen of the United States and the State of Virginia and currently resides in the State of Virginia. She was an applicant for employment as a Special Agent of the U.S. Secret Service.

6. Plaintiff Jane Doe#2 is a citizen of the United States and the State of Maryland and currently resides in the State of Maryland. She was an applicant for employment as a Special Agent of the FBI.

7. Defendant Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) is a component of the United State Department of Justice and an agency of the United States.

8. Defendant United States Secret Service (“USSS”) is a component of the United States Department of the Treasury and an agency of the United States.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9. The utilization of polygraph examinations by various agencies of the federal government is alleged to be used in order to ferret out the truth from those who would seek to proffer a lie, whether that be in a preemployment setting or during a counterintelligence or criminal investigation. Yet as Spinoza, one of the greatest Western thinkers and philosophers, wrote more than 300 years ago in his famous treatise "Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata” (otherwise known as “Ethics”)(1677):

He who would distinguish the false from the true

Must have an adequate idea of what is false and true.

10. Unfortunately, in administering polygraph examinations in preemployment situations, neither the polygrapher (throughout the Complaint this term will be interposed with “examiner”) or the federal agency in which the applicant is seeking employment knows what is false or true, except to the extent told to them by the examinee-applicant. Despite the shortcomings and dangers of the polygraph the federal government continues to administer polygraph examinations to the detriment of individuals who would like nothing else but to serve the interests of the United States Government.

11. The FBI and the USSS use the polygraph in preemployment settings in order to indiscriminately weed out individuals who may potentially be found to have hiring problems were a complete background investigation to be conducted. This permits the agencies to avoid spending time and resources on individuals they may possibly later seek to reject from employment. As a result, however, innocent individuals are falsely labeled drug users, drug dealers, terrorists and/or spies without any reasonable opportunity to ever clear their name. After receiving a false-positive reading that falls outside an agency’s defined acceptable parameters, the applicant is simply left out in the cold while the agency continues to maintain the posture that the applicant is a liar. Moreover, this unfavorable and false information is often shared with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, whether that be federal, state or local. Not only does this result in irreparable harm to these applicants, but it denies the FBI and USSS access to qualified and capable employees. Yet when it suits the federal government’s needs, an agency will not hesitate to overlook an otherwise deceptive polygraph reading or denounce the polygraph as unreliable.

12. Many applicants for employment in the federal government have been misled to believe that the polygraph machine accurately identifies truths and falsehoods. Polygraphers, including those at the FBI and USSS, often falsely accuse applicants of deception in order to see how they will react. Others may genuinely believe the applicant is lying although they really are telling the truth. Polygraph examiners will typically tell an applicant that, for example, if they would just confess to smoking a few more marijuana cigarettes than previously admitted in writing - but to an amount still within that particular agency’s acceptable past drug use guidelines - the machine may stop reading “deception” and the examinee’s application would be back on track. Once confronted by Special Agents of the FBI or USSS that they are lying - no matter even if the applicant believes and/or knows they are telling the truth - many applicants will attempt to appease the polygrapher and even admit something that is untrue based on the examiner’s unequivocal assurances and pressure that no problems will arise. Of course, the fact that many years have passed, sometimes more than a decade, since the applicant may have last smoked marijuana, it is completely unrealistic that someone will remember whether they smoked three rather than seven marijuana cigarettes. As a result, oftentimes agencies such as the FBI or USSS will revoke the applicant’s conditional job offer solely because of what transpired during the polygraph examination, regardless of the real truth and without undertaking any efforts to arrive at an educated determination.

13. To make matters worse, every federal agency, including the FBI and USSS, conducts and uses polygraph testing in a different fashion. No standardized guidelines are followed with respect to the questions asked or the manner by which the examiners act. For example, some testing sessions are audiotaped, others not. Some applicants are permitted a second polygraph test, others not. The inconsistencies found among federal agencies has contributed to the negative image of the polygraph and the unfairness that has arisen from its use.

14. The polygraph, in one form or another, has been around for nearly one century. William M. Marston, J.D., Ph.D., is considered by many to be one of the fathers of the modern lie detector, and was one of the first to realize its commercial possibilities in the 1920s. Dr. Marston, under his pseudonym “Charles Moulton”, is probably more famous for having created the popular comic book character Wonder Woman. It is no coincidence that her magic lasso requires those who feel its bind to tell the absolute truth. Indeed, the validity and reliability of the polygraph machine, particularly when used for preemployment screening, is no more realistic than Wonder Woman’s lasso.

I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A. WHAT IS THE POLYGRAPH

15. A modern polygraph machine measures respiration at two points on the body; on the upper chest (thoracic respiration), and on the abdomen (abdominal respiration). Movements of the body associated with breathing are recorded such that the rate and depth of inspiration and expiration can be measured. The polygraph machine also measures skin conductance or galvanic skin response. Electrodes attached to the subject’s fingertip or palm of the hand indicate changes in the sweat gland activity in those areas. In addition, the polygraph measures increases in blood pressure and changes in the heart rate. This measurement, known as the cardiovascular measurement, is obtained by placing a standard blood pressure cuff on the subject’s upper arm. Finally, the polygraph may also measure, by means of a plethysmograph, blood supply changes in the skin which occur as blood vessels in the skin of the finger constrict due to stimulation.

16. A polygraph examiner purports to interpret these readings while asking a series of questions, commonly in three categories: direct accusatory questions concerning the matter under investigation, irrelevant or neutral questions, and more general “control” questions concerning wrongdoing by the subject in general. The examiner forms an opinion of the subject’s truthfulness by allegedly comparing the physiological reactions to each set of questions.

17. Most preemployment screening examinations utilize a series of relevant-irrelevant questions. A person is asked a series of question which contain relevant information about the subject matter being tested, which are interspersed among a series of neutral questions. If the physiological reactions are stronger to the relevant questions than to the neutral ones, the person is diagnosed as being deceptive. Conversely, a lack of difference is considered to be an indication of truthfulness. This test tends to be vague and broad because the examiner is seeking to determine what an employee or prospective employee has done many years in the past or may do in the future. Relevant-irrelevant tests are thought by experts to be less accurate than control question tests.

18. Upon information and belief, an expert polygraph examination generally takes a minimum of several hours to complete. However, examinations conducted utilizing the relevant-irrelevant test typically are much shorter in duration.

19. A number of extrinsic factors effect polygraph validity. Because the examiner must formulate the questions, supplement the data with his own impression of the subject during the exam, and infer lies from a combination of the data and his impressions, the level of skill and training of the examiner will effect the reliability of the results. A polygraph examiner’s interpretation of polygraph results is not, in fact, true evidence of conduct. It is merely the opinion of an individual with no knowledge about any of the facts surrounding the subject matter of the questions.

20. Upon information and belief, polygraph research (direction, funding, and evaluation), training, and operational review is primarily controlled by those who practice polygraphy and depend upon it for a living. This is tantamount to having the governments’ cancer research efforts controlled by the tobacco industry.

B. THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE POLYGRAPH

21. The late Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., once stated about polygraph testing that “[t]he process smacks of 20th century witchcraft...The burden of proof should be on those who assert the efficacy of polygraph in predicting the behavior of prospective...employees. There have been practically no efforts to compile this proof...Why then do [employers] have such blind faith in these devices? In my opinion, it is directly related to the role of science and technology in our society - the cult of the ‘expert’. There is an increasing belief that anything scientific must be more reliable and rational than the judgment of men...There is no necessity for these infringements of freedom and invasions of privacy; but even if there were a necessity for them, I believe that every citizen should answer like William Pitt: ‘Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human liberty. It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves.’”

22. The scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques. This lack of scientific consensus is reflected in the disagreement among state and federal courts concerning both the admissibility and the reliability of polygraph evidence. Whatever their approach, most state and federal courts continue to express doubt about whether polygraph evidence is reliable. Upon information and belief, although there is disagreement amongst scientists about the use of polygraph testing in criminal matters, there is almost universal agreement that polygraph preemployment screening is completely invalid and should be stopped.

23. Although many courts over the years have discussed the reliability of the polygraph, the overwhelming majority have done so in the criminal context. No court has yet addressed in a civil context the reliability of polygraph evidence arising from preemployment testing, and the abuses that may result therefrom.

24. Although the degree of reliability of polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.

25. In fact, the polygraph predicts whether a person is lying with accuracy that is only slightly greater than chance. Since the question “Is the subject lying?” is a yes or no question, a random method of answering the question (e.g., a coin toss) would be correct 50% of the time. Indeed, studies have repeatedly shown that the polygraph is more likely to find innocent people guilty than vice verSpecial Agent.

26. In 1965 and again in 1976, the House Government Operations Committee concluded that there was not adequate evidence to establish the validity of the polygraph. In 1979, the Oversight Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the U.S. House of Representatives was notified that polygraph testing is a central component of the preemployment screening process for applicants for positions in most federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Approximately 75% of those denied security clearances by the CIA or NSA came as a result of polygraph examinations. Based, in part, on this information the subcommittee urged the director of the CIA to institute research on “the accuracy of the polygraph in the pre-employment setting and to establish some level of confidence in the use of that technique.” To date, no credible research on the topic of preemployment polygraph screening has been published.

27. In November 1983, the Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) issued a report “Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation”. The report concluded that “the available research evidence does not establish the scientific validity of the polygraph test for personnel security screening” and that the “mathematical chance of incorrect identification of innocent persons as deceptive (false positives) is highest when the polygraph is used for screening purposes.” The OTA compiled the results (for research on the control question technique in specific incident criminal investigations) of six prior reviews of polygraph research, ten field studies, and fourteen analog studies that it determined met the minimum scientific standards. The results were as follows:

1) Six prior reviews of field studies:

- average accuracy ranged from 64% to 98%.

2) Ten individual field studies:

- correct guilty detections ranged from 70.6% to 98.6% and averaged 86.3%;

- correct innocent detections ranged from 12.5% to 94.1% and averaged 76%;

c) false positive rate (innocent persons found deceptive) ranged from 0% to 75% and averaged 19.1%;

d) false negative rate (guilty persons found nondeceptive) ranged from 0% to 29.4% and averaged 10.2%.

3) Fourteen individual analog studies:

a) correct guilty detections ranged from 35.4% to 100% and averaged 63.7%;

b) correct innocent detections ranged from 32% to 91% and averaged 57.9%;

c) false positives ranged from 2% to 50.7% and averaged 14.1%;

d) false negatives ranged from 0% to 28.7% and averaged 10.4%.

28. The United States Congress, particularly in light of the OTA report questioning the reliability of the polygraph machine, enacted - and the president signed into law - The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, which generally prohibits the private sector from using polygraphs in preemployment screening and sharply curtails the permissible uses of the polygraph in specific-incident investigations. Prior to the enactment of this legislation, it was estimated that a minimum of 400,000 honest workers were wrongfully labeled deceptive and suffered adverse employment consequences each year. The federal government, however, is exempt from the provisions prohibiting preemployment testing.

29. Even the primary and largest law enforcement agency of the United States has expressed significant concerns regarding the reliability of the polygraph machine. In the 1998 Supreme Court case United States v. Scheffer, the Department of Justice argued against admissibility of polygraph evidence by stressing its inaccuracy, thus creating an inconsistency between the government’s extensive use of polygraphs to make vital security and preemployment determinations and in instances where the results of the test - as in Scheffer where the criminal defendant had passed a polygraph - do not suit the purposes of the government.

30. On or about February 3, 1997, James K. Murphy, the Chief of the FBI’s Laboratory’s Polygraph Unit in Washington, D.C. and a FBI polygraph examiner since 1978, submitted a declaration to the United States Military Court, Mid-Atlantic Region, Norfolk, Virginia, in the case of United States v. Ens. Patrick J. Jacobson, USN. He stated that "[i]t is the policy of The Department of Justice to oppose all attempts by defense counsel to admit polygraph results as evidence and to refrain from seeking the admission of favorable examinations which may have been conducted during the investigatory stage of a case...The FBI uses the polygraph as an investigative tool and cautions that the results should not be relied upon to the exclusion of other evidence or knowledge obtained during the course of an investigation...This policy is based upon the fact that, a) the polygraph technique has not reached a level of acceptability within the relevant scientific community, b) scientific research has not been able to establish the true validity of polygraph testing in criminal applications, c) there is a lack of standardization within the polygraph community for training and for conducting polygraph examinations."

C. SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF POLYGRAPH PROBLEMS AND ABUSE

31. There are many examples of the unreliability of polygraph examinations, and its potential abuse. Aldrich Ames, the former CIA official turned-spy, convinced a polygraph examiner on at least two occasions that the deceptive readings he was allegedly displaying were easily explained away. As a result, Ames “passed” the polygraph. Of course, Ames was instructed by the Soviet Union on how to utilize countermeasures to beat the polygraph. Upon information and belief, few true spies, if any, have ever been caught by the United States Government solely because of the polygraph.

32. In fact, it is a simple feat to defeat the polygraph, which undermines the entire purpose of utilizing it to determine the truth. The very persons most likely to be the subject of a polygraph examination can use any number of techniques to “truthfully” lie. Various instructions on how to defeat the polygraph are publicly available in books and on the Internet. Upon information and belief, during the 1980s, approximately thirty Cubans who served as agents (i.e., spies) for the CIA passed extensive polygraph examinations. Following the defection of a Cuban intelligence officer and his debriefing, it was revealed that all of the CIA’s “Cuban agents” were actually double-agents working for the Cuban Government. Each and every one of them had defeated the CIA’s polygraph examination.

33. The recent treatment of Wen Ho Lee, a former nuclear scientist now facing criminal charges for mishandling classified information, is further evidence of the unreliability and misuse of the polygraph. On or about December 23, 1998, Lee was given a polygraph examination by a Department of Energy (DOE) polygrapher in Albuquerque, New Mexico. After completing the test, the polygrapher concluded that Lee was not deceptive. Two other polygraphers in the DOE's Albuquerque test center, including the manager, reviewed the charts and concurred with the result. Upon information and belief, the polygraph results were so convincing and unequivocal, that the deputy director of the Los Alamos lab issued an apology to Lee, and work began to get him reinstated to his former position. Several weeks after the polygraph, the DOE decided to assign Lee’s test the unusual designation of "incomplete." When FBI headquarters finally obtained the DOE polygraph results, it concluded that Lee had failed the polygraph. The FBI on its own then tested Lee, and claimed that he failed.

34. In researching a story on Lee’s polygraph tests, CBS News spoke to Richard Keifer, the current chairman of the American Polygraph Association and a former FBI Special Agent who used to run the FBI's polygraph program. Keifer indicated that, "[t]here are never enough variables to cause one person to say [a polygraph subject is] deceptive, and one to say he's non-deceptive...there should never be that kind of discrepancy on the evaluation of the same chart." After personally reviewing Lee’s polygraph scores, Keifer remarked that the scores are "crystal clear." Indeed, he added that in all his years as a polygrapher, he had never been able to score anyone so high on the non-deceptive scale. Yet the FBI was adamant that Lee had failed the test; a perfect example of deliberate misuse of the polygraph.

35. Another example was that of the CIA’s mistreatment of one of its former staff attorneys, Adam Ciralsky. The CIA fired him and revoked his top-secret security clearance, in part, because he allegedly exhibited a "lack of candor" about relationships with associates who may have been tied to Israeli intelligence. Official CIA records, however, revealed that the CIA tried to manipulate Ciralsky's polygraph tests so as to transform demonstrably "non-deceptive" results into "deceptive" results. A CIA memo, written two weeks before Ciralsky's final polygraph, stated that Tenet [Director of the CIA] "says this guy is outta here because of lack of candor. . . . Subject is scheduled for [another] poly. . . . Once that's over, it looks like we'll be waving goodbye to our friend." Thus, official records indicated that the CIA were set to base Ciralsky's dismissal on the outcome of a polygraph examination that he had yet to take. In fact, Ciralsky underwent and successfully completed counterintelligence polygraphs in 1993, 1996 and 1998, at which times his answers were consistently deemed to be "strongly non-deceptive." Yet when Ciralsky submitted to CIA polygraph examinations in August and October 1997, he was accused of "deception" with regard to issues and events which pre-dated, and hence were covered by, his earlier polygraphs. Upon information and belief, Ciralsky did not fail any of his CIA polygraph examinations. The CIA’s actions demonstrated how federal agencies utilize polygraph results to suit their own purposes, which are not necessarily consistent with the truth.

36. Upon information and belief, in or around 1997-98, CIA polygraphers reported to the DOJ's Public Integrity Section that CIA management does, in fact, instruct polygraphers to "fail" certain employees. It can be assumed that similar tactics exist within the FBI, DEA, and USSS.

II. THE DEFENDANT FEDERAL AGENCIES

A. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

37. Upon information and belief, in or around the 1930s, the FBI conducted a criminal investigation in the State of Florida. Following the identification of a suspect, the individual was administrated a polygraph examination and was found to be deceptive. As a result, the FBI believed this individual was the guilty culprit. However, soon thereafter it became apparent that this individual was not guilty of the crime, but in fact another individual was proven to be the guilty party. This prompted J. Edgar Hoover, then the director of the FBI, to exclaim (something to the effect) that the FBI should “take the damn thing [polygraph machine] and throw it in the lake.” The polygraph was not utilized by the FBI for years afterwards.

38. Despite the lack of scientific evidence supporting its use, the polygraph machine is now heavily relied upon by the FBI for personnel screening. The current Director Louis Freeh implemented the present policy in or around March 1994. Any applicant for a full-time position with the FBI, no matter the individual’s level of responsibility, is required to undergo a polygraph examination. The FBI’s polygraph screening focuses exclusively on counterintelligence issues, the sale and/or use of illegal drugs, and the accuracy and completeness of information furnished by applicants in their employment applications.

39. According to an October 28, 1997, letter sent by Donald Kerr, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Laboratory Division, to Senator Charles E. Grassley, between March 1994, and October 1997, “the FBI conducted approximately 16,200 preemployment polygraph examinations. Of those, 12,930 applicants (80 percent) passed and continued processing; 3,270 applicants (20 percent) were determined to be withholding pertinent information. When these individuals were interviewed about their unacceptable performance in the polygraph session, 1,170 (36 percent) admitted to withholding substantive information.” While the FBI’s definition of “substantive” is unknown, based on the above FBI figures up to 64 percent of those individuals (2,100) who were deemed deceptive by the polygraph examiner may have been or were innocent of any wrongdoing.

40. Upon information and belief, approximately 20%-40% of all FBI employee candidates each year fail the polygraph examination, typically due to responses to the drug use question.

41. The FBI’s website explains how it uses the polygraph machine in its recruitment process at http://www.fbi.gov/kids/crimedet/poly/poly.htm. It states that the “polygraph test consist [sic] of three phases: the pretest interview, the test, and the post-test phase which may include the examiner questioning the examinee concerning responses to specific test questions. Before beginning the first phase in the polygraph process, the examiner will gather information about the case from the investigator. Collecting this information allows the examiner to create appropriate questions for the actual examination. After constructing these questions, the examiner is ready for the pretest interview. To begin the pretest interview, the examiner is introduced to the examinee and describes what will happen during the test. The examiner then gets the individual to explain their version of what happened and then discusses the questions that will be asked during the polygraph test. Once the examiner has discussed this information with the examinee, phase two of the polygraph test begins. Within the test, the examinee will face a variety of questions. All the questions require a simple "yes" or "no" answer. Through most of these questions, the examiner is trying to determine the individual's knowledge and participation or involvement in the crime under investigation. The theory is that, throughout the polygraph test, the examinee’s attention will focus on the questions that he or she finds most threatening. These questions are usually those which the examinee will attempt to provide a deceptive answer. Any attempt to provide deceptive answers by the examinee usually results in significant changes in their recorded physiology which is detected by the examiner. The examinee's responses are compared to a variety of deceptive criteria which the examiner is trained to recognize in each physiological parameter recorded. To establish how an individual would physically respond when telling the truth or lying, the polygraph test includes questions that develop baseline readings for what examiners call known-truths and probable-lies. Both known-truth and probable-lie questions allow the examiner to record the blood pressure/pulse ratio (mean pressure), galvanic skin response, and respiration of the examinee, and then compare those results to the results recorded for questions regarding the crime or relevant issue. Once the examiner finishes with all of the questions, he or she evaluates the results to determine whether the individual told the truth or was deceptive. If the polygraph results indicate that the examinee was telling the truth, the individual is thanked for participating in the test and allowed to leave. But, if the polygraph results indicate deception, the examiner will begin the third phase of the test, questioning or interrogation to determine the reason for the deceptive test results. While acting in a professional and understanding manner, a skilled examiner will use effective questioning techniques to make the examinee comfortable with telling the truth.” Upon information and belief, experiences for applicants have revealed that FBI polygraphers routinely fail to act in a professional or understanding manner.

42. The FBI has asserted in correspondence that the “polygraph is one of the many tools that law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, use when conducting investigations. Besides identifying guilty subjects, the polygraph can eliminate suspects, verify witnesses' statements or informant information, and determine the truth of an individual's statement. When used properly by trained qualified examiners, the polygraph is an effective investigative tool which can save many investigative man-hours, decrease the overall cost of investigations, and provide valuable investigative leads or information which could not otherwise be developed due to lack of evidence or other noteworthy information.”

43. Specifically with respect to preemployment screening, the FBI has also indicated in correspondence that it “uses the polygraph as an aid to investigation and considers it highly reliable when used by a competent and ethical examiner. It is one part of the screening process and is designed to address issues that may not be resolved by more traditional investigative methods.” It has also said that “[h]ighly trained and experienced FBI polygraphers are utilized to conduct these examinations which have proven very reliable in our employment process.”

44. Once an applicant successfully completes the initial application process, the individual is required to successfully complete a polygraph examination in order to continue processing. Although Donald Kerr, the Assistant Director of the FBI’s Laboratory Division, informed Senator Charles E. Grassley by letter dated October 28, 1997, that the polygraph “is not a substitute for, but merely one component of, a thorough and complete background investigation”, upon information and belief only upon a successful completion of the polygraph examination will an applicant be afforded a full-fledged background investigation. Therefore, any applicant that is falsely accused of a violation as a result of the polygraph will be unable to “clear” his/her name as the FBI will not conduct any further investigation into their background. The applicant is left to prove a negative does not exist.

45. Upon information and belief, when the FBI implemented its polygraph program in 1994, the then current special agent class had already begun its training. Nevertheless, members of the 1994 class were administered polygraph examinations and approximately half the class failed. However, the FBI simply overlooked this problem and waived the requirements of the polygraph for the 1994 class.

46. Upon information and belief, it is a common perception among FBI personnel involved in the application and polygraph process that applicants who “fail” the polygraph will reveal something that they withheld or will simply just go away.

47. The FBI official policy, as set forth in various correspondence, is that “[a]ny applicant who does not successfully pass an initial polygraph examination may request to be afforded a second polygraph examination; however, certain criteria must be met.” While the criteria is not publicly known, upon information and belief the FBI policy on this issue is contained in, but not limited to, Buairtel dated May 1, 1995, captioned “Special Agent Selection System (SASS) Polygraph Policy”. Although applicants to the FBI have been notified by letter that the “FBI’s policy regarding additional polygraph examinations is consistent for all applicants”, upon information and belief the FBI inconsistently applies this policy.

48. On or about September 29, 1997, Dr. Drew C. Richardson, a FBI Supervisory Special Agent, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee and condemned the use of the polygraph machine. He testified, in part, that “[w]ithin the Bureau, polygraph examiners who have little or no understanding of the scientific principles underlying their practice, report to mid-level managers who are largely ignorant of polygraph matters. These mid-level managers in turn report to executives, who have real problems for which they seek needed solutions (e.g., the need to protect national security from the danger of espionage, and the need to hire employees with appropriate backgrounds). These executives are left unable to evaluate that polygraph is not a viable solution and do not comprehend that ignorance and mis-information are built into their own command structure.”

49. The FBI’s polygraph examinations are neither tape recorded or videotaped, despite the fact that such actions would only ensure that polygraph examinations are conducted properly. Upon information and belief, the FBI chose not to tape record or videotape polygraph examinations in order to reduce an applicants’ ability to challenge the results of a polygraph examination.

50. During the period relevant to this litigation, the FBI’s drug use policy was that an applicant is unsuitable for employment if marijuana was used during the last three years or more than fifteen times, or if usage of any illegal drug(s) or combination of illegal drugs, other than marijuana, was more than five times or during the last ten years.

51. Upon information and belief, many of the FBI’s polygraph examiners are biased in their perceptions of applicants, which affects the manner in which the test is administered and the results achieved. Indeed, one FBI polygraph examiner, Special Agent H. L. Byford, stated in an e-mail dated August 6, 1999, that “if someone has smoked marijuana 15 times, he's done it 50 times....Those who have any doubts about how many times they used are going to fail. Those who are certain that they only tried it once or three times or five or whatever, will pass....I got to tell you though, if I was running the show, there would be no one in the FBI that ever used illegal drugs!”

52. Upon information and belief, many former FBI Special Agents, including some who had distinguished careers, have failed polygraph examinations when trying to either re-enter the FBI or attain a consulting arrangement. In solely considering the results of the polygraph machine, the FBI literally accused its former agents of having committed crimes while on duty with the FBI; acts that if true have still gone unpunished.

B. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

53. The USSS requires applicants to undergo a complete background investigation , which includes in-depth interviews, drug screening, medical examination, and a polygraph examination.

54. The USSS maintains a Polygraph Examination Program which it uses as a major investigative tool for all cases under Secret Service jurisdiction. Each examiner is trained in interview and interrogation techniques, and may conduct polygraph examinations on issues involving criminal, national security, and employee-screening matters.

55. Upon information and belief, the USSS audiotapes all polygraph examinations. However, applicants are not provided with copies of these tapes except if requested through the Freedom of Information or Privacy Acts; a process that typically takes years. Thus, applicants are not permitted a timely opportunity to use the audiotapes to support their allegations of irregularities or misconduct.

56. Upon information and belief, the USSS does not typically permit applicants the opportunity to take a second polygraph examination if the first one allegedly revealed deception. In fact, no formal appellate process offers applicants any due process rights to challenge false positive polygraph results.

57. Upon information and belief, the USSS has revoked applicants’ conditional job offers solely based on the results of polygraph examinations.

III. THE PLAINTIFFS

A. JOHN DOE#6 (FBI)

58. John Doe#6 is currently a federal agent with the Immigration & Naturalization Service (“INS”), and has served in this position since August 1996. During his tenure with the INS, he has won numerous awards for his performance. He has never used or sold illegal narcotics.

59. On or about August 17, 1997, John Doe#6 submitted his application for employment as a FBI Special Agent. His first effort in January 1998, to pass the written examination failed. However, in or around May 1999, John Doe#6 attained a passing score on the first battery of tests to continue his eligibility. On or about August 17, 1999, he submitted a revised application form.

60. By letter dated December 16, 1999, John Doe#6 was offered a conditional appointment as a Special Agent of the FBI.

61. On January 4, 2000, John Doe#6 was administered a polygraph examination as part of his application procedure by Special Agent John Long at the FBI field office in Springfield, Illinois. Special Agent Long indicated he was based with the FBI’s St. Louis, Missouri field office and had been chosen to administer the exam instead of Special Agent Don Barez (sic) due to possible conflicts of interest. Special Agent Barez (sic) worked with John Doe#6’s cousin. Special Agent Long’s facial expressions and body language indicated to John Doe#6 that Special Agent Long was annoyed at having been chosen to perform this task.

62. Special Agent Long had with him several papers, among them a copy of John Doe#6’s FD-140 Application for Employment. As Special Agent Long thumbed through the application, he highlighted several basic pieces of information and orally confirmed the accuracy. He asked John Doe#6 to confirm his current employment, where he was educated and the degrees he attained, and his date of birth, all of which were of course contained in his application. He also asked John Doe#6 if he was currently using any medication, to which he responded “no”. Special Agent Long then showed John Doe#6 a page with typewritten statements that were read aloud. He modified and crossed out sections, which he said, did not apply to John Doe#6. Each statement was to be

confirmed or denied during the actual polygraph examination.

63. Special Agent Long explained what was going to transpire. He stated, “This is the analog polygraph machine. It is commonly referred to as the lie detector”. He then explained how it worked and submitted that through this device he could ascertain if John Doe#6 was telling the truth. Special Agent Long continually praised the wonders of the polygraph. For example, he told John Doe#6 that through the use of the machine he was going to determine what John Doe#6’s name really was and where he really lived.

64. Special Agent Long continued on by giving a small discourse on integrity. He stated that you can never go wrong while working for his agency as long as you never lack candor or integrity. He explained that sometimes situations and matters arise during the course of employment in which you may be disciplined for making mistakes, but that this discipline would never be significant as long as it was always accompanied by candor and integrity. John Doe#6 tried try to get a word in edgewise to tell him that he, too, felt that integrity was of the utmost importance, but Special Agent Long cut him off.

65. Special Agent Long then asked John Doe#6 a question pertaining to lying. John Doe#6 told him that he dealt with fraud all the time through work and that “bluffing” is an integral part of law enforcement. John Doe#6 tried to explain to Special Agent

Long some of the situations that he had been involved in since he began working with

INS, but Special Agent Long appeared annoyed and cut John Doe#6 short by repeating

that as long as there is no ‘lack of candor or lack of integrity’, whatever an individual does

is acceptable.

66. The pre-test interview began with the question as to whether John Doe#6 had ever been subjected to a polygraph examination before, to which John Doe#6 replied “no”. John Doe#6 did indicate he was concerned over the possibility of a false positive. Special Agent Long reacted curiously to this statement and asked John Doe#6 why he made mention of the words ‘false positive’ and whether or not he had been reading anything about how the polygraph worked. John Doe#6 responded that he not read anything about the polygraph but that based on general scientific rules of experimentation a false positive is always within the realm of possibility. Special Agent Long responded that even if John Doe#6 had been reading about the polygraph, it would not help him since he had been trained in detecting all the existing types of countermeasures that are used.

67. Special Agent Long began to focus on the first part of the exam, which addressed contact with foreign counterintelligence, and asked John Doe#6 if he had ever had any such contact in the course of his life. Before John Doe#6 responded, Special Agent Long indicated that this did not include his roommate from college who was currently working for the CIA. John Doe#6 told him “no”, however, while working at the airport with INS he occasionally dealt with foreign diplomats.

68. “Do you drink?”, Special Agent Long asked. “Yes,” John Doe#6 responded. “Have you ever driven after a few drinks?”, he asked. “That’s subjective, but I’ve never driven while legally drunk.”, John Doe#6 said. “So we can ask the question ‘have you truthfully represented your drinking to me today?’ and answer that ‘yes’, right?” “Yes,” John Doe#6 said.

69. “Have you ever cheated?”, Special Agent Long asked. John Doe#6

replied that he didn’t cheat and in fact he took cheating very seriously. He continued by

saying that in high school sometimes people would ask to look at his papers during tests and he told them that they could do whatever but that was their prerogative and that if they were caught that was their thing. John Doe#6 stated that he did not have time to worry about policing access to his work while under the stress of a testing situation. That was the teacher’s job.” Special Agent Long then asked John Doe#6 if he had ever asked someone what material was covered on a test. John Doe#6 answered that he did not consider that cheating. Cheating would be to ask the particular questions on the test, but to ask someone what chapters were covered was not really cheating in his opinion. Special Agent Long continued by asking if it was accurate to say “no” to the question - besides what John Doe#6 told him –had he ever cheated? “Sure,” replied John Doe#6. He was then asked if he had ever hurt someone, more specifically if he had deliberately hurt another person?. John Doe#6 was asked if he could say no to that question. John Doe#6 replied by saying “Sure,” but he did not really understand the reason why he was being asked all these questions in the first place. Special Agent Long then exclaimed that he thought they we were ready to begin.

70. John Doe#6 was strapped to the machine and the testing began. After finishing the first set there was a brief break. Special Agent Long violently ripped off the paper under the needles of the polygraph machine and got up from his chair. He came around from behind the desk and stood right in front of John Doe#6. Special Agent Long yelled at John Doe#6, telling him to stop holding his breath. John Doe#6 told Special Agent Long that he did not understand what he was talking about. Special Agent Long angrily continued to yell at John Doe#6. He pointed to the charts in his hand and said “here, this is what I am talking about.” There were long flat lines of approximately 2 inches long separated by short, steep hills on the paper. John Doe#6 apologized repeatedly telling him “I’m sorry,” not really understanding why Special Agent Long was so angry. John Doe#6 asked Special Agent Long how he wanted him to breathe. He was told to breath like he did before, when they were talking to one another. Special Agent Long told John Doe#6 to let his body breathe. John Doe#6 made a conscious effort to try and relax, but he was unable to do so, especially after being so violently yelled at. John Doe#6 did not fully understand what Special Agent Long wanted from him and he feared being yelled at again if he did not try to breathe the way Special Agent Long wanted him to. Special Agent Long then added that he was a highly skilled examiner who was trained in detecting a whole gamut of countermeasures. John Doe#6 responded that the exam was nerve-racking.

71. After the first part of the exam was completed, John Doe#6 remained hooked up to the polygraph during the formulation of the second set of control questions which dealt with illegal drug use. Special Agent Long stated that John Doe#6 had already been told the FBI’s policy on illegal drugs but re-read the sheet that they went over at the beginning of the interview. John Doe#6 was told that there would be three questions, at which time the questions were enumerated to him. John Doe#6 answered in the negative to all of the questions. Special Agent Long then formulated more control questions. One of the questions pertained to shoplifting. John Doe#6 was asked if he had ever walked into a store and thought about stealing something. He quickly responded “no”, somewhat

offended by the question. Another control question was whether there was anything that John Doe#6 was afraid he would be asked during the polygraph exam. John Doe#6 was asked if he could say “no” to that question. John Doe#6 responded by saying “sure”, that he would answer any questions put to him. Special Agent Long asked if the answer was “no” and John Doe#6 responded by saying “yes”. Special Agent Long continued by formulating the last control question, which was if John Doe#6 had ever deliberately hurt another person, friend or family member, besides what John Doe#6 had told him today. Special Agent Long asked if he could say “no” which John Doe#6 said “yes”, though not entirely understanding the applicability of the question to the rest of the exam. John Doe#6 began to ponder the significance of the question and thought to himself that he had likely hurt some people in his life but if it was deliberate or not was not clear.

72. During all this time John Doe#6 was still ‘hooked up’ to the polygraph. After the first session, Special Agent Long stated to John Doe#6 that he seemed to be having a problem with the shoplifting question. John Doe#6 did not understand why Special Agent Long Special said that he was having trouble with a question that clearly did not apply to him and to which he could confidently state ‘no’. Perplexed, John Doe#6 continued to take the next two tests. During either the second or third test John Doe#6 heard a clicking sound emanating from the machine on two questions, one being “have you ever sold illegal drugs?” When he heard the clicking he got nervous, and then heard more clicking. He thought nothing of it as he trusted the machine would ascertain his truthful responses.

73. There was a long pause by Special Agent Long who appeared to be “grading” the charts. John Doe#6 could not see Special Agent Long because he was still seated in the polygraph chair. However, he did hear a lot of ruffling of papers. After ten minutes passed, Special Agent Long got up from his chair to exit the room. He used the excuse that he needed to go to the bathroom and that he would be right back. When he left the room, Special Agent Long took the papers with him. John Doe#6 then realized that there was a problem.

74. About 10 minutes later Special Agent Long returned to the room accompanied by Special Agent Don Barez, who looked at the polygraph charts and stated he came to the same conclusion as Special Agent Long. John Doe#6 asked what conclusion that was. Special Agent Long said that John Doe#6 was being deceptive based on the charts. In shock, he said to them both that this whole process was a joke. It was completely ridiculous. He asked them both what would happen next.

75. Special Agent Long Special said something to the effect that the application process would be stopped. John Doe#6 asked what that meant. Special Agent Barez added that the FBI could not process his application further based on the results.

76. Special Agent Long asked if there was something that John Doe#6 was not telling him? He stated that the polygraph charts indicated a strong charge when John Doe#6 was asked if he had ever sold illegal drugs. John Doe#6 responded by stating, “he had never sold, used or tried illegal drugs before.” Special Agent Barez jumped into the interrogation, saying that sometimes there are spillover effects from other experiences that cause people to react to these questions. Sometimes because people have a brother or a father or a family member that did something related to drugs, this might cause someone to react to the questions on the polygraph.

77. John Doe#6 said that his family has never done anything related to

illegal drugs and his friends did not do drugs. He said that he would try to think of any possible explanation for the charge in the charts. John Doe#6 said that one time when he and his friends arrived at a party where apparently there was marijuana being smoked by other people, or so he was told, his friends told him to stay away from that part of the residence since his friends knew how much he despised drugs and how studious of an individual he was. He was told not to go over there and he never did. He left the party shortly thereafter. Special Agent Long said that there must be something else because his reaction to the question indicated a strong charge to the question on the sale of illegal drugs. Once again, John Doe#6 was asked if there was something that he was not telling him. Special Agent Barez jumped in again and

said that there had to be something that was causing John Doe#6 to react the way he did.

78. Special Agent Long asked the same question one last time, was there anything that John Doe#6 was not telling him, that it was off the record, and had nothing to do with what he did with INS. John Doe#6 said that he had told him everything, that this was ridiculous, that he had a secret level security clearance at his current job and dealt with national security issues on a day in and day out basis. John Doe#6 said the machine was not taking into account that he was nervous, particularly because it was the first time he had ever taken a polygraph. Special Agent Long smugly replied to his statements telling John Doe#6 that the FBI was a stressful job, that maybe it was not for John Doe#6.

79. There were a few moments of silence while Special Agent Long began to gather his papers and belongings. John Doe#6 asked what kind of recourse there was. Special Agent Long responded that he was not supposed to tell John Doe#6, but if he wrote a letter to Washington, they would give him a second chance. John Doe#6 then asked if that was a guaranteed thing. Special Agent Long sharply interrupted and said

that if John Doe#6 wrote the letter he would get a second chance.

80. John Doe#6 asked if he could see his polygraph results. Special Agent Long said that under normal circumstances he was not supposed to show the charts or the numbers of pluses and minuses assigned to each relevant question. On the report he showed me the numbers which read: +5 on recruitment by FCI, +6 on contact w/FCI, -1 on withholding information on application, +1 on use of illegal drugs, -5 on sale of illegal drugs. Special Agent Long also showed John Doe#6 the actual lines of

the charts and stated how everyone during the first session of the three sessions on the second half usually react strongly to the relevant questions. He said he thought that would go away in the other two sessions and that is why he asked if John Doe#6 was having a problem with the shoplifting question.

81. John Doe#6 asked whether he could just take the exam again. Special

Agent Long said he did not think that would be appropriate under the circumstances. Special Agent Beraz said that he thought John Doe#6 needed to examine his conscience in the next 24 to 48 hours and determine what was causing the ‘spillover’ effect. He added that over 50% of the people that take the polygraph fail.

82. By letter dated January 14, 2000, John Doe#6 was notified by Patrick M. Maloy, Chief, Bureau Applicant Employment Unit, FBI, that his conditional offer of appointment was rescinded because “the results of your polygraph examination were not within acceptable parameters.”

83. By letter dated January 21, 2000, John Doe#6 wrote to Maloy requesting a second polygraph examination. A similar letter was also sent to Attorney General Janet Reno. By letter dated February 11, 2000, John Doe#6 was notified by Michael E. Varnum, Section Chief, Administrative Services Division, FBI, that his request was denied. Upon information and belief, this decision was based on Special Agent Long’s false opinion that John Doe#6 attempted countermeasures. Varnum’s letter indicated that the FBI’s “hiring policies provide no further avenues for you to pursue to gain employment with the FBI.”

84. John Doe#6 is in the process of applying for employment as a federal law enforcement officer. At some point during the application process he will have to reveal the fact that he supposedly failed polygraph examinations with both the FBI. The FBI will also reveal to other agencies that he failed the tests. Upon information and belief, as a result, his chances of attaining employment in the federal law enforcement arena will be significantly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.

B. JOHN DOE#7 (USSS)

85. John Doe#7 has been an employee of the “INS” as a Special Agent since 1992.

He has also served in the United States Marine Corps and as a Revenue Officer for the Internal Revenue Service. He has taken and passed a pre-employment polygraph examination, which included extensive questioning concerning past drug use, for the Drug Enforcement Administration. The only affiliation with any illegal substance use consisted of a drag from one marijuana cigarette in or about June 1977. At no other time in his life has John Doe#7 ever used or experimented with illegal drugs.

86. In or around August 1994, John Doe#7 submitted an application to the USSS.

He made his first attempt at passing the Treasury Departments Enforcement Examination

in or around March 1995, but was notified that he had not passed. However, in or about

February 1997, he re-took the exam and was notified by letter dated April 30, 1997, that

he had passed. As a result, by letter dated May 15, 1997, he was extended a conditional offer of employment. He was then invited to participate in an oral interview on or about January 15, 1998. After successfully completing the panel interview, where he was told he scored very well, John Doe#7 was given a pre-employment physical. This physical took place in or about March 1998.

87. On or about August 25, 1998, John Doe#7 was administered a polygraph examination by Special Agent Ignacio Zamora which lasted approximately five hours. There was also another person attending, who he was intentionally misled to believe was a USSS supervisory special agent. John Doe#7 later discovered that this individual was a special agent with the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agency simply observing for training purposes. Upon information and belief, his presence created unnecessary anxiety for John Doe#7 that affected his test results.

88. Prior to the actual test, Special Agent Zamora reviewed the questions that were going to be asked. Emphasis was placed on a question regarding cheating on college exams. Special Agent Zamora informed John Doe#7 that the Secret Service held as the utmost importance the issue of integrity. Cheating on college examinations was considered

a serious breach of integrity.

89. John Doe#7 was then "hooked up" to the polygraph machine and Special Agent

Zamora administered the first series of polygraph examination questions. When a question was posed regarding cheating on college exams, John Doe#7 had a sudden recollection of when he had solicited information from a fellow student concerning an examination. John Doe#7 maintained his earlier answer that he had not cheated, but was concerned about Special Agent Zamora's earlier statements on this subject. This compounded John Doe#7’s nervousness and created a great deal of anxiety for him. After this series of questioning, Special Agent Zamora left the room for approximately twenty minutes.

90. Upon Special Agent Zamora’s return, he administered a second series of

questions which included crimes and illegal drug usage. John Doe#7 was also asked whether he had ever committed a felony, including whether he had ever had sex with an animal. As this second series of question began, John Doe#7 continued to further ponder the question of cheating on a college exam. When asked about the use of illicit controlled substances, he answered truthfully and honestly but was still thinking about the previous questions regarding cheating on college exams.

91. After the second series was completed, Special Agent Zamora again left the

room and re-entered after approximately twenty minutes. Special Agent Zamora then

informed John Doe#7 that he had failed the portion of the test concerning illicit drug use.

At this point Special Agent Zamora proceeded to interrogate John Doe#7 regarding illegal

drug usage. John Doe#7 continually denied any drug use other than that previously

stated. Special Agent Zamora was adamant in his insistence that John Doe#7 was lying.

This debate continued for approximately one hour and was physically exhausting for John

Doe#7. At one point, after the interrogation, Special Agent Zamora informed John Doe#7

that there were people with disqualifying medical problems that had successfully

completed the polygraph test. This gave John Doe#7 the impression that the polygraph

machine is fallible in registering false positives.

92. On September 17, 1998, John Doe#7 contacted Special Agent Gail Moor of the

Los Angeles Field Office to inquire about a make-up polygraph examination. Special

Agent Moor informed John Doe#7 that he had failed the initial polygraph examination and

would not be given the opportunity to take a second examination.

93. On or about October 1, 1998 John Doe#7 sent a letter to Frank R. O'Donnell, Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Field Office detailing the circumstances surrounding the initial polygraph test. In or around October 1998, John Doe#7 was informed that he would be given the opportunity to retake the polygraph exam. On or about November 3, 1998, John Doe#7 was administered a second polygraph examination by Special Agent John Savage.

94. As with the first test, a series of review questions were asked. Special Agent Savage also asked whether John Doe#7 had ever had sex with an animal. After the review questions, John Doe#7 was hooked up to the polygraph machine and a series of questions were asked concerning, but not limited to, illicit drug use. After this series of questions were asked, Special Agent Savage left the room for approximately 20 minutes, leaving John Doe#7 still attached to the polygraph machine. When Special Agent Savage returned, he informed John Doe#7 that he was convinced John Doe#7 was lying about his past drug use. Special Agent Savage proceeded to interrogate John Doe#7 about past drug use. He informed John Doe#7 that questions concerning his past drug use could be cleared up here and now if John Doe#7 had any further information he was willing to volunteer regarding his past drug use. This exchange continued for over one hour. When John Doe#7 informed Special Agent Savage there was no further information that he had to provide the polygraph test was terminated. Special Agent Savage informed John Doe#7 that the results would be sent back to Headquarters, in Washington D.C. and that he may be given the opportunity for retaking the polygraph examination.

95. On January 7, 1999, John Doe#7 received a letter from the United States Secret

Service informing him that he was no longer being considered for employment with the

agency. Upon information and belief, this decision was based solely on his polygraph results. All other steps in the application process had been successfully completed.

96. By letter dated January 20, 1999, John Doe#7 wrote the USSS requesting reconsideration of his application. No response was ever received.

97. John Doe#7 is in the process of applying for employment as a federal law enforcement officer. At some point during the application process he will have to reveal the fact that he supposedly failed polygraph examinations with both the USSS. The USSS will also reveal to other agencies that he failed the tests. Upon information and belief, as a result, his chances of attaining employment in the federal law enforcement arena will be significantly diminished, if not eliminated altogether.

C. JANE DOE#1 (USSS)

98. Jane Doe#1 is currently an Intelligence Research Specialist with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). She has never used or sold illegal narcotics.

99. In or around October 1993, Jane Doe#1 sent an application to the USSS for a Special Agent position. She had previously served as an unpaid intern and Student Trainee/Employee Development Specialist (GS-299-7) with the USSS’s Office of Training.

100. On October 26, 1993, Jane Doe#1 took the Treasury Enforcement Agent Examination. By letter dated November 5, 1993, she was notified that she had passed the test. She also received official written confirmation of her score of S-3 proficiency in the French language. In or around January 1994, Jane Doe#1 met with three active Special Agents of the Washington Field Division for a panel interview. During the interview, Jane Doe#1 confirmed that the information she had provided on her application was true and accurate, to include her assertion that she had never used illegal drugs. Upon information and belief, the panel recommended that Jane Doe be continued in the process as a “high-priority candidate.”

101. In or around February 1994, Jane Doe#1 underwent a polygraph examination through the Washington Field Division by Special Agent Jim Helminski (phonetic), who explained the polygraph test and reviewed the questions. During the pre-test interview, Jane Doe#1 detailed the limited experiences she had had in encountering acquaintances involved with illegal drugs and how she had been able to extract herself from those situations. The polygrapher completed this portion of the exam and proceeded to hook Jane Doe#1 up to the machine to start the polygraph exam itself. She was told this portion of the exam was being recorded in case there was a dispute over the results or regarding the examiner’s conduct.

102. Special Agent Helminski went through at least two rounds of questioning, which Jane Doe#1 answered easily and without uncertainty. After approximately three hours, the exam ended and Special Agent Helminski left the room with the printed polygraph results. When he returned, he told Jane Doe#1 that, in his mind, she had successfully passed the exam but that the results always had to be reviewed by a senior examiner before being approved. However, he was fairly confident that the results

would stand and reassured her.

103. Shortly thereafter, Jane Doe#1 was notified that she would have to take a second polygraph exam. The reason she was given was that she had gone through too many rounds of questioning on her first exam and that she may have become immune, or nonreactive, to the questions. Approximately one week later, Jane Doe#1 reported again to the Washington Field Division and met with polygraph examiner Special Agent Roy Hendrix. The pretest interview proceeded in a similar fashion to that of the first exam; however, once the machine was hooked up, the atmosphere in the testing room changed significantly. Special Agent Hendrix was accusatory and abusive, and he indicated that if Jane Doe#1 wanted this position, she would have to be truthful about her past drug use. At one point, Special Agent Hendrix turned off the polygraph machine and told Jane Doe#1 that “three people know you’re lying: me, you, and God.” Jane Doe#1 became indignant at this assault on her integrity and told him “No, God and I know I’m telling the truth.” The implication was offensive to Jane Doe#1, both for her religious convictions and for the fact of her innocence. The exam ended soon afterwards with Special Agent Hendrix having made it clear that Jane Doe#1 had not passed to his satisfaction and that she was being “deceptive.”

104. Surprisingly, Jane Doe#1 was scheduled for a third polygraph examination. Several days later, Jane Doe#1 reported to the Secret Service headquarters where a senior polygraph examiner, Special Agent Glenn LNU, told her she was there to see if they couldn’t “get her through this exam.” He told Jane Doe#1 that the only thing standing between her and the Special Agent position was the exam. Unfortunately, throughout the examination the Special Agent did not appear to allow for the possibility that Jane Doe#1 was telling the truth, as the machine indicated that she was “mildly deceptive” in her response to the drug use question. Upon his inability to get Jane Doe#1 “through the exam,” the Special Agent dismissed her with the clear indication that she would not be hired as a Special Agent.

105. Word of her “failure” quickly spread throughout the office. At least one supervisory official stated to Jane Doe#1 that she must know what it is that she was “holding back.” Others simply avoided her. At the time, the general knowledge in the Office of Training was that Jane Doe#1 would not be getting the Special Agent position because she had “failed” the polygraph.

106. A short time after the third polygraph examination and her physical exam, in March 1994, Jane Doe#1 was called into her supervisor’s office to sign the final

paperwork on her Top Secret clearance, which had been conducted as part of her regular

position as a Student Trainee in a sensitive unit. The clearance had been completed earlier

but was not considered official until she had signed it. Ironically, the USSS background investigation – as well as the that of the Defense Intelligence Agency where she had been accorded a secret clearance - confirmed Jane Doe#1’s assertion that she had never used illegal drugs even once in her life. The investigation leading to the Top Secret clearance was apparently overruled by the “findings” of the polygraph machine.