May 7, 2001
VIA FACSIMILE AND MAIL
Honorable Orrin Hatch
Chairman,
Senate Judiciary Committee
224 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Re: Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing - April 25, 2001
“Issues Surrounding the Use of Polygraphs” - Supplemental
Written Questions
Dear Senator Hatch:
As a follow-up to my oral testimony before the Committee with
respect to the above topic, I am pleased to submit my supplemental responses to
written questions submitted by Senators Patrick Leahy and Charles Grassley. I
have only responded to those questions where I feel I am most qualified based
on my expertise and research.
Questions Submitted By
Senator Leahy
1. In Mr. Kiefer's testimony, he refers to
"prior studies" indicating that the
polygraph has
"an accuracy rate" of between 90 percent and 99 percent. Is there
any report in
the peer-reviewed scientific literature establishing that
polygraph
screening has a higher accuracy rate than 90 percent? If so, could
you please
identify that study.
Almost every available polygraph study conducted pertains to
specific incident criminal investigations (i.e., identifying the thief who
embezzled funds). This question properly addresses the most significant aspect
affecting current federal polygraph policies. The Congress needs to be most
concerned about the reliability/validity of polygraph screening tests. It is
these types of tests that are administered every year to thousands of
applicants for federal employment, as well as tens of thousands of current
federal employees who undergo routine security investigations. The primary
purpose of
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the applicant screening test
is to determine suitability while the security screening test is designed to
expose espionage. However, there is absolutely no scientific evidence that
either type of screening test is reliable or valid. The few studies that
exist prove that screening tests should be stopped immediately.
The largest study of polygraph tests used for national security
screening ever conducted - “Studies of
the Accuracy of Security Screening Polygraph Examinations” - was published
in 1989 for the Department of Defense’s Polygraph Institute (“DoDPI”) by Gordon
H. Barland, Charles R. Honts and Steven Barger. Although the report was never
classified, the government declined to publish it in the open literature.
Indeed, when the results were first made known to the respective agencies
involved there was tremendous pressure to classify the entire report. One of
the authors, in fact, was forbidden by his parent agency from publishing or
presenting the results. As a concession to the agencies involved, the
association of the agency names with their performance data was classified.[1] A copy of the report is at http://truth.boisestate.edu/raredocuments/bhb.html.
The study reports on three mock espionage experiments using
different polygraph screening techniques. In Experiment One, 94% of the
innocent subjects were cleared, but only 34% of the guilty subjects were
identified as deceptive. Thus, the false negative rate (i.e., guilty
individuals being declared innocent) was a staggering 66%. Experiment Two
correctly classified only 79% of those who were innocent and 93% of those who
were guilty. Finally, Experiment Three identified 90% of the innocent subjects
and 81% of the guilty subjects. It is important to note that the examiners used
in these experiments were trained federal polygraphers who regularly conducted
periodic national security tests for their agencies. Following this primary
study, four follow-up studies were conducted by the Department of Defense. The
results of each supported and strengthened the findings of the primary study.
Professor Honts, one of the primary authors of the DoDPI study
and a strong advocate of the polygraph, has harshly criticized the federal
government’s use of polygraph testing for screening purposes. I strongly
recommend that the Committee review two of his articles on the topic: “The Emperor’s New Clothes: Application of
Polygraph Tests in the American Workplace”, Forensic Reports,
4:91-116 (1991)(available at http://truth.
boisestate.edu/raredocuments/ENC.html), and “Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) Test Found To Be Poor
Discriminator”, Forensic Reports, 5: 215-218 (1992)(available at http://truth.boisestate.edu/raredocuments/CSP.html).
With respect to specific incident
polygraph studies, from which Mr. Kiefer derives his statistics from, there
have been many studies regarding the reliability of the polygraph
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when used in
this manner. The resulting figures have varied widely. Though somewhat dated,
let me recommend one report in particular for review. In November 1983, the
Office of Technology Assessment (“OTA”) issued a report entitled “Scientific
Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Research Review and Evaluation”. The OTA
compiled the results of six prior reviews of polygraph research, ten field
studies, and fourteen analog studies that it determined met the minimum
scientific standards. The results were as follows:
1) Six
prior reviews of field studies:
- average
accuracy ranged from 64% to 98%.
2) Ten
individual field studies:
- correct
guilty detections ranged from 70.6% to 98.6% and averaged 86.3%;
- correct
innocent detections ranged from 12.5% to 94.1% and averaged 76%;
- false
positive rate (innocent persons found deceptive) ranged from 0% to 75% and
averaged 19.1%;
- false
negative rate (guilty persons found nondeceptive) ranged from 0% to 29.4%
and averaged 10.2%.
3) Fourteen
individual analog studies:
- correct
guilty detections ranged from 35.4% to 100% and averaged 63.7%;
- correct
innocent detections ranged from 32% to 91% and averaged 57.9%;
- false
positives ranged from 2% to 50.7% and averaged 14.1%;
- false
negatives ranged from 0% to 28.7% and averaged 10.4%.
These statistics led to the enactment of The Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 et seq. The Act outlawed the
use of polygraph screening tests in the private sector. Prior to enactment, it
was estimated that each year at least 400,000 honest workers were wrongfully
labeled deceptive and suffered adverse employment consequences. However, the
federal government was exempted from the legislation.
Given that there are no studies that support either the need or
usefulness of this exemption, the Committee should consider legislation to have
it removed.
2. Mr. Kiefer opines that, if Robert Hanssen
had been given a polygraph
examination,
he would have "reacted with greater than 99% certainty." Yet we
know that
Aldrich Ames was not caught even though he was given two polygraph
examinations
while he was at the CIA and that other guilty people have passed
polygraph
tests. Is there any reliable basis to
estimate the probability that a
particular
person would or would not pass a polygraph test?
Mr. Kiefer’s statement was worded perfectly for use in live
testimony in order to generate shock value, but it has absolutely no basis in
fact. It is no more based on reality than the magic of pulling a rabbit from a
hat. Indeed, as described above, the only government studies available on
screening examinations reveal that guilty individuals are
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far more likely to escape
detection than even an innocent person will be falsely accused - as high as 66%
of the time.
However, more than anything Mr. Kiefer’s statement illustrates
the enormous significant dangers that exist with respect to polygraph screening
and the negative impact it can have on federal employees. Mr. Kiefer served as
a distinguished Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for more
than two decades, including many years as a polygrapher, and is a former past
president of the American Polygraph Association. Based on my experiences, his
strong bias is quite typical of government polygraphers in general. With that type
of obvious bias revealed publicly, it is not unreasonable to assume that such
an attitude during an examination would have negative consequences on many
innocent individuals simply because the polygrapher personally believed
something was suspect.
In any event, for purposes of my response, let us presume Mr.
Kiefer’s statement is accurate and Mr. Hanssen would have registered deceptive
in a routine screening examination. What then would have occurred? Based on all
publicly available information concerning Mr. Hanssen’s case - and as my legal
practice substantially involves national security matters, I am following the
investigation very closely - there is little, if any, incriminating evidence
that would have been discovered through a follow-up investigation. The
overwhelming evidence against Mr. Hanssen was obtained directly from a foreign
source or agent. Unlike other spies such as Aldrich Ames, Harold Nicholson, or
Edward Howard, there was no suspicious evidence of significant debt, serious
employment disputes, drug or alcohol abuse or marital difficulties that would
likely have prompted additional investigations and the exposure of espionage
activities. Therefore, even if Mr. Hanssen had registered deceptive - and there
is no scientific basis to conclude this to be so - the result would have likely
been no more indicative of a truthful result as that of a false positive.
While it appears so simple to discuss Mr. Hanssen’s case in
retrospect, we cannot use the knowledge we possess now in order to analyze the
possible scenarios that could have occurred had a polygraph examination been
administered. For all anyone knows, a deceptive reading five, ten or fifteen
years ago would have meant Mr. Hanssen was being falsely accused of something
he never did, as occurs every year to federal employees and applicants, and his career would have
unfairly suffered as a result.
3. Everyone acknowledges that "false
positive" polygraph examinations can occur
in which
innocent people will show deceptive reactions.
In addition, Mr. Kiefer
estimates that
"there might be a maximum of 3 spies in a population of 10,000."
Assuming for
the sake of argument that Mr. Kiefer's estimate of the frequency of
espionage is
correct:
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a. Is it not likely that if you give polygraphs
to 10,000 people in order to
catch the
three spies, you will get hundreds of false positive responses?
b. Assuming that the three spies all fail their
polygraph tests, they would be
only three out
of perhaps hundreds of employees who failed the test. How are
investigators
going to be able to find the three real spies and not unfairly
cast suspicion
on all of the innocent employees who have false positive results?
Attorney General John Ashcroft recently admitted that there
exists a 15% false-positive rate. “Spy-Wary
FBI Agrees to Polygraphs”, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 2, 2001. Based on
this figure, up to 1,500 individuals will be falsely accused of espionage. Even
applying the most conservative false-positive figures, say 1%, then 100
individuals will be stigmatized in order to catch three spies. This
hypothetical scenario became a reality at the Central Intelligence Agency
following the arrest of Aldrich Ames in 1994. Approximately 300 employees had
their careers put on hold, some for as long as six years, until they were
finally exonerated of any wrongdoing. Some have likely never recovered from the
experiences, nor will they.
Given existing policies at
the federal agencies, it is virtually impossible to ensure that unfair
suspicion will not be conferred on individual employees during a witch hunt for
a spy. This is the essence of the public policy balance that this Committee
must address. Is it fair and appropriate to knowingly ruin innocent careers
while on a fishing expedition for a spy who likely will never be exposed by the
polygraph? In my opinion, it is not.
4. Do you believe it is appropriate to exclude
someone from government
employment,
without any independent corroborating evidence of deception or other
information
indicating that the applicant is unqualified for the position,
solely because
that person failed a polygraph? If not,
what specific steps
should be
taken to insure that this does not occur?
Obviously, I do not. Indeed, this is the very issue that is
being litigated in Croddy et al. v. FBI et al., Civil Action No. 00-0651
(Mar. 15, 2000 D.D.C.)(EGS) and John Doe #6 et al. v. FBI et al., Civil
Action No. 00-2440 (Oct. 11, 2000 D.D.C.)(EGS). Federal agencies routinely
rescind conditional job offers based solely on polygraph results. I would
respectfully refer you to the pleadings in these two cases for further
discussion of the relevant legal analysis. Copies can be found at the following
websites: www.nopolygraph.com, www.stopolygraph.com and www.antipolygraph.org. Based on my
experiences, I would recommend that either screening eligibility tests are
eliminated or that a requirement be imposed that a background investigation
must first be conducted to collaborate any polygraph results before the
information can be considered in the employment decision.
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9. How do you insure that routine polygraph
tests do not probe into purely
private
matters? Are there any questions that
are off limits? What safeguards
exist to
prevent the release of private information?
Although the American Polygraph Association, the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act and many state licensing laws prohibit inquiry into
such areas as religious beliefs or affiliations, beliefs or opinions regarding
racial matters, political beliefs or affiliations, beliefs, affiliations or
lawful activities regarding unions or labor organizations and sexual
preferences or activities, there are few prohibitions imposed upon the federal
government. For example, the United States Secret Service routinely questions
applicants on sexual behavior, both lawful (premarital sex) and unlawful
(sexual involvement with animals).
The only means by which to ensure certain areas of inquiry are
forbidden is to require the federal government to comply with the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act. While some exceptions may be necessary, no agency should be
permitted to question individuals on topics that do not reasonably relate to
the skills needed to adequately perform the position in question.
With respect to the release of private information, there are
essentially no existing safeguards. The extent to which a federal agency can
disseminate polygraph results to other federal, state or local agencies is
governed by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a et seq. The
sharing of information is explicitly permitted under the Act’s routine use
exception. Id. at § 552a(b)(3).
For example, the FBI maintains a system of records -
JUSTICE/FBI-002 - within its Central Records System that pertains to
applicants for employment with the FBI. The system includes all records and
information relevant to an applicant’s investigation, personnel inquiry, or
other personnel matters. The FBI may disclose all personal information and
records - even if inaccurate - from this system as a routine use to any federal
agency where the purpose in making the disclosure is compatible with the law
enforcement purpose for which it was collected, e.g., to assist the recipient
agency in conducting a lawful criminal or intelligence investigation, to assist
the recipient agency in making a determination concerning an individual's
suitability for employment and/or trustworthiness for employment and/or
trustworthiness for access clearance purposes, or to assist the recipient
agency in the performance of any authorized function where access to records in
this system is declared by the recipient agency to be relevant to that
function.
As a result of this ability to freely share information,
individuals who falsely registered deceptive on one agency’s polygraph
examination may have that information used against them by another agency,
without ever being given an opportunity to challenge the underlying allegation
of deception. Unfortunately, the enactment of additional legislation will be
required to minimize the extent to which a federal agency
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can disseminate information
pertaining to polygraph examinations. Current law is clearly inadequate.
Questions Submitted by
Senator Grassley
1. Let’s say that an employee
polygraph exam ends with a deceptive result but with no admission of guilt. How
do agencies deal with this situation? How about with an inconclusive result?
Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide a precise answer to
this question as procedures differ from agency to agency. Typically, however,
should either of the situations occur above, the agency will initiate further
investigation into the individual’s background and activities. Oftentimes, the
employee may be transferred to a non-sensitive or less sensitive position and
may even have promotions withheld. On paper, the employee may very well not
suffer an adverse personnel action. By this I mean, they will continue to hold
employment and remain at the same pay grade.
The most recent example describing this
type of circumstance is that of the FBI. By Memorandum dated March 16, 2001,
the FBI announced it would institute counterintelligence-focused polygraph
examinations to employees who occupy certain assignments or occupations. With
respect to those employees who experience trouble with the polygraph, the
Memorandum noted:
Experience
has shown that most FBI employees taking the counterintelligence-focused
polygraph examination successfully complete the test. However, there may be a
very small number of employees whose tests are either inconclusive or are
indicative of deception. Polygraph examiners will attempt to fully resolve all
unexplained responses through the effective use of thorough pre-and post-test
interviews. If, upon completion of a thorough examination, there is still an inconclusive
or deceptive response, it will be considered “unexplained”. Consistent with
existing policy, no adverse action will be taken based upon the polygraph
results alone. However, more extensive investigation will be initiated to
resolve the unexplained test results.
However, realistically, an employee in this situation will
unequivocally suffer the equivalent of an adverse personnel decision. Some
agencies, such as the CIA and FBI, have taken years to finally resolve a
false-positive or inconclusive polygraph result. Some employees may be
suspended with pay, which is not always considered an “adverse action”.
Employees at the CIA who found themselves in such a position were not permitted
to attain overseas assignments. This is often the end of a career for
individuals
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employed within the
Directorate of Operations. Scientists under contract at the Department of
Energy who experience polygraph problems will find themselves transferred to
other positions, which often would negatively impact upon their careers. In my
written testimony, I described the situation of FBI Special Agent Mark Mallah.
In his case, it took approximately two years of intensive and intrusive
investigation before he was finally exonerated. He was so disgusted by how he
was treated, he resigned in protest. Unfortunately, Special Agent Mallah’s
reaction is not unusual, and the U.S. government has lost many fine employees
strictly because of false polygraph results.
3. Will there be adverse
consequences for employees who refuse to take a polygraph examination?
Again, this can differ from agency to agency. However, most
agencies will react in a similar manner. For example, the FBI Memorandum
referred to above states that those employees who refuse to take the
test will be subjected to administrative actions which may include transfer, a
finding of insubordination and disciplinary action or a reevaluation of the
employee’s security clearance.
5. FBI
regulations prohibit the use of the polygraph as a “substitute for logical
investigation by conventional means” (FBI Poly. Reg: 13-22.299(2)). Does this
mean that, if all other factors are in order, the failure of a polygraph
examination in the context of a national security update will not necessarily
result in an adverse action?
Again, by viewing this question solely by the legal definition
of “adverse action” (such as those actions that can be appealed to the Merit
Systems Protection Board,
5 U.S.C. § 1201.3), the
conclusion would be accurate. However, as I described above, reality dictates
otherwise. For all intents and purposes, the employee does suffer “adverse
consequences”, though it might not legally be in the form of an “adverse action”.
This question, however, does raise a larger issue. If such a
prohibition exists with respect to employees, why should applicants receive any
less consideration? How “logical” is that? There is no question that FBI
applicants who have received a conditional offer of employment, but who then
fail their polygraph examination (or register inconclusive) are not afforded
the opportunity of a background investigation. Their job offer is immediately
rescinded. More than that, the polygraph result is maintained in that
individual’s personnel file, and will be freely disseminated as permitted by
law. One polygraph examination may stigmatize an individual throughout the
federal government thereby precluding their future employment and contribution
to the United States.
There is something inherently wrong and unfair with the current
federal polygraph policies that are implemented throughout the different law
enforcement and intelligence
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agencies of our government.
Without intervention by this Committee, there is little chance these policies
will ever change.
I trust this additional information proves to be useful. I
would be happy to elaborate further upon any question, or respond to additional
inquiries.
Sincerely,
Mark S. Zaid
cc: Senator Patrick Leahy
Ranking Minority
Member
Senator Charles Grassley
Senator Arlen Specter
Senator Richard Durbin
[1]The agencies have since been identified as the Army INSCOM, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency.