Certainly, polygraphers may observe behaviors that may lead them to suspect countermeasures. But this is not evidence, let alone proof, that they can actually detect the kinds of countermeasures described in TLBTLD at better-than-chance levels.

With regard to the Silent Answer Test described by Matte, recall that it is suggested for "eliminating causes of distortions from the examinee who prepares himself or herself to answer each question aloud by inhaling a great amount of air; from the examinee who loudly bellows his or her answer to emphasize his or her denial; from the examinee who feels compelled to give an elaborate answer instead of a simple "yes" or "no" as instructed; and from the examinee whose throat is dry or irritated necessitating the clearing of his or her throat or coughing at intervals during the test. "

Note that none of the foregoing behaviors are consistent with the countermeasures described in TLBTLD.

learning how the test works, and learning how to beat it go hand in hand. if you know all the little secrets to the test, in my opinion and im sure george will confirm or deny, you will have no chance to pass the test because you wont worry about the questions you should (control) because you've learn of certain irrelevences to questions. either go in blind, or with full vision. not partial

gijoeyl33 wrote on Apr 10^th, 2004 at 7:25pm:


gijoey,

There is no peer-reviewed research on the effects of examinee knowledge of polygraph procedure on the accuracy of polygraph outcomes. However, the basic assumption of CQT polygraphy (that is, that  truthful subjects will be more concerned about the "control" questions while deceptive subjects will be more concerned about the relevant questions) collapses when the examinee understands the true nature of the "control" questions.

Some polygraph programs, such as the counterinteligence-scope screening programs of the Departments of Defense and Energy, as well as the FBI's screening program for current employees (as opposed to applicants) have a nearly 100% pass rate. In programs such as these, knowing the truth about the procedure may be less likely to have an effect on the outcome, since policy considerations dictate that almost everyone will "pass."

In other polygraph programs, where the failure rate is higher (for example, the FBI's pre-employment polygraph screening program, with a failure rate of about 50%), it is still hard to say what the effect of one's knowledge will be. Some people, understanding the function of the "control" questions, might involuntarily show physiological reactions to them just because they know that doing so is crucial to passing the "test." Then again, others might not react to them, based on their knowledge that the polygraph operator is not really concerned about "deception" to these questions.

Considering that CQT polygraphy has no scientific basis and polygraphers have no demonstrated ability to detect countermeasures, I do think it would be prudent for anyone facing a polygraph examination to employ countermeasures rather than leaving the results to chance.

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I think it likely that there is sufficient variance in the timing of events measured over question types in a standard polygraph exam (in the absence of properly applied countermeasures) such as to make any conclusions drawn, stemming from relative changes noted in such timing during a situation in which countermeasures might be so applied, as completely meaningless.  But the proof is in the pudding...

A patent is no indication that an invention actually works.  I don't know for sure, but I'd bet that there are patents out there on activity sensors for detecting countermeasures, too.

I would think that the idea behind the invention is either the assumption that knowing the two types of questions are different in importance will translate consistently into different time lapses between questions and answers, or that conscious concentration on countermeasures during control questions will cause the same result.  This may, of course, be the case, but I'll wait for the evidence.  After all, if such an obvious indicator were available, I would guess countermeasures would be consistently detectable by polygraph operators themselves, without the need for the electronic timing mechanism that the patent holder would doubtless be happy to sell them.  

Why buy an expensive stopwatch when you could be making money ($5000) by taking up Antipolygraph.org's countermeasure challenge?

Skeptic

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Skeptic wrote on Apr 24^th, 2004 at 8:40am:


Isn't some showing that an invention actually does that which its inventor claims required? Would Thomas Edison have been granted a patent for his electric lamp (U.S. Patent Number 223,898) if it did not yield electromagnetic radiation within the visible spectrum?

I searched the U.S. Patent Office website, but was unable to find any patents or applications for patents for the activity sensors (seat pads) that are currently being marketed as countermeasure detection devices. I did, however, find some patents by such polygraph pioneers as Leonarde Keeler, C.D. Lee, and John Reid. While I have not yet thoroughly reviewed these patents, the inventors do not at first sight appear to make the claim that their inventions actually detect deception. They instead describe them as physiological recording instruments. These patents will eventually be made available on AntiPolygraph.org.

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I am aware of no studies (published or unpublished) of Mr. Cohen's technique. Surprisingly (to me, at least) a Google search for "Emmanuel Cohen" and "polygraph" yielded no matches.

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Indeed!

Here is another counter-countermeasure technique that may be in use within the federal polygraph community with subjects who deny having researched polygraphy and who produce "passing" charts.

After the "in-test" or chart-collection phase, the polygrapher will inform the examinee that his polygraph results are "NDI." An examinee who has not researched the polygraph should not understand that "NDI" means "No Deception Indicated" (that is, he/she has passed), and should appear confused by the examiner's statement. On the other hand, if the examinee appears relieved by the news that his charts were "NDI" it would suggest that the examinee had in fact researched polygraphy and it might be further inferred that the examinee had employed countermeasures.

Alternatively, the polygrapher might use the term "NSR," which is shorthand for "No Significant Response." Some agencies prefer to use this term in the context of screening examinations instead of "NDI."

This ruse can also be used with subjects whose charts are scored as "failing." In this case, the polygrapher may start by telling the examinee that his charts are "DI" which is shorthand for "Deception Indicated" (or possibly "SR" for "Significant Response"). Again, the subject who has not researched polygraphy should not understand the meaning of either of these terms.