In his Secrecy News newsletter & blog, Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Sciences publishes news and commentary regarding the Department of Energy’s decision, published in the Federal Register, to reduce the number of employees subjected to polygraph screening. See “Energy Department Will Significantly Reduce Polygraph Testing.”
However, while the new polygraph policy may reduce the number of employees (and contractors) subjected to polygraph screening, it is not at all clear that the new regulation will actually reduce the number of polygraph examinations administered. Faced with a reduced pool of polygraph candidates, it would not be surprising if the DOE Office of Counterintelligence were to significantly increase the number of putatively random polygraph screenings conducted in order to ensure full employment for the Department’s existing complement of polygraph operators.
In its new policy, DOE persists in the peculiar notion that because polygraph screening is unreliable, it should somehow be used to screen only those with access to the most sensitive information and material. In addition, in its justification of its new polygraph policy, DOE tellingly avoids any mention of the National Academy of Sciences‘ key conclusion that “[polygraph screening’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.” It is a national embarrassment — and sign of gross incompetence in DOE management — that a department responsible for such weighty scientific matters as atomic weapons design continues to rely on such pseudoscientific quackery as polygraphy.